Equilibrium design in an n-player quadratic game

Dokka, T., Moulin, H. , Ray, I. and SenGupta, S. (2023) Equilibrium design in an n-player quadratic game. Review of Economic Design, 27(2), pp. 419-438. (doi: 10.1007/s10058-022-00299-2)

Abstract

As in public good provisions, in a public bad situation such as abatement, the non-cooperative interplay of the participants typically results in low levels of quantities (provision or abatement). In a simple class of n-person quadratic games, we show how Coarse correlated equilibria, using simple mediation devices, can significantly outperform Nash equilibrium outcomes in terms of a stated policy objective.

• Item Type: Articles
• Additional Information: Ray’s research is supported by the British Academy Small Grant on “Mediation in Environmental Games”.
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Moulin, Professor Herve
• Authors: Dokka, T., Moulin, H., Ray, I., and SenGupta, S.
• College/School: College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
• Journal Name: Review of Economic Design
• Publisher: Springer
• ISSN: 1434-4742
• ISSN (Online): 1434-4750
• Published Online: 04 April 2022
• Copyright Holders: Copyright © 2022 The Authors
• First Published: First published in Review of Economic Design 27(2): 419-438
• Publisher Policy: Reproduced under a Creative Commons License