Simion, M. (2021) Knowledge and reasoning. Synthese, 199(3), pp. 10371-10388. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-021-03251-z)
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Abstract
This paper develops a novel, functionalist, unified account of the epistemic normativity of reasoning. On this view, epistemic norms drop out of epistemic functions. I argue that practical reasoning serves a prudential function of generating prudentially permissible action, and the epistemic function of generating knowledge of what one ought to do. This picture, if right, goes a long way towards normatively divorcing action and practical reasoning. At the same time, it unifies reasoning epistemically: practical and theoretical reasoning will turn out to be governed by the same epistemic norm—knowledge—in virtue of serving the same epistemic function: generating knowledge of the conclusion.
Item Type: | Articles |
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Additional Information: | This research was funded by the Mind Association (Mind Fellowship for the ‘Epistemic Norms and Epistemic Functions’ project, 2018–2019) and the European Research Council (KnowledgeLab: Knowledge First Social Epistemology project, grant agreement 948,356)). |
Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Simion, Professor Mona |
Authors: | Simion, M. |
Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
Research Group: | COGITO Epistemology Research Centre |
Journal Name: | Synthese |
Publisher: | Springer |
ISSN: | 0039-7857 |
ISSN (Online): | 1573-0964 |
Published Online: | 21 June 2021 |
Copyright Holders: | Copyright © The Author(s) 2021 |
First Published: | First published in Synthese 199(3): 10371-10388 |
Publisher Policy: | Reproduced under a Creative Commons licence |
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