Property dualism and the merits of solutions to the mind-body problem: a reply to Strawson

Macpherson, F. (2006) Property dualism and the merits of solutions to the mind-body problem: a reply to Strawson. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13(10-11), pp. 72-89.




This paper is divided into two main sections. The first articulates what I believe Strawson's position to be. I contrast Strawson's usage of 'physicalism' with the mainstream use. I then explain why I think that Strawson's position is one of property dualism and substance monism. In doing this, I outline his view and Locke's view on the nature of substance. I argue that they are similar in many respects and thus it is no surprise that Strawson actually holds a view on the mind much like one plausible interpretation of Locke's position. Strawson's use of terminology cloaks this fact and he does not himself explicitly recognize it in his paper. In the second section, I outline some of Strawson's assumptions that he uses in arguing for his position. I comment on the plausibility of his position concerning the relation of the mind to the body compared with mainstream physicalism and various forms of dualism. Before embarking on the two main sections, in the remainder of this introduction, I very briefly sketch Strawson's view.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Macpherson, Professor Fiona
Authors: Macpherson, F.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Journal of Consciousness Studies
Publisher:Imprint Academic
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2006 Imprint Academic
First Published:First published in Journal of Consciousness Studies 13(10-11):72-89
Publisher Policy:Reproduced with the permission of the author

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