Virtue, emotion and attention

Brady, M.S. (2010) Virtue, emotion and attention. Metaphilosophy, 41(1-2), pp. 115-131. (doi:10.1111/j.1467-9973.2009.01620.x)

Brady, M.S. (2010) Virtue, emotion and attention. Metaphilosophy, 41(1-2), pp. 115-131. (doi:10.1111/j.1467-9973.2009.01620.x)

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Publisher's URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9973.2009.01620.x

Abstract

The <i>perceptual model</i> of emotions maintains that emotions involve, or are at least analogous to, perceptions of value. On this account, emotions purport to tell us about the evaluative realm, in much the same way that sensory perceptions inform us about the sensible world. An important development of this position, prominent in recent work by Peter Goldie amongst others, concerns the essential role that virtuous habits of attention play in enabling us to gain perceptual and evaluative knowledge. I think that there are good reasons to be sceptical about this picture of virtue. In this essay I set out these reasons, and explain the consequences this scepticism has for our understanding of the relation between virtue, emotion, and attention. In particular, I argue that our primary capacity for recognizing value is in fact a non-emotional capacity.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Brady, Professor Michael
Authors: Brady, M.S.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Metaphilosophy
Publisher:John Wiley & Sons
ISSN:0026-1068
ISSN (Online):1467-9973
Published Online:11 January 2010

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