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Publisher's URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0261-3794(99)00031-1
High levels of split ticket voting in elections usually indicate either an instrumental electorate, or widespread disaffection from the major parties. Elections to the Russian lower house, the Duma, permit voters both party list options and single-member ballots; as a result, the 1993 and 1995 Duma elections recorded some of the highest levels of split ticket voting ever recorded. Using national survey data collected just after the 1995 Duma election, we test two major explanations for split ticket voting, one based on the activities of voters, the other on the strategic behaviour of parties. The results show that split ticket voting is caused by voters, and more specifically, by their weak attachments to parties. But party strategy also plays a modest role in promoting the phenomenon. In the absence of major reform of the Russian electoral system, split ticket voting is likely to remain at high levels.
|Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:||White, Professor Stephen|
|Authors:||McAllister, I., and White, S.L.|
|College/School:||College of Social Sciences > School of Social and Political Sciences > Politics|
|Journal Name:||Electoral Studies|