Are there "Ratatouille" restaurants? On anticorrelation of food quality and hygiene

Yoshimoto, H. and Zapechelnyuk, A. (2021) Are there "Ratatouille" restaurants? On anticorrelation of food quality and hygiene. Technical Report. SSRN. (doi: 10.2139/ssrn.3508023).

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Abstract

We study the empirical relationship between restaurants’ effort to maintain hygiene standards and their food quality scores, as provided by both professional reviewers and consumers. We first propose a microeconomic model, in which the observed hygiene scores are Poisson-generated from the effort made by restaurants. The first-order condition of a restaurant’s profit maximization is used as a Poisson regression equation that relates the hygiene score to the food quality (and other variables). Then, using evidence from the UK high-end restaurants, we show that this relationship is negative and statistically significant. So, a higher food quality is generally associated with less effort to keep the kitchen clean. We find that 3% of Michelin starred restaurants in our dataset have poor hygiene, while the same is true for only 2% of non-Michelin starred restaurants. Our findings illuminate potential channels through which the anticorrelation between food quality and hygiene effort could be mitigated, and can be helpful for hygiene inspection design.

Item Type:Research Reports or Papers (Technical Report)
Additional Information:Financial support from the Economic and Social Research Council Grant ES/N01829X/1 is gratefully acknowledged.
Status:Published
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Yoshimoto, Dr Hisayuki
Authors: Yoshimoto, H., and Zapechelnyuk, A.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School
College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Publisher:SSRN

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Project CodeAward NoProject NamePrincipal InvestigatorFunder's NameFunder RefLead Dept
172844Theoretical Foundations and Design of Persuasion MechanismsAndriy ZapechelnyukEconomic and Social Research Council (ESRC)ES/N01829X/1BS - Economics