Does a CEO's private reputation impede corporate governance?

Yang, G., Huang, R., Shi, Y. and Jia, Z. (2021) Does a CEO's private reputation impede corporate governance? Economic Modelling, 104, 105640. (doi: 10.1016/j.econmod.2021.105640)

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Abstract

The CEO's reputation is a valuable intangible resource for a firm. This study investigates the effect of a CEO's reputation on corporate governance efficiency. Using a sample of 3504 Chinese listed companies from 2002 to 2018, we find that the CEO's reputation built through corporate donations reduces the probability of their forced turnover. This effect is stronger when a firm/CEO has more media exposure and weaker when a firm's peer companies donate more. The mechanism of this effect is that the CEO's reputation is a valuable resource that makes it difficult for firms to find a substitute in a short time; therefore, firing a CEO who has a high reputation is costly to a firm, and reputable CEOs are likely to become entrenched. Our study demonstrates a new perspective on the CEO's reputation by explaining the failure of corporate governance and provides practical insights for constraining managers and promoting the management efficiency of enterprises.

Item Type:Articles
Additional Information:This paper is funded by Chinese National Funding of Social Science (Grant No.: 20CJY046) and Scientific Research Project Funding of East China University of Political Science and Law.
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Shi, Dr Yukun
Authors: Yang, G., Huang, R., Shi, Y., and Jia, Z.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Accounting and Finance
Journal Name:Economic Modelling
Publisher:Elsevier
ISSN:0264-9993
ISSN (Online):1873-6122
Published Online:04 September 2021

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