Political parties, state resources and electoral clientelism

Gherghina, S. and Nemcok, M. (2021) Political parties, state resources and electoral clientelism. Acta Politica, 56, pp. 591-599. (doi: 10.1057/s41269-021-00216-5)

Abstract

Contemporary political parties often use state resources to win elections. In this context, electoral clientelism evolved from the straightforward vote buying to sophisticated exchanges in which the relationship between patrons (parties or candidates) and clients (voters) is sometimes difficult to grasp. We address the question how do the distributive politics and electoral clientelism interact, how these forms of interactions differ across various context, and what implications they bring for the functioning of political systems. The special issue provides theoretical, methodological and empirical contributions to the burgeoning literature about the multi-faceted feature of electoral clientelism. It unfolds the complex relationship between distributive politics and clientelism, and conceptualizes electoral clientelism as a dynamic process that occurs through different sequences. It enriches the methodological tools aimed at investigating electoral clientelism. Finally, the special issue approaches clientelism from several perspectives and brings together substantive empirical evidence about the varieties of clientelism around the world.

• Item Type: Articles
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Gherghina, Dr Sergiu
• Authors: Gherghina, S., and Nemcok, M.
• College/School: College of Social Sciences > School of Social and Political Sciences > Politics
• Journal Name: Acta Politica
• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• ISSN: 0001-6810
• ISSN (Online): 1741-1416
• Copyright Holders: Copyright © 2021 Springer Nature Limited
• First Published: First published in Acta Politica 56:591-599
• Publisher Policy: Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher