Willard-Kyle, C. (2021) Against the doctrine of infallibility. Philosophical Quarterly, 71(4), pp. 758-779. (doi: 10.1093/pq/pqaa082)
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Abstract
Abstract According to the doctrine of infallibility, one is permitted to believe p if one knows that necessarily, one would be right if one believed that p. This plausible principle—made famous in Descartes’ cogito—is false. There are some self-fulfilling, higher-order propositions one can’t be wrong about but shouldn’t believe anyway: believing them would immediately make one's overall doxastic state worse.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Willard-Kyle, Dr Christopher |
| Authors: | Willard-Kyle, C. |
| College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
| Journal Name: | Philosophical Quarterly |
| Publisher: | Oxford University Press |
| ISSN: | 0031-8094 |
| ISSN (Online): | 1467-9213 |
| Published Online: | 24 December 2020 |
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