Internal realism, religious pluralism and ontology

Harrison, V.S. (2008) Internal realism, religious pluralism and ontology. Philosophia, 36(1), pp. 97-110. (doi:10.1007/s11406-007-9089-1)

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Abstract

Internalist pluralism is an attractive and elegant theory. However, there are two apparently powerful objections to this approach that prevent its widespread adoption. According to the first objection, the resulting analysis of religious belief systems is intrinsically atheistic; while according to the second objection, the analysis is unsatisfactory because it allows religious objects simply to be defined into existence. In this article, I demonstrate that an adherent of internalist pluralism can deflect both of these objections, and in the course of so arguing, I deploy a distinction between “conceptual-scheme targetability” and “successful conceptual-scheme targeting”.

Item Type:Articles
Keywords:Philosophy of religion - Religious pluralism - Internal realism - Internalist pluralism - Hilary putnam - Conceptual schemes - Cultural diversity - Ontology
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Harrison, Dr Victoria
Authors: Harrison, V.S.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Philosophia
Publisher:Springer
ISSN:0048-3893
Published Online:03 October 2007
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2007 Springer
First Published:First published in Philosophia 36(1)
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher

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