Persistence in corporate networks through boards of directors? A longitudinal study of interlocks in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom

Brullebaut, B., Allemand, I., Prinz, E. and Thépot, F. (2022) Persistence in corporate networks through boards of directors? A longitudinal study of interlocks in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Review of Managerial Science, 16(6), pp. 1743-1782. (doi: 10.1007/s11846-021-00490-9)

Abstract

This article studies, over the period 2006 to 2019, both the structure and the evolution of corporate networks built on shared board directors between the largest listed firms of three European countries: France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. It offers a longitudinal and up-to-date analysis of the state of links between companies through examining interlocking directorates. Contrary to previous studies which have emphasized a decline of interlocks when analyzed at the board director level, we observe relative stability of these networks at the corporate level with a number of connected firms remaining quite stable despite a decline of board ties. As a result, the most central companies remain mainly the same at the national and international level over the considered period. Our findings provide evidence for the resource perspective: access to key resources seemingly pushes firms to continue their network participation despite strengthened national regulations on directors with multiple board seats. This evolution echoes the concept of weak ties of Granovetter (Am J Sociol 78: 360–1380, 1973). Lastly, it is worth noting that it cannot be affirmed that there has been an emergence of a cross-national network which operates to substitute national board ties.

• Item Type: Articles
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Thepot, Dr Florence
• Authors: Brullebaut, B., Allemand, I., Prinz, E., and Thépot, F.
• College/School: College of Social Sciences > School of Law
• Journal Name: Review of Managerial Science
• Publisher: Springer
• ISSN: 1863-6683
• ISSN (Online): 1863-6691
• Published Online: 12 October 2021
• Copyright Holders: Copyright © 2021 The Authors, under exclusive licence to Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature
• First Published: First published in Review of Managerial Science 16(6): 1743-1782
• Publisher Policy: Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher