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Abstract: Many countries adopted mixed-member (MM) electoral systems in the 1990s, but several switched to list proportional representation (PR) recently. Most switchers are post-communist countries that used the semi-proportional mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system, often associated with dominant parties. List PR was adopted under competitive conditions in some cases (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Ukraine), while in places where authoritarian control remains (Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan), list PR appears to be used as a means of reducing competition and undermining multiparty democracy.
Introduction

Mixed-member (MM) electoral systems, in which some representatives are elected from (usually) single-member constituencies, while others are elected from party lists on a regional or national basis, became quite popular among electoral systems designers in the 1990s. Three established democracies – New Zealand, Italy, and Japan – adopted MM systems in that decade, and several new democracies also introduced this ‘model’ of electoral reform around that time, one that gained support among political scientists, such as Matthew Shugart and Martin Wattenberg, who argue that MM systems potentially offer the ‘best of both worlds’ of nationwide party organisations and local accountability (2003: 582). Many of the new democracies introducing MM systems were making the transition from communism. A number of these post-communist countries have since abandoned MM electoral systems, however, replacing their MM systems with list proportional representation (PR).

This article argues that MM systems, often associated with dominant parties, have given way to list PR in some places (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Ukraine) where one-party dominance has been replaced by politicians’ acceptance of multiparty competition. Here, the change to a more proportional electoral system is in line with the rational expectation that parties in competitive, uncertain electoral circumstances will calculate that majoritarian elements of the electoral system could be harmful to their prospects, while PR is a safer option. In some instances, external pressures have also pushed post-communist countries seeking to promote a favourable image abroad, perhaps because they want to join international organisations, into choosing PR.

By contrast, those post-communist countries that are still authoritarian have governments less concerned about fostering a democratic image and more interested in curbing dissent – there is no consensus over the legitimacy of multiparty competition. While the expectation here would be for a continuation of the majoritarian type of MM system,
Russia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan have recently adopted list PR. Here, list PR has been used as a means of reducing multiparty competition. Therefore, while PR has been more commonly associated with democracy than majoritarian electoral systems, as the literature to follow demonstrates, the relatively recent shift from MM systems to list PR has not always occurred in democratic contexts. Russia, in particular, labelled a ‘managed democracy’ under former President Vladimir Putin (Colton and McFaul 2003), does not combine PR with enhanced democracy. This means it is very important to consider the details, and not just the broad categories, of electoral systems carefully when assessing the relationship between electoral systems, party systems, and the level of democracy in transitional countries.

The literature on electoral systems and party systems explores how these develop in tandem, with Sarah Birch and her colleagues noting that ‘electoral reform in the post-communist countries went hand-in-hand with party system development’ (2002: 182). Their research is particularly important here because so many countries abandoning MM systems are post-communist states that made the transition to democracy in the 1990s. In a later paper, Birch (2006) argues that MM systems were popular with political actors at a time of uncertainty as a good way of ‘hedging bets’ – MM electoral results will give politicians a sense of how their parties will perform in both single-member constituency and proportional elections.

Recent theoretical literature on institutional choice suggests that electoral systems are chosen mainly out of partisan self-interest: politicians make rational calculations to estimate how many seats they might win at the next election under various electoral system models (see, for example, Benoit 2004). If politicians expect to gain seats, or simply to cut expected losses, they will change the system if they can. Electoral system changes appear related to party system changes caused by new issue dimensions and the accompanying political struggles. Josep Colomer argues that this increase in the number of parties (often prompted by
social changes) causes ‘establishment’ parties to adopt PR out of the fear that new challengers could overcome them under a continuation of the existing majority or plurality electoral rules (Colomer 2005: 17-8). Colomer’s data reveal a global trend towards greater proportionality in electoral systems over the course of the twentieth century in democracies, and Jack Bielskiak has noted this trend in post-communist Eastern Europe as well (2002: 192).

The fact that many post-communist countries using MM systems have abandoned them does not mean that the MM model is inherently unstable, however. The proportional variety, described below, has seen few significant changes in operation or frequency of usage (although there are fewer of these cases to begin with), and some of the majoritarian examples, such as those used in Asia, remain in use. What seems to stand out about most MM systems is their implementation by dominant parties, as Shugart and Wattenberg noted in the conclusion to their edited volume on the MM system, which they described as ‘a product of transitions that feature a declining but still powerful ruling party, and a rising opposition’ (2003: 581). Therefore, one important factor in the abandonment of MM systems lies in the transformation of the party system from one displaying one-party dominance to one containing greater competitive diversity.

Yet in some post-communist cases, ruling politicians have not accepted multiparty competition. Because MM systems allow two routes for entry into the legislature – via large regions (sometimes the entire country) or smaller constituencies – dissenters have two strategic options. If the national legal threshold for obtaining PR seats, for example, is too high, opposition groups can target their resources in smaller constituencies, perhaps where they have concentrated support. Authoritarian governments might want to raise the threshold by making candidate nomination more difficult in constituencies, or simply abolishing the constituency route altogether.
Types of MM systems

MM electoral systems come in different types, and scholars disagree on how to classify them and distinguish them from other electoral systems (Massicotte and Blais 1999: 342). In general, to be a mixed electoral system, there must be a combination of some representatives elected in small, normally single-member, constituencies (usually on a plurality basis, but sometimes using a two-round majority runoff system), while others are elected on a proportional, usually closed party list, basis in larger multimember constituencies (sometimes even nationwide), usually covering the same territory. One of the most important distinctions to be made within the world of MM systems is between those systems that are proportional, on a partisan basis, in outcome and those that are only semi-proportional. In the former model, representatives elected on a proportional basis are added so that they compensate parties whose candidates perform poorly at the constituency level so that each party’s total outcome in seats (adding both constituency and regional/national list together) is proportional to its vote share. This model is called mixed-member proportional (MMP) by most electoral systems scholars (Shugart and Wattenberg 2003; Lijphart 1999; Reynolds et al. 2005) and its best-known example is found in Germany, where the Bundestag and most state (Land) parliaments are elected in this way. Other examples include New Zealand, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Lesotho (see Table 1), while the British devolved assemblies in Scotland, Wales, and Greater London also use MMP.

The more common model of MM system around the world, however, is not designed to give a proportional outcome to parties. These systems allow no compensation to parties on a seat basis, although a few models do transfer votes from one tier to another, resulting in some degree of compensation for parties that do poorly in single-member constituency races. Most, however, are set up so that there are two separate, parallel elections at the constituency
and regional or national levels, with no linkage between these tiers. Systems with no connection between tiers are called ‘parallel’ by Reynolds et al. (2005) while the broader term ‘mixed-member majoritarian’ (MMM) is used by Shugart and Wattenberg to describe mixed systems in which there is no compensation on a seat basis (2003: 13); the latter terminology will be used throughout this article. MM systems were adopted around the world in the 1990s by many countries, and Table 1 illustrates which are still using them.

The changes under study here have all been in countries which used to have MMM, not MMP, apart from Albania, which did change from MMP to MMM and then back to MMP before deciding in 2008 on list PR. Countries that used to have MMM and have made changes in recent years are listed in Table 2. Most have changed from MMM to list PR: Bulgaria, Croatia, East Timor, Italy, Kazakhstan, Macedonia, Russia, and Ukraine. One exception can be found in Azerbaijan, where the authoritarian government abolished the PR portion of its MM system for the 2005 parliamentary election in order ‘to weaken the opposition’, according to Leila Alieva (2006: 150). The change means that all members of parliament are now elected by the single-member plurality (SMP) method, the system colloquially referred to as ‘first-past-the-post’ in some countries. Another exception is found in Kyrgyzstan, where MMM was used in the lower house of the bicameral parliament in the election of 2001, but the new unicameral parliament introduced for the 2005 election used the two-round majority system (TRS) to elect all the representatives. Later, however, Kyrgyzstan changed to list PR for its 2007 election.

Implications of moving away from MM systems

The abandonment of MMM, a semi-proportional electoral system, in several post-communist countries should lead to an increase in proportionality in election results since list PR was almost always chosen as the replacement. Although list PR has shut out competition in a few
cases, thus generating high levels of disproportionality, there is the potential for a more consolidated nationwide party system to emerge in the future if more competitive conditions arise (Moraski 2007: 562). Most communist countries used single-member constituencies for their elections, a legacy that influenced electoral system choice during the transition away from communism (Birch et al. 2002: 4). The retention of single-member constituencies, as part of MMM, can allow a large number of independent candidates to be elected, which is harmful to the development of nationally focused parties (Moser 2001: 138). Therefore, while an entirely list PR-based system could shut out dissenters who might be elected in single-member constituencies, it also keeps out ‘local notables’ who parochialise a national parliament (although list PR can be designed to allow the election of independents with a significant share of the regional or national vote).

The choice of PR in early twentieth century Europe was a defence mechanism used by minorities against the majority, according to Stein Rokkan (1970) and, more recently, Carles Boix (1999). This explanation was expanded upon by Colomer (2005), who argued that the increase in societal divisions would lead to more parties and ultimately an irresistible pressure for PR as established parties tried to defend themselves from an increasingly unpredictable set of electoral circumstances. Colomer’s argument might apply to ex-communist countries where the overriding cleavage – communists versus democrats – was replaced by several other societal divisions once communism ended (Kitschelt 1995). The increase in parties that accompanied the rise in salience of other issue dimensions, such as ethnic ‘troubles’, would make the party system more crowded and the electoral calculus more unpredictable, perhaps leading major parties to concede PR in order to cut potential losses under a continuation of majoritarian electoral rules.

Alternatively, MMM would be useful for major parties that wanted to hedge their bets, since the results from the two different types of election would provide information about
their prospects (Birch *et al.* 2002: 19). An obvious decline in fortunes would lead weakened (but still able to govern) parties to go for full proportionality next time: ‘establishment’ parties will try to prevent electoral disaster in circumstances in which the party system is changing, confirming rational choice expectations. In such circumstances, most parties appear to have accepted the basic principle of PR, resulting in the movement towards list PR (or the retention of MMP), while the prior choice of MMM reflects the previous disagreement among parties over what the principle of representation – majoritarian or proportional – should be (Shugart 2007).

Some scholars warn against giving too much credit to simple or ‘elegant’ rational choice explanations of electoral system choice. Many factors that might not be apparent or expected can complicate the situation, even when political actors appear to be winning the electoral game, as Richard Katz has argued (2005: 63). Furthermore, André Blais and colleagues argue that PR was not chosen in most European countries in the early twentieth century simply out of the self-preservation interests of the established parties (which they think are insufficient to explain the outcome), but that the widespread ‘view that PR was the only truly “democratic” system that ensured the fair representation of various viewpoints’ also mattered (2005: 189). Birch (2006) notes that PR in ex-communist countries tends to be associated with greater levels of democracy, as measured by Freedom House ratings. She argues that in ‘moments of concentrated democracy’, coupled with uncertainty about how they will perform in elections, political actors are aware of more than just self-interest (Birch 2006). On a more global scale, André Blais and Louis Massicotte find in a large-\(n\) study of electoral systems worldwide that the more democratic countries were more likely to use proportional electoral systems (1997: 116). On the other hand, Russia’s transition to PR was not accompanied by enhanced democracy – the 2007 Freedom House classification for Russia is ‘not free’ (Freedom House 2007). The same can be said for Kazakhstan, although Freedom
House rates Kyrgyzstan as ‘partly free’ in 2007. The next section will examine the post-communist cases of abandoning MM systems.

**Cases of changing from MM systems to list PR**

The earliest case of ditching MMM in the post-communist world is seen in Bulgaria, where MMM was only used once, to be replaced by party list PR, which has been used for parliamentary elections since. The Bulgarians used MMM in 1990 to elect an interim body, the Grand National Assembly, that would draft a constitution and act as a legislature only until new elections could be held. Half of the members of the Grand National Assembly were elected from single-member constituencies on a two-round basis (where no candidate won an absolute majority of the vote there was a second round, where a plurality was sufficient for victory), while the other half came from party lists (Birch *et al.* 2002: 117). The Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), successors to the communists, won a majority of seats, but changed the electoral system for subsequent elections to list PR.

Such a change may not make sense, since the BSP did well with MMM. This question is addressed by Birch *et al.* who argue that a number of factors prompted the BSP to bow to the preferences of the opposition, the Union of Democratic Forces: during the transition to democracy, the BSP sought democratic credibility, not just an electoral system that would give it more seats (and PR had been associated with democratic interludes in Bulgaria’s past, while the two-round majority portion of the MMM system was associated with allegations of fraud); because the transition from communism also involves a transition to the market economy, the government had to enact painful economic reforms, and wanted to involve the opposition in this process ‘to share the blame’; and the Union of Democratic Forces refused to accept any single-member constituency element in the new electoral system (2002: 110-3). MMM was abolished, and the opposition won the 1991 parliamentary election held under list
PR. Arguably, the BSP could have anticipated defeat and changed to list PR to limit the scale of the opposition’s victory (Simon 1997:365).

Croatia also made the transition from MMM to list PR – several alterations in the system had been made which ‘often served to improve the chances of victory for incumbent governments’, according to a Freedom House report (Forto 2003). Freedom House claims that the former president, Franjo Tudjman, ensured that non-resident Croats, big supporters of his Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), could participate in parliamentary elections, and that Tudjman ‘gerrymandered’ boundaries in his favour (Forto 2003). The October 1999 electoral law, adopted for the 2000 election, abolished MMM and established closed list PR with ten 14-member regional constituencies, plus one non-resident ‘constituency’ electing six members in that election; parties or coalitions must achieve five per cent of the vote in a constituency in order to win seats (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2000: 4). A change to PR might have been seen by the HDZ as a way to cut its expected losses as the party’s support deteriorated around the time of its leader’s death – the 2000 election was won by the opposition. Croatia’s list PR system is still in place, despite the continuing struggle between HDZ and the Social Democrats, described as ‘polarizing’ by international election monitors (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2008a: 1).

Political struggles in Ukraine ended with the same electoral system outcome as in Croatia and Bulgaria. MMM was used in the late 1990s after a two-round majority system was abolished; PR was seen as a way to strengthen political parties, with single-member constituencies associated with party system fragmentation, as in Russia (Birch et al. 2002: 153). In addition, parliamentary fragmentation gave the president, Leonid Kuchma, an advantage in his power struggle with the Rada, Ukraine’s parliament (Birch et al. 2002: 154). The MMM system was abolished later, replaced by a party list PR system passed into law in
2004 and first used for the 2006 election (Hesli 2007: 507). The law has a three per cent threshold for parties to enter the Rada, lower than the previous four per cent threshold.

The change to a fully proportional electoral system emerged as part of a larger package of constitutional changes, which included a shift in powers from the president to the Rada. The opposition parties supported PR to eliminate perceived fraud, while those elected in single-member constituencies opposed the removal of their route into parliament (Herron 2007: 73). Around the same time, opponents of President Kuchma were trying to reduce his powers and strengthen the Rada. In the process of this struggle for power, politicians on both sides of the electoral system debate changed their positions over the course of this very fluid situation, one that lasted for several years. Erik Herron argues that they ‘acted in accordance with their preferences, but in the broader context of constitutional change rather than the narrow context of electoral rule reform’ (2007: 72).

Partisan advantage is not necessarily the only factor in the cases of electoral reform; sometimes, powerful external pressures force change. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia switched from a two-round majority system to MMM, which was used in 1998, but a fully proportional system was introduced in 2002 (Birch 2003: 44). According to Eben Friedman, the MMM law’s provisions ‘reflect the strength of the successors to the League of Communists….relative to their main opposition’ which was expected to win the next election, and unsurprisingly wanted a retention of the two-round majority system, not MMM, which would dilute the scale of its victory (2005: 386). While partisan calculations of electoral advantage might have continued, the conflict instigated by the grievances of the ethnic Albanian minority cut short the kind of power struggle seen in other post-communist countries.

Part of the peace agreement that ended hostilities in Macedonia required the adoption of a fully proportional electoral system (Friedman 2005: 387). MMM was replaced by closed
list PR with no formal threshold for parties to cross in order to gain parliamentary seats – the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights argues that the PR system ‘has the potential to help reduce inter-communal political tensions by dividing election contests among six regions, and to enhance the representation of smaller minorities and parties’ (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2002: 4). Research by Friedman (2005: 390) shows that the ethnic Albanian parties did, indeed, fare better in the 2002 PR-based election than under MMM. The Ohrid Framework Agreement, which imposed PR and decentralisation, was motivated by Macedonia’s desire to join international organisations like the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO); as Armend Reka puts it, ‘EU conditionality has become a strong democratizing force in Macedonian politics’ (2008: 67).

External pressure was also a factor in Albania’s movement to an entirely list PR-based electoral system recently. This Balkan state is also seeking closer relations with the rest of Europe, but its recent invitation to join NATO depends upon ‘additional reforms’, with the 2008 decision to reform the electoral system ‘welcomed’ by the OSCE (Associated Press 2008). One problem in particular that caught the attention of the OSCE was the fact that the previous MMP electoral system did not ensure PR, the principle of which is enshrined in the constitution: parties could ‘circumvent the aim of the electoral system and distort the allocation of supplementary mandates in their favour’ (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2005: 5). As explained by a Freedom House report, Albania’s ‘two main political parties distorted the constitutional principle of proportionality by encouraging voters to cast the proportional vote for their political allies in order to maximize the number of seats they could earn together. The outcome was a legislature that does not reflect the popular will where the smaller parties are concerned’ (Trimcev 2006). Labelled the ‘Dushk Phenomenon’, this vote-splitting practice ‘significantly weakens the “linkage”’ between the constituency and
list tiers of the MMP system, making the result look more like the product of an MMM or parallel system (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2005: 5). This abuse of MMP also occurred in Lesotho in that country’s 2007 election, where party alliances ‘undermined the purpose of MMP, which is aimed at maximising party participation in Parliament’ (United Nations Development Programme 2007).

The above post-communist examples of abandoning MM systems took place in circumstances of fierce partisan competition, with politicians ultimately settling on list PR systems. While the cases above show political actors constrained by a need to appear democratic, the Russian case is characterised by politicians with little interest in democratic appearances. In Stephen White’s opinion, Russian electoral laws have been designed by the government to enhance its control over the political process; he writes that the ‘politics of electoral design in Russia has been a game in which the Kremlin has held almost all the cards, and in which the interests of ordinary citizens have scarcely been represented’ (2005: 328). In the 1990s, Russia adopted MMM to elect its parliament, the State Duma. The system was changed to list PR in 2005, going into effect for the 2007 election. The previous MMM system was notorious for featuring far more fragmentation in the single-member constituency tier than in the party list tier (with a five per cent threshold that eliminated very small parties), an ‘unexpected outcome’ according to the received wisdom that plurality in single-member constituencies should constrain party system fragmentation (Moser 2001: 134). This fragmentation included a large number of successful independent candidates who could be considered the most successful ‘party’ in the single-member constituency races (White 2005: 323).

The party system fragmentation seen in the early years of Russia’s transition from communism, however, had become drastically reduced. By 2005, when the new electoral system was enacted into law, there were only four parties in the Duma, raising the question of
why eliminating the single-member constituencies and raising the threshold for parties to enter the Duma from five per cent of the vote to seven were necessary (Oversloot 2007: 53). News reports from this period state that President Vladimir Putin wanted to strengthen the political system after hostages were taken by Chechen rebels in 2004, and that he preferred the stability of a party system with a few large parties, rather than many small ones (Takac 2005). Critics, like White, argue instead that a Duma dominated by the larger (often pro-government) parties ‘will give the Kremlin a more coherent party system that [it] will more easily be able to manage’ (2005: 327). Struggles between president and parliament in Russia ended with the president gaining the upper hand, largely in control of the Duma – by 2005, the ‘Kremlin-controlled’ United Russia party had more than two-thirds of its seats (Takac 2005). A new electoral law apparently designed to prevent any dissenters from entering the Duma via single-member constituencies would assure this control.

Reducing (if not eliminating) dissent appeared to motivate the choice of electoral system reform in two other post-Soviet states. In Kyrgyzstan, MMM was replace by the TRS in 2005, as mentioned in the previous section, but list PR was later adopted in 2007. The closed list system required parties not only to achieve five per cent of the national vote to win seats, but also to surpass regional thresholds, which the OSCE considered ‘unusual’ and sufficient to ‘compromise the objective of proportional representation’ (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2008b: 1). The main opposition party was disqualified from winning seats on grounds of failing to surpass a regional threshold, while two other parties ‘considered sympathetic to the government’ entered parliament with the president’s party, which won by far the largest share of seats (Daniel 2007). Presidential domination of politics was also pointed out by critics in the case of Kazakhstan’s transition from MMM to closed list PR, with a seven per cent threshold, in 2007; the law also barred independent candidates and prevented deputies from leaving their parties, causing Rico Isaacs to argue that the ‘changes
provide the President with a tool for disposing [of] dissenting voices’ (2008: 382). The president’s party won all the seats up for election.

Conclusions

While it appears that MMM systems are inherently unstable (or at least a lot less stable than MMP systems), there remain a number of MMM systems in use, particularly in Asia (see Table 1). Some are used in relatively new democracies, while others exist in more established democracies, like Japan. Ben Reilly points out that Japan is not alone; there has been a trend towards the adoption of MMM in East Asia in recent years (2007: 188). What these examples, plus a few African cases, appear to have in common is the presence of a dominant party able to control (or strongly influence) the eventual outcome of electoral system choice. While Japanese MMM came about in the wake of serious problems for the long-governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the electoral system adopted in the 1990s ended up being very kind to the party, despite the hopes of some politicians and scholars, that the majoritarian MMM system would facilitate the transition to two-party alternation in power (Wada 2004).

Furthermore, the idea that MM systems offer the best of both worlds – combining the local and individual accountability of single-member constituencies with the fairness and nationwide party-building aspects of list PR – is not accepted by everyone. Giovanni Sartori once criticised those who believed the ‘best of both worlds’ could be obtained from the MM model, which he thought would result in a ‘bastard-producing hybrid’ combining the faults of plurality and PR systems (Sartori 1994: 75). According to Renske Doorenspleet, MMM systems ‘perform significantly worse than PR systems, on all indicators of democratic quality’ (2005: 42; emphasis in original). Doorenspleet finds that the democratic quality of MMP, however, is almost indistinguishable from other PR systems, leading to the conclusion that Reynolds and Reilly (1997) were correct in grouping MMP within the PR family of
electoral systems (Doorenspleet 2005: 42). Others who are careful to distinguish between MMM and MMP are Frank Thames and Martin Edwards (2006), who find significant differences in policy outcomes (in terms of government spending) when comparing MMM to MMP systems. Clearly, care should be taken in distinguishing between MMM and MMP. MMP was the favourite electoral system in a recent poll of experts (Bowler et al. 2005). Some researchers have found virtues within MMP, particularly regarding the value of competition by candidates over constituency service in Germany (Klingemann and Wessels 2003) and in Scotland and Wales (Lundberg 2007). The ‘best of both worlds’ argument of Shugart and Wattenberg (2003) might apply better to MMP than to MMM.

This article has argued that the details of electoral system change must be examined carefully when assessing the change’s democratic impact. Changes can be made relatively easily within the basic framework of the MM model – tiers can be linked or unlinked, the PR tier(s) can be increased or decreased in size without the need for re-drawing constituency boundaries, and the PR threshold for entry can be altered. Yet despite this potential for flexibility, many MM systems (particularly MMM) have been simply abandoned in recent years, usually in favour of party list PR. While this change should increase the proportionality of results, and PR is normally associated with democracy in the academic literature, there are some important exceptions to this expectation.
Acknowledgements

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Table 1 Global distribution of mixed-member systems for national legislative elections, 2008

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<tr>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Asia</th>
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<td>Guinea</td>
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Sources: Reynolds et al. 2005; Birch 2006; news updates.
Note: Lower (or only) house elections
*MMP; the rest are MMM (Shugart and Wattenberg 2003); Reynolds et al. (2005) classify Hungary as MMP

Table 2 Countries having changed from MMM systems as of 2008

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<tr>
<th>To List PR</th>
<th>To SMP</th>
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<td>Albania**</td>
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<td>Bulgaria</td>
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<td>Croatia</td>
<td>To TRS</td>
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<td>East Timor</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan (now List PR)</td>
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Note: This table uses the criteria defining MMM in Shugart and Wattenberg (2003); Reynolds and Reilly (1997: 55) classify Ecuador, Guatemala, and Niger as having MMM in 1997, with their updated book (Reynolds et al. 2005) now classifying these as List PR.
* Reynolds et al. (2005) classify Italy as MMP
**Albania has switched between MMM and MMP, most recently using the latter
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