Social discount rate: spaces for agreement

Hayashi, T. and Lombardi, M. (2021) Social discount rate: spaces for agreement. Economic Theory Bulletin, 9(2), pp. 247-257. (doi: 10.1007/s40505-021-00209-9)

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Abstract

We study the problem of aggregating discounted utility preferences into a social discounted utility preference model. We use an axiom capturing a social responsibility of individuals’ attitudes to time, called consensus Pareto. We show that this axiom can provide consistent foundations for welfare judgments. Moreover, in conjunction with the standard axioms of anonymity and continuity, consensus Pareto can help adjudicate some fundamental issues related to the choice of the social discount rate: the society selects the rate through a generalized median voter scheme.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Hayashi, Professor Takashi and Lombardi, Dr Michele
Authors: Hayashi, T., and Lombardi, M.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Economic Theory Bulletin
Publisher:Springer
ISSN:2196-1085
ISSN (Online):2196-1093
Published Online:17 August 2021
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2021 The Authors
First Published:First published in Economic Theory Bulletin 9(2): 247-257
Publisher Policy:Reproduced under a Creative Commons License

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