How to be an infallibilist

Kelp, C. , Carter, A. and Simion, M. (2022) How to be an infallibilist. Philosophical Studies, 179(8), pp. 2675-2682. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-022-01785-7)

Abstract

While fallibilism has been the dominant view in epistemology in recent times, the field has witnessed the rise of a new form of infallibilism. In a recent book, Jessica Brown has taken on the task of mounting a systematic defence of fallibilism against this new infallibilism. She argues that new infallibilism incurs several problematic commitments that fallibilism can avoid. In addition, the key data points that infallibilists have adduced in support of their view can be accommodated by fallibilism, giving fallibilism the upper hand. This paper develops a rejoinder on behalf of new infallibilism. It explores ways in which new infallibilists can avoid the problematic commitments Brown identifies and provides reason to think that some of the data points supporting new infallibilism cannot be as readily handled by fallibilism as Brown would have us think.

• Item Type: Articles
• Additional Information: The authors would like to thank the Leverhulme Trust (#RPG-2019-302), the European Research Council (#948356), and the Swiss National Science Foundation (#100012M_200737/1) for supporting this research.
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Simion, Professor Mona and Kelp, Professor Christoph and Carter, Professor J Adam
• Authors: Kelp, C., Carter, A., and Simion, M.
• Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
• College/School: College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
• Journal Name: Philosophical Studies
• Publisher: Springer
• ISSN: 0031-8116
• ISSN (Online): 1573-0883
• Published Online: 30 January 2022
• Copyright Holders: Copyright © 2022 The Authors
• First Published: First published in Philosophical Studies 179(8): 2675-2682
• Publisher Policy: Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

Project Code	Award No	Project Name	Principal Investigator	Funder's Name	Funder Ref	Lead Dept
306621		A Virtue Epistemology of Trust	Joseph Carter	Leverhulme Trust (LEVERHUL)	RPG-2019-302	Arts - Philosophy
309239		Knowledge-First Social Epistemology	Mona Simion	European Research Council (ERC)	948356	Arts - Philosophy