Ambiguous figures and the content of experience

Macpherson, F. (2006) Ambiguous figures and the content of experience. Noûs, 40(1), pp. 82-117. (doi:10.1111/j.0029-4624.2006.00602.x)

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Publisher's URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0029-4624.2006.00602.x

Abstract

Representationalism is the position that the phenomenal character of an experience is either identical with, or supervenes on, the content of that experience. Many representationalists hold that the relevant content of experience is nonconceptual. I propose a counterexample to this form of representationalism that arises from the phenomenon of Gestalt switching, which occurs when viewing ambiguous figures. First, I argue that one does not need to appeal to the conceptual content of experience or to judgements to account for Gestalt switching. I then argue that experiences of certain ambiguous figures are problematic because they have different phenomenal characters but that no difference in the nonconceptual content of these experiences can be identified. I consider three solutions to this problem that have been proposed by both philosophers and psychologists and conclude that none can account for all the ambiguous figures that pose the problem. I conclude that the onus is on representationalists to specify the relevant difference in content or to abandon their position.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Macpherson, Professor Fiona
Authors: Macpherson, F.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Noûs
Publisher:Blackwell Publishing
ISSN:0029-4624
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2006 Blackwell Publishing
First Published:First published in Nous 40(1):82-117
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher

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