Response to Hoeltje: Davidson vindicated?

Edwards, J.S. (2007) Response to Hoeltje: Davidson vindicated? Mind, 116(461), pp. 131-141. (doi: 10.1093/mind/fzm131)

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Publisher's URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzm131

Abstract

In response to Hoeltje I concede the main point of his first section: for each logical truth S of the object language, it is a logical consequence of the Davidsonian theory of meaning I offered in my paper that S is logically true, contrary to what I asserted in the paper. However, I now argue that a Davidsonian theory of meaning may be formulated equally well in such a way that it not a logical consequence of the theory that S is a logical truth. Nonetheless, the revised theory of meaning will still ‘entail’ in a wider sense that S is a logical truth, for we can prove by induction on the consequence class of the revised theory that S is a logical truth. So far, my disagreement with Hoeltje is over the more charitable interpretation of a passage from Davidson. I close by arguing that Davidson was mistaken on one point, a theory of meaning will entail a threefold distinction among the sentences of the object language, not a twofold distinction as he claimed.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Edwards, Dr James
Authors: Edwards, J.S.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BC Logic
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Mind
ISSN:1460-2113

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