Smith, M.J. (2009) Transmission failure explained. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 79(1), pp. 164-189. (doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00270.x)
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Abstract
In this paper I draw attention to a peculiar epistemic feature exhibited by certain deductively valid inferences. Certain deductively valid inferences are unable to enhance the reliability of one's belief that the conclusion is true—in a sense that will be fully explained. As I shall show, this feature is demonstrably present in certain philosophically significant inferences—such as GE Moore's notorious 'proof' of the existence of the external world. I suggest that this peculiar epistemic feature might be correlated with the much discussed phenomenon that Crispin Wright and Martin Davies have called 'transmission failure'—the apparent failure, on the part of some deductively valid inferences to transmit one's justification for believing the premises.
Item Type: | Articles |
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Additional Information: | The definitive version is available at www3.interscience.wiley.com |
Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Smith, Dr Martin |
Authors: | Smith, M.J. |
Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
Journal Name: | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |
ISSN: | 0031-8205 |
ISSN (Online): | 1933-1592 |
Published Online: | 23 June 2009 |
Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2009 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC |
First Published: | First published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79(1)164-189 |
Publisher Policy: | Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher |
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