Lombardi, M. (2009) Minimal covering set solutions. Social Choice and Welfare, 32(4), pp. 687-695. (doi: 10.1007/s00355-008-0361-5)
Full text not currently available from Enlighten.
Abstract
We study necessary and sufficient conditions for a multi-valued solution S to be rationalized in the following sense: there exists a complete asymmetric relation T (a tournament) such that, for each feasible (finite) set, the solution set of S coincides with the minimal covering set of T restricted to that feasible set. Our characterization result relies only on properties relating S across feasible choice sets.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Lombardi, Dr Michele |
| Authors: | Lombardi, M. |
| College/School: | College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics |
| Journal Name: | Social Choice and Welfare |
| ISSN: | 0176-1714 |
| Published Online: | 20 December 2008 |
University Staff: Request a correction | Enlighten Editors: Update this record
Deposit and Record Details
Deposit and Record Details