Introduction: varieties of disjunctivism

Macpherson, F. and Haddock, A. (2008) Introduction: varieties of disjunctivism. In: Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780199231546 (doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.003.0001)

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Publisher's URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.003.0001

Abstract

This introductory chapter argues that there are a number of different varieties of disjunctivism. But it is suggested that a mark of disjunctivism, in all of its varieties, is a refusal to credit a certain kind of significance to the fact that a pair of states can be indistinguishable from the subject's point of view. Three different varieties of disjunctivism about experience are introduced: experiential disjunctivism, according to which indistinguishable experiences can differ in intrinsic nature; epistemological disjunctivism, according to which indistinguishable experiences can differ in epistemic significance; and phenomenal disjunctivism, according to which indistinguishable experiences can differ in phenomenal character. A comparison is made with disjunctivism about bodily movement, and disjunctivism about reasons for acting. It is suggested that each variety of disjunctivism stands opposed to a Cartesian picture of the relation between the inner and the outer worlds.

Item Type:Book Sections
Keywords:perception, action, knowledge, mind, epistemology, indistinguishability, experience, phenomenal character, bodily movement, reasons
Status:Published
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Macpherson, Professor Fiona
Authors: Macpherson, F., and Haddock, A.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Publisher:Oxford University Press
ISBN:9780199231546

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