Transmission failure explained

Smith, M.J. (2009) Transmission failure explained. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 79(1), pp. 164-189. (doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00270.x)

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Abstract

In this paper I draw attention to a peculiar epistemic feature exhibited by certain deductively valid inferences. Certain deductively valid inferences are unable to enhance the reliability of one's belief that the conclusion is true—in a sense that will be fully explained. As I shall show, this feature is demonstrably present in certain philosophically significant inferences—such as GE Moore's notorious 'proof' of the existence of the external world. I suggest that this peculiar epistemic feature might be correlated with the much discussed phenomenon that Crispin Wright and Martin Davies have called 'transmission failure'—the apparent failure, on the part of some deductively valid inferences to transmit one's justification for believing the premises.

Item Type:Articles
Additional Information:The definitive version is available at www3.interscience.wiley.com
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Smith, Dr Martin
Authors: Smith, M.J.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
ISSN:0031-8205
ISSN (Online):1933-1592
Published Online:23 June 2009
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2009 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC
First Published:First published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79(1)164-189
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher

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