Strategic debt in vertical relations: evidence from franchising

de Jong, A., Jiang, T. and Verwijmeren, P. (2011) Strategic debt in vertical relations: evidence from franchising. Journal of Retailing, 87(3), pp. 381-392. (doi: 10.1016/j.jretai.2010.12.002)

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Publisher's URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jretai.2010.12.002

Abstract

In this paper, we examine the strategic use of debt in franchise organizations. We focus on both the franchisee's and the franchisor's capital structures. The primary goal of this study is to examine whether franchisors impose limits on franchisees’ debt levels to be able to increase their own leverage. We find that the franchisor's leverage is significantly related to the maximum leverage allowed for the franchisee. As the franchisor sets an upper limit on the franchisee's debt ratio, the franchisor can raise more debt and therefore seizes tax benefits, since interest payments are tax deductible. We find that this effect is stronger in chains with larger fractions of franchised outlet

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Verwijmeren, Professor Patrick
Authors: de Jong, A., Jiang, T., and Verwijmeren, P.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Accounting and Finance
Journal Name:Journal of Retailing
ISSN (Online):0022-4359
Published Online:26 January 2011

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