Constitutional pluralism and the question of the European common good

Goldoni, M. (2012) Constitutional pluralism and the question of the European common good. European Law Journal, 18(3), pp. 385-406. (doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0386.2012.00605.x)

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Publisher's URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0386.2012.00605.x

Abstract

Constitutional pluralism seems to be one of the most inspiring theories of European constitutionalism. It can account for the multilayered institutional framework of the Union. Therefore, it is a natural candidate for explaining how to track the European public interest. Pluralism may serve as the best methodology for keeping into account and for respecting the multiple perspectives on the common good represented by every institutional layer of the Union. After having examined the theories of two of the most influential authors of constitutional pluralism, Mattias Kumm and Miguel Maduro, this essay tries to show how pluralism might improve its highly potential explanatory and normative force, that is, by including in the institutional picture not only courts but also political institutions. In this way, the constitutional dialogue between the European and the national layers would be enriched, and every European and national voice might have a say in the interactions between institutions, securing a fairer way of tracking the European common good.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Goldoni, Dr Marco
Authors: Goldoni, M.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > School of Law
Journal Name:European Law Journal
ISSN:1351-5993
ISSN (Online):1468-0386
Published Online:12 April 2012

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