Reassessing lucky understanding

Belkoniene, M. (2023) Reassessing lucky understanding. Episteme, 20(2), pp. 513-527. (doi: 10.1017/epi.2022.23)

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Abstract

Knowledge is widely regarded as being incompatible with epistemic luck, but according to several philosophers, the same does not hold for understanding. This paper examines to what extent understanding is vulnerable to epistemic luck. After discussing the weaknesses of some of the cases that have been offered to support the conclusion that understanding tolerates environmental epistemic luck, I turn to a more recent one offered in favour of the opposite conclusion. I argue that this case does not manage to establish that understanding is vulnerable to environmental luck; this even if the fact that understanding comes in degrees is taken into account. Finally, I examine the vulnerability of understanding to intervening luck – the type of luck present in classical Gettier cases – and conclude that when such luck is present, one's understanding is necessarily sub-optimal; a conclusion that does not hold, according to what I argue, when it comes to environmental luck.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Belkoniene, Dr Miloud
Authors: Belkoniene, M.
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Episteme
Publisher:Cambridge University Press
ISSN:1742-3600
ISSN (Online):1750-0117
Published Online:18 July 2022
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2022 The Author
First Published:First published in Episteme 20(2): 513-527
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

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