Lombardi, M. and Mariotti, M. (2009) Uncovered bargaining solutions. International Journal of Game Theory, 38(4), pp. 601-610. (doi: 10.1007/s00182-009-0172-7)
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Abstract
An uncovered bargaining solution is a bargaining solution for which there exists a complete and asymmetric relation (tournament) such that, for each feasible set, the bargaining solution set coincides with the uncovered set of the tournament. We provide a characterization of a class of uncovered bargaining solutions.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Lombardi, Dr Michele |
| Authors: | Lombardi, M., and Mariotti, M. |
| College/School: | College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics |
| Journal Name: | International Journal of Game Theory |
| ISSN: | 0020-7276 |
| Published Online: | 06 August 2009 |
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