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security for the world’s oil supply. They ignore the reality that the United States, still the most powerful state in the system by a wide margin, has been in decline on its cycle of relative power since 1970. Their contention is that the United States and other unmentioned “core states” first and foremost are attempting to defend the capitalist order.

In the final chapter, the authors clarify their concern that the United States and its allies are not sufficiently attentive to democracy. Yet the active role that these states have played regarding the Arab Spring surely belies the plausibility of this concern. How could the United States, Britain, and France, for example, have made their actions as well as their words any plainer to the demagogues and dictators that have run these Moslem countries for so long?

The book is nicely crafted. Its argument is consistently framed by the Wallersteinian perspective that the world is divided into sectors, the core states and the periphery, and that the liberal, capitalist order is oppressive to the developing world. Yet surely China, India, and Brazil, for example, have benefited extraordinarily from their interdependence with the rich countries. Moreover, international politics is now so multifaceted and subject to the complex forces of political equilibrium that any simple dichotomy between “hegemon” and “challenger,” or between hegemon and periphery, could only awkwardly fit the international system and then with huge distortion.

Any book written from such a strong ideological bent may transmit a sense of certainty and conviction for those who share the ideology, but for others many questions will arise. Washington and New York, after all, were attacked in an unprecedented way. The United States may have overreacted and even misconstrued the nature of the threat, but American “imperial” reach did not instigate the challenge on 9/11 in any immediate or direct way. Governments like those of Russia and China did not oppose US actions in Afghanistan, for instance, because they were fearful of Islamist extremism in their own populations. The United States pulled the Russian and Chinese “chestnuts out of the fire,” so to speak.

Alternative interpretations of the events leading to the Iraq intervention call into question the simple imperial explanation offered in this book. Fear of the spread of weapons of mass destruction, neoconservative anxiety about the security of Israel, concern that another oil supply interruption would occur, this time triggering a much larger war—none of these alternative explanations is anywhere examined extensively by the authors.

Likewise ignored is the diversity of political administrations in the United States: The Obama administration is not the George W. Bush administration. When political scientists Kenneth N. Waltz, John J. Mearsheimer, and Stephen Walt joined the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy in 2003, they were worried about a tendency for the first Bush administration to become imperialistic. By the second administration it had surely shed these impulses.

Barack Obama eliminated any remnants in policy and rhetoric. If the United States was motivated preponderantly by an imperial impulse, then the contracts awarded to oil companies in Iraq at the end of the war suggest how disappointed the proponents of empire must be. The first and richest contracts went to the Iraqi national oil company and a national oil company from China, not to Exxon-Mobil or Chevron.

Global Energy Security and American Hegemony is smoothly written, well organized, and essentially correct that the security of the oil supply is central to American interests (and to the interest of virtually every other country in the system). Likewise, the American concern, shared with its allies first and foremost, that the liberal trade order be preserved, that democracy prevail wherever its roots prosper, and that major war be avoided are objectives for which no scholar or policymaker must apologize. Indeed, the authors, notwithstanding the ideological position that shapes their analysis, would be hard put to dispute the validity of these concerns broadly shared with other nations about energy security, the liberal trade order, emergent democracy, and war over the oil fields that could get out of hand—very human principles indeed.


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Since the 1990s, scholars have paid increasing attention to the importance of territorial conflict as a predictor of war. More accurately, territorial disputes and disagreements are likely the key factor that explains both war and peace. There are currently 71 ongoing territorial disputes, and many of them seem to defy settlement. Enduring Territorial Disputes makes an important contribution to this literature since it is one of the few books to cover the settlement of territorial disputes exclusively.

The strength of this work is its comprehensive nature, accessibility for students, and theoretical breakthrough in focusing on issue linkages. Krista Wiegand provides detailed case studies of the major ongoing territorial disputes and also surveys all territorial settlements. This work is impressive in that it is a suitable introduction to the field of territorial conflict management. The case studies provide a comprehensive overview of the major enduring conflicts and are excellent examples of structured and focused qualitative investigations.

In regards to theory, Wiegand makes a conceptual breakthrough by proposing an issue-linkage theory that might explain why some disputes defy territorial settlement. In short, some states will allow ongoing disputes to endure and never seriously attempt settlement in an effort to use
them as leverage in other disputes. It is in the interest of the state to let the dispute fester and endure even, when valid settlement opportunities are presented. Each case study Wiegand examined makes extensive use of this theory and applies evidence that this perspective can explain why some territorial disputes endure and are never really part of the bargaining process.

To challenge the issue-linkage theory, the author presents a theory of territorial value and one of domestic accountability. The value-of-territory theory holds that either the symbolic or tangible elements of the territorial disputes will explain which disputes are settled and which endure. Territories with strategic or economic value might defy settlement since the issues are so important to the reputation of the state. The domestic-accountability theory maintains that leaders use territorial disputes to mobilize the public and that these disputes could then be costly to settle since the leader has raised the stakes. Neither theory gains much support in this work.

The only factor that seems to have been left out to account for the settlement of territorial disputes is the power of international institutions to push for settlement. However, this perspective might not have provided much additional content since institutions seem ineffective overall in motivating states to agree to settlements unless the initiative is with the state. Wiegand makes it clear that for a state to accept settlement, it often has to be willing to settle the issue without outside intervention. Forced settlement, even if forced by the opposing side through maximum military force, tends not to terminate the dispute inasmuch as these issues could reignite at a later time as the state recovers from being forced to accept a position.

One flaw of the book is that theories centering on territorial value and domestic accountability are presented as alternatives to the issue-linkage theory. Likely, as with most social theories, the issue-linkage theory works hand in hand with other perspectives. Some disputes might endure because of the economic value of the territory and also because the issue is linked to other issues, like the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute among China, Taiwan, and Japan. In such a three-headed theoretical test, some of important findings related to the value of the territory and the domestic audience costs might be lost. Another flaw is the lack of attention paid by the author to ethnic territorial questions that might prevent settlement; questions of ethnic kin might make territorial settlements even more difficult to attain.

An advantage of this study is its ability to connect territoriality to nonstate-actor groups, such as Hezbollah in the Shebaa Farms dispute, a link missed by many scholars. This factor will become more important as time goes on, and the Israel-Syria-Lebanon chapter is an important contribution for this reason.

Unfortunately, this study is lacking a statistical analysis of the data provided in Chapter 4. Although there may not be a sufficient number of cases to undertake a normal statistical investigation, there was likely enough data to use some sort of method to give us confidence that the results and case studies presented here are not random, as well as to pinpoint the magnitude of the effect of issue linkages in making territorial disputes endure. It is useful that the author does list all of the ongoing territorial disputes and codes them according to type: uninhabited island disputes, border disputes, and disputes over inhabited tracts of land. It is to be hoped that others who follow this researcher can provide added empirical evidence that the issue-linkage theory is correct.

Overall, Enduring Territorial Disputes is a strong piece of scholarship that advances knowledge in the field. One reason disputes endure (likely all disputes, not just territorial ones) is that they become linked to other ongoing issues and provide leverage for the states involved. The issue-based approach to world politics is clearly gaining in prominence, and it is hoped that other scholars will undertake research of the issues at stake for conflict. It is also hoped that other scholars will examine how certain issues are linked together. Sometimes issues cannot be delinked and must be approached from a holistic point of view. It is these disputes that tend to defy settlement and become major obstacles to peace in the international system.


—Stephen E. Gent, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Understanding why the European major powers found themselves embroiled in “The War to End all Wars” in the late summer of 1914 has been an ambition of political scientists and historians for almost a century. Given all this attention, just about every possible logical explanation for its onset has been proposed at one point or another. In his well-researched recent book, Frank C. Zagare does not aim to bring additional explanations to the table. Instead, he uses an existing, formal, theoretic framework to identify a logically consistent and plausible explanation for the outbreak of World War I.

Zagare’s framework for analyzing the July Crisis is perfect deterrence theory, which he developed with D. Marc Kilgour in a series of articles and a previous book (Perfect Deterrence, 2000). Perfect deterrence theory is a set of related game-theoretic models in which actors have incomplete information about each other’s credibility. In many ways, the current book can largely be seen as an exploration of the empirical validity of the theory. To do this, Zagare pursues a methodological approach similar to the analytic narratives used by Robert Bates and his coauthors (Analytic Narratives, 1998), in which the insights from a