The imperative view of pain

Bain, D.T. (2011) The imperative view of pain. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 18(9-10), pp. 164-185.

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Abstract

Pain, crucially, is unpleasant and motivational. It can be awful; and it drives us to action, e.g. to take our weight off a sprained ankle. But what is the relationship between pain and those two features? And in virtue of what does pain have them? Addressing these questions, Colin Klein and Richard J. Hall have recently developed the idea that pains are, at least partly, experiential commands—to stop placing your weight on your ankle, for example. In this paper, I reject their accounts. Against Klein, I use dissociation cases to argue that possession of ‘imperative content’ cannot wholly constitute pain. Against them both, I further claim that possession of such content cannot constitute even pain’s unpleasant, motivational aspect. For, even if it were possible to specify the relevant imperative content—which is far from clear—the idea of a command cannot bear the explanatory weight Klein and Hall place on it.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Bain, Dr David
Authors: Bain, D.T.
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Journal of Consciousness Studies
ISSN:1355-8250
Published Online:01 January 2011

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