Uncovered bargaining solutions

Lombardi, M. and Mariotti, M. (2009) Uncovered bargaining solutions. International Journal of Game Theory, 38(4), pp. 601-610. (doi:10.1007/s00182-009-0172-7)

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Abstract

An uncovered bargaining solution is a bargaining solution for which there exists a complete and asymmetric relation (tournament) such that, for each feasible set, the bargaining solution set coincides with the uncovered set of the tournament. We provide a characterization of a class of uncovered bargaining solutions.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Lombardi, Dr Michele
Authors: Lombardi, M., and Mariotti, M.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:International Journal of Game Theory
ISSN:0020-7276
Published Online:06 August 2009

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