Caesar from Frege's perspective

Kemp, G. (2005) Caesar from Frege's perspective. Dialectica, 59(2), pp. 179-199. (doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.2005.01026.x)

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Abstract

I attempt to explain Frege's handling of the Julius Caesar issue in terms of his more general philosophical commitments. These only became fully explicit in his middle-period writings, but his earlier moves are best explained, I suggest, if we suppose them to be implicit in his earlier thinking. These commitments conditionally justify Frege in rejecting Hume's Principle as either a definition or axiom but in accepting Axiom V. However, the general epistemological picture they constitute has serious problems in accounting for how knowledge is possible at all of such propositions as that Julius Caesar is not a number.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Kemp, Dr Gary
Authors: Kemp, G.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BD Speculative Philosophy
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Dialectica
ISSN:0012-2017
ISSN (Online):1746-8361
Published Online:27 July 2005

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