Lombardi, M. (2012) Nash implementation via simple stochastic mechanisms: strategy space reduction. Review of Economic Design, 16(4), pp. 297-309. (doi: 10.1007/s10058-012-0117-7)
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Abstract
Benoît and Ok (Games Econ Behav 64:51–67, 2008) show that in a society with at least three agents any weakly unanimous social choice correspondence (SCC) is Maskin’s monotonic if and only if it is Nash-implementable via a simple stochastic mechanism (Benoît-Ok’s Theorem). This paper fully identifies the class of weakly unanimous SCCs that are Nash-implementable via a simple stochastic mechanism endowed with Saijo’s message space specification (Saijo in Econometrica 56:693–700, 1988). It is shown that this class of SCCs is equivalent to the class of SCCs that are Nash-implementable via Benoît-Ok’s Theorem.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Lombardi, Dr Michele |
| Authors: | Lombardi, M. |
| College/School: | College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics |
| Journal Name: | Review of Economic Design |
| ISSN: | 1434-4742 |
| ISSN (Online): | 1434-4750 |
| Published Online: | 30 March 2012 |
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