The liar, the strengthened liar, and bivalence

Rieger, A. (2001) The liar, the strengthened liar, and bivalence. Erkenntnis, 54(2), pp. 195-203. (doi: 10.1023/A:1005600831298)

Abstract

A view often expressed is that to classify the liar sentence as neither true nor false is satisfactory for the simple liar but not for the strengthened liar. I argue that in fact it is equally unsatisfactory for both liars. I go on to discuss whether, nevertheless, Kripke's theory of truth represents an advance on that of Tarski.

• Item Type: Articles
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Rieger, Dr Adam
• Authors: Rieger, A.
• Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BC Logic
• College/School: College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
• Journal Name: Erkenntnis
• ISSN: 0165-0106
• ISSN (Online): 1572-8420