Lombardi, M. and Yoshihara, N. (2013) A full characterization of nash implementation with strategy space reduction. Economic Theory, 54(1), pp. 131-151. (doi: 10.1007/s00199-012-0714-2)
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Publisher's URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-012-0714-2
Abstract
The paper fully characterizes the class of Nash implementable social choice correspondences (SCCs) by mechanisms endowed with Saijo’s message space specification—s-mechanisms. This class of SCCs is equivalent to the class of Nash implementable SCCs, though any game form involving ‘one less’ preference announcements breaks this equivalence relationship down.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Lombardi, Dr Michele |
| Authors: | Lombardi, M., and Yoshihara, N. |
| College/School: | College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics |
| Journal Name: | Economic Theory |
| Publisher: | Springer |
| ISSN: | 0938-2259 |
| ISSN (Online): | 1432-0479 |
| Published Online: | 11 August 2012 |
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