Nash implementation via simple stochastic mechanisms: strategy space reduction

Lombardi, M. (2012) Nash implementation via simple stochastic mechanisms: strategy space reduction. Review of Economic Design, 16(4), pp. 297-309. (doi:10.1007/s10058-012-0117-7)

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Abstract

Benoît and Ok (Games Econ Behav 64:51–67, 2008) show that in a society with at least three agents any weakly unanimous social choice correspondence (SCC) is Maskin’s monotonic if and only if it is Nash-implementable via a simple stochastic mechanism (Benoît-Ok’s Theorem). This paper fully identifies the class of weakly unanimous SCCs that are Nash-implementable via a simple stochastic mechanism endowed with Saijo’s message space specification (Saijo in Econometrica 56:693–700, 1988). It is shown that this class of SCCs is equivalent to the class of SCCs that are Nash-implementable via Benoît-Ok’s Theorem.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Lombardi, Dr Michele
Authors: Lombardi, M.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Review of Economic Design
ISSN:1434-4742
ISSN (Online):1434-4750
Published Online:30 March 2012

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