A full characterization of nash implementation with strategy space reduction

Lombardi, M. and Yoshihara, N. (2013) A full characterization of nash implementation with strategy space reduction. Economic Theory, 54(1), pp. 131-151. (doi:10.1007/s00199-012-0714-2)

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Publisher's URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-012-0714-2

Abstract

The paper fully characterizes the class of Nash implementable social choice correspondences (SCCs) by mechanisms endowed with Saijo’s message space specification—s-mechanisms. This class of SCCs is equivalent to the class of Nash implementable SCCs, though any game form involving ‘one less’ preference announcements breaks this equivalence relationship down.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Lombardi, Dr Michele
Authors: Lombardi, M., and Yoshihara, N.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Economic Theory
Publisher:Springer
ISSN:0938-2259
ISSN (Online):1432-0479
Published Online:11 August 2012

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