Hayashi, T. and Sakai, T. (2009) Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market. International Journal of Game Theory, 38(4), pp. 453-467. (doi: 10.1007/s00182-009-0163-8)
Full text not currently available from Enlighten.
Abstract
This paper studies Nash implementation in the job-matching market where each worker works for only one firm and a firm hires as many workers as it wishes. We show that the competitive equilibrium correspondence (CEC) is the smallest Nash implementable correspondence satisfying individual rationality and Pareto indifference. Furthermore, the CEC is the minimal monotonic extension of the worker-optimal and firm-optimal subcorrespondences. We offer two “good” mechanisms that implement this correspondence in Nash equilibrium.
Item Type: | Articles |
---|---|
Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Hayashi, Professor Takashi |
Authors: | Hayashi, T., and Sakai, T. |
College/School: | College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics |
Journal Name: | International Journal of Game Theory |
ISSN: | 0020-7276 |
Published Online: | 30 June 2009 |
University Staff: Request a correction | Enlighten Editors: Update this record