Collective decision under ignorance

Hayashi, T. (2021) Collective decision under ignorance. Social Choice and Welfare, 57(2), pp. 347-359. (doi: 10.1007/s00355-021-01320-3)

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Abstract

This paper studies aggregation of preferences under ignorance, in which everybody knows that the true probability distribution over outcomes lies in some objective set but knows nothing about which one in it is true or which one in it is more likely to be true. We consider two decision models which express the precautionary principle under ignorance, the maximin criterion and the α-maximin criterion. We show that the Pareto axiom implies dictatorship, in each decision model. The impossibility results force us to choose between two options, one is to give up the precautionary principle as modelled at the social level, the other is to weaken the Pareto axiom. We provide possibility results for each of the options.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Hayashi, Professor Takashi
Authors: Hayashi, T.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Social Choice and Welfare
Publisher:Springer
ISSN:0176-1714
ISSN (Online):1432-217X
Published Online:18 March 2021
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2021 The Author
First Published:First published in Social Choice and Welfare 57(2): 347-359
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

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