Belkoniene, M. (2023) Reassessing lucky understanding. Episteme, 20(2), pp. 513-527. (doi: 10.1017/epi.2022.23)
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Abstract
Knowledge is widely regarded as being incompatible with epistemic luck, but according to several philosophers, the same does not hold for understanding. This paper examines to what extent understanding is vulnerable to epistemic luck. After discussing the weaknesses of some of the cases that have been offered to support the conclusion that understanding tolerates environmental epistemic luck, I turn to a more recent one offered in favour of the opposite conclusion. I argue that this case does not manage to establish that understanding is vulnerable to environmental luck; this even if the fact that understanding comes in degrees is taken into account. Finally, I examine the vulnerability of understanding to intervening luck – the type of luck present in classical Gettier cases – and conclude that when such luck is present, one's understanding is necessarily sub-optimal; a conclusion that does not hold, according to what I argue, when it comes to environmental luck.
Item Type: | Articles |
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Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Belkoniene, Dr Miloud |
Authors: | Belkoniene, M. |
College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
Journal Name: | Episteme |
Publisher: | Cambridge University Press |
ISSN: | 1742-3600 |
ISSN (Online): | 1750-0117 |
Published Online: | 18 July 2022 |
Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2022 The Author |
First Published: | First published in Episteme 20(2): 513-527 |
Publisher Policy: | Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy |
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