Education markets and school segregation: a mechanism-based explanation

Education markets have spread worldwide over the past few decades. Frequently, the expansion of markets in education is presented by their promoters as a means to improve the opportunities of the most socioeconomically disadvantaged students. However, the evidence available shows that market-oriented policies that enhance competition and choice tend to produce negative effects on equity by boosting school segregation and social stratification among public and private schools. This paper aims to unpack the mechanisms through which market-oriented policies and the involvement of private actors in education can foster the uneven distribution of students from disadvantaged backgrounds. By using a mechanism-based explanation, this paper identifies and describes the functioning of three main mechanisms by which pro-market policies generate school segregation. Finally, the paper addresses the analytical benefits of the mechanism-based approach and reflects on its policy implications regarding market-oriented reforms in education.

Keywords: social mechanisms, education markets, school segregation, educational inequalities, privatisation.

Introduction

Despite the existence and persistence of advocates of the virtues of privatisation and market systems of provision of education, there is a growing body of evidence for the negative effects of education markets on equity. A large number of national case studies (Bonal and Bellei, 2018; Macpherson, Robertson and Walford 2014) and international comparisons (OECD 2019, 2012; Alegre and Ferrer 2010) provide further evidence that processes of choice and competition in education tend to undermine equality of opportunities, increase performance inequalities and trigger school segregation. Of course, these effects differ in their form and intensity. Market mechanisms in education are far from being homogenous and may take different forms (e.g., vouchers, charter schools, subsidies), as well as include different levels of public intervention to compensate for market failure (Lubienski 2006). The social context and the policy design modulate both the potential and the
real effects of market mechanisms on equity. The two main policies by which market systems of provision impact on education equity, choice and competition, are diversely promoted and regulated in different education systems. While some education systems are close to what could be understood as ‘pure markets’ (Chile, for instance), others allow for choice under conditions of gratuity (e.g., the Netherlands) and others restrict choice by using catchment areas to ensure proximity and equal opportunities (e.g., Spain).

Interestingly, the diversity of policy designs under which mechanisms of choice and competition take place do not seem to alter the direction of their effects on inequalities and school segregation. In other words, despite a theory of change that foresees equity gains associated with market-oriented reforms, there is no consistent empirical evidence in support of such positive effects. Policies designed to increase equity by means of more choice and school competition frequently run in direct contradiction with actors’ responses, which do not react as the theory of change predicts. There are different theoretical approaches and empirical studies that give us answers to the reasons why market systems of provision and funding in education generate negative effects. For instance, bounded rationality approach (Ben-Porath 2009; Bonal and Zancajo, 2018) points out that families’ and students’ school choices are not necessarily only oriented to maximise the level of educational quality but mediated and restricted by their social and economic conditions. Other authors consider that social class significantly influences the capacity of families to interpret information and to make choices, which in some cases leads to characterise some working-class families as ‘disconnected parents’ (Gewirtz, Ball and Bowe 1995). There are also approaches that emphasise how schools’ logics of action in the education market can trigger the development of opportunistic behaviours, such as students’ selection or exclusion (van Zanten, 2009). Despite their analytical relevance, these theoretical approaches focus on one side of education markets, either demand or supply, but do not explore how both sides interact to produce school segregation.

The diversity regarding the drivers of school segregation does not open the black box between market reforms and school segregation. Beyond the collection of case studies or multilevel statistical analyses showing a positive relationship between privatisation and segregation, we know little about how these effects are specifically generated. Processes by which these effects take place are either excluded or taken for granted in a number of studies assessing the impact of school choice or privatisation on inequalities (Elacqua, 2012; Garcia 2008; Dronkers and Avram, 2012).

In this paper, we argue that mechanism-based explanations, currently widely discussed in the social sciences, is a useful approach to open the black box between education markets and school segregation. A mechanism-based explanation, as Gundersen (2018) argues, ‘is a model which
describes interacting parts in order to show how a phenomenon is generated’ (p.37). Social-mechanisms explanations search for regularities that connect structural elements and circumstances to actors’ responses. Different sets of institutional and social conditions generate particular actors’ responses that produce specific outcomes, in this case, school segregation.

In the field of pro-market policies in education, the mechanism-based explanations can contribute decisively to understanding how these policies work. While quantitative studies focusing on the relationship between school choice, private schools and education inequalities have used comparative strategies to interpret results from a probabilistic perspective (Alegre and Ferrer 2010, Dronkers and Avram 2012), qualitative case studies rarely overcome their contextual embeddedness and are unable to identify regularities that could have explanatory capacity for different contexts (Bosetti and Prytt 2007; Bell 2009). Interestingly, the exception to this rule is usually given by those authors that have used systematic reviews to identify mechanisms of production and reproduction of inequalities (Waslander, Pater and Weide 2010). While these reviews inform about how inequalities are produced, they do not attempt to theorise about the relationship between the social contexts of education markets and processes that translate specific social action into education inequalities. Mechanisms-based explanations may help us to understand why specific individual actions appear in specific contexts and why they produce specific effects. In this article, we make use of James Coleman’s theory of social action and his typology of social mechanism to show how this connection operates in the field of education markets and school segregation (Coleman 1986).

This paper proposes a conceptual and systematic approach to understanding the mechanisms that link education privatisation and pro-market policies to school segregation. In the next section, we review the main evidence regarding the relationship between education markets and school segregation. The third section focuses on mechanism-based explanations in the social sciences and their limited use in education policy studies. The fourth section describes these three mechanisms and illustrates their functioning based on the evidence provided by different case studies. The last section elaborates on the theoretical and policy implications of the mechanism-based approach.

**Market mechanisms and school segregation**

Beyond the particular case of the United States, school segregation has only become a source of concern in many education systems over the last few decades. The increasing number of international comparisons, mainly related to the emergence of international large-scale assessments like PISA, have generated a growing interest in and concern for school segregation (OECD 2012; Alegre and Ferrer 2010). Although it is well-known that school segregation is influenced by a diverse range of non-
educational factors (e.g., residential segregation, demographic trends or migration waves, etc.), the research has also shown how educational institutional settings can play an important role in affecting school segregation. Among educational factors, the role of market policies fostering or reducing the uneven distribution of pupils, has attracted great interest in the academic literature and the policy debate.

Market mechanisms in education are frequently presented by their advocates as an effective policy option to improve educational opportunities and reduce school segregation (Musset 2012). Despite the diversity of market-oriented reforms, advocates of these policies consider them as a way to overcome school segregation generated by traditionally bureaucratic regimes of schooling. For instance, Tooley (1996) affirms that state intervention tends to create inequalities because ‘they are an inevitable consequence of the middle classes “muscling in” on welfare, using the state to provide for their needs, at the expense of the poor’ (p. 63). From this point of view, it is expected that market mechanisms will contribute to levelling the playing field, equalising the opportunities of socioeconomically affluent and disadvantaged students (Moe 2008).

The claims of pro-market policy advocates regarding the desegregation capacity of these policies are sustained by a particular theory of change regarding the relationship between market-oriented policies and school segregation, which is based on the functioning of two main associations. The first one refers to the capacity of school choice to facilitate overcoming residential segregation. It is assumed that increasing families’ capacity to choose will allow poor populations to exercise an ‘exit’ (Hirschmann 1970) from their neighbourhood schools (which are usually assumed to be low quality schools) and access schools previously restricted to them because of economic barriers, geographical allocation or restrictive catchment areas (Hoxby 2003). Pro-market advocates consider that families will choose schools based on instrumental rationality and trying to maximise the educational quality obtained (Bonal and Zancajo 2018b). The second association is related to the capacity of education markets to foster competition between schools. Frequently, choice and per capita funding schemes increase the need for schools to attract demand as a way to ensure the viability of the market (Belfield and Levin 2002). With respect to school segregation, it is assumed that low-quality schools, usually with a high concentration of socioeconomically disadvantaged students, will be forced to exit the market due to the lack of demand (Chubb and Moe 1990). Education market advocates consider that socioeconomically disadvantaged students, in particular, will benefit from this market turnover since they are more likely to attend schools with low levels of performance.

However, empirical evidence has consistently shown that market mechanisms and privatisation policies tend to increase school segregation. From a comparative point of view Alegre
and Ferrer (2010) show how OECD education systems where market policies and private provision play a significant role, tend to have higher levels of school segregation. Similarly, OECD (2012) estimates that countries with universal or targeted vouchers have higher levels of social stratification among schools than education systems without these financing schemes. In addition, a recent OECD study shows that those education systems that have weakened the link between place of residence and school allocation, therefore giving more prominence to school choice, have a higher level of socioeconomic school segregation (OECD 2019). In the case of analyses conducted within the same national context, Valenzuela, Bellei and de los Ríos (2014) conclude that those municipalities in Chile with higher levels of private provision tend to be more socioeconomically segregated. Different studies have shown how the adoption of pro-market reforms that increase school choice and school competition have led to an expansion of school segregation in contexts such as Chile (Hsieh and Urquiola 2006; Elacqua 2012), New Zealand (Fiske and Ladd 2000) or Sweden (Böhlmark and Lindahl 2007).

As Waslander et al. (2010) point out, studies showing a positive effect of privatisation and pro-market policies on school segregation are almost non-existent. Similarly, Musset (2012) reviews the existing evidence on the effect of school choice on school segregation, concluding that all the studies find that school segregation by race or socioeconomic status increases as a consequence of pro-choice policy reforms (p. 35). However, some studies indicate that the adoption of privatisation and market policies in education has not affected school segregation significantly. This is the case of Gorard, Fitz and Taylor (2001), who conclude that pro-market reforms adopted in England did not lead to a significant variation in the level of school segregation. In the case of the US, some studies have shown that expanding school choice has increased the racial and social diversity of charter schools, but have not examined their general effects on the segregation of the whole local education market (Garcia, 2008; Ritter et al., 2016).

What the vast majority of the evidence suggests is that there is a strong positive relationship between education markets and school segregation. However, less is known about how this relationship operates. Actors’ beliefs, expectations and actions produce effects that differ significantly from those expected by the advocates of the virtues of education markets. However, proving and verifying the gap between theory and practice does not tell us why this happens. What mediates between the existence of specific systems of market provision of education and the actors’ responses to produce school segregation? Social mechanism-based explanations can provide answers to these questions.
Social-mechanism-based explanations and education policy effects: a methodology

Over the last few decades, social mechanisms have received significant attention in the social sciences. Social scientists have tried to develop mechanism-based explanations that aim to overcome either covering-law accounts or purely co-variation between variables. Although there are several definitions of social mechanisms in the literature, the basis of the concept is as simple as Elster’s idea ‘that proper explanations should detail the cogs and wheels of the causal process through which the outcome to be explained was brought about’ (Hedström and Ylikoski 2010, 50).

Thus, mechanism-based explanations aim to open the black box that normally connects different inputs with specific outcomes or effects. They aim to distinguish spurious from real associations and ‘provide deeper, more direct, and more fine-grained explanations’ (Hedström and Swedberg 1996, 288). The very idea of causality associated with mechanisms is the basis for understanding that mechanisms are generative, that is, they include the why of the relationship between entities, something that cannot be captured even by sophisticated statistical models (Boudon 1979). Social mechanisms are also characterised as having a structure, for acting with regularity in the production of a specific effect, which allows the black box to be turned into a transparent box and makes visible how the interacting entities produce a particular outcome (Hedström and Ylikoski 2010, 51; Little 2011, 277).

Interestingly enough, the structural regularity that characterises social mechanisms can only be achieved by capturing ‘the interests, identities, networks, allies and repertoires’ of the actions of purposive agents (Little 2011, 277). Therefore, observing social action is a necessary condition for grasping the structural mechanisms that produce specific social effects in specific circumstances.

The use of mechanism-based explanations in education policy studies has not proliferated as an alternative approach to either statistical probability-based explanations or ethnographic and cases study accounts. The most salient example of the use of a mechanism-based understanding of education policy was provided by Dale (1999). In a context of rapid transformations caused by globalisation, Dale tries to understand the causal links between globalisation and specific national education policies. Beyond the interest of his object of study, there are two methodological aspects of Dale’s approach that are noteworthy. The first refers to the non-neutrality of the mechanism to understand the nature of the effects it produces.

Linked to this idea, the second salient aspect of Dale’s approach is his focus on the variables that differentiate the mechanisms themselves. Dale identifies a set of dimensions that help us to understand why a specific mechanism appears and produces a certain effect. Aspects such as the type
of power of the agents of globalisation, their scope of intervention or their explicit or implicit mandate are aspects that generate different types of effects. It is then the confluence of these characteristics that allows him to identify the structural regularities that a specific mechanism incorporates. These dimensions of variability can be understood as the ‘specific circumstances’ operating in social reality that explain the particularities of the mechanisms to produce specific effects.

An interesting alternative analytical and methodological perspective to understand the unobservable aspects that shape these mechanisms is provided by Hedström and Swedberg (1996). Based on James Coleman’s theory of social action and his macro-micro-macro model, these authors differentiate three types of mechanism that occur between macro states. Structural or macro elements set the conditions for the emergence of ‘individual desires, beliefs, and action opportunities’ (Hedström and Swedberg 1996, 297) that generate specific actions inspired in these values and opportunities at the micro level. The aggregate of individual actions produces a collective action, sometimes unintended or unexpected, that is transformed into a collective outcome at the macro level. The authors call these three steps situational, individual action and transformational mechanisms.

Figure 1 adapts Coleman’s model to our object of study. In our analysis, we depart from the existence of education markets as a macro state. Specific policy/institutional designs that characterise the operation of these educational markets may generate specific individual responses. For instance, actors at the demand side may activate strategies of exit from public schools or may develop strategies of social closure to avoid the entrance of disadvantaged students. From the supply side, schools’ selection processes act as entrance barriers for certain students or schools use innovation and differentiation in order to attract the best students. In the end, aggregate individual actions produce a collective outcome (school segregation) at the macro level (which can be unexpected and unintended).

Figure 1. Mechanisms of school segregation, based on James Coleman’s model (Coleman 1986, cited in Hedström and Swedberg 1996: 297).
The institutional design that regulates the presence of educational markets produces different situational mechanisms. Education markets may have different regulations and might stress more school choice, school competition or both. Depending on this institutional design, different situational mechanisms can be activated and generate different expectations and action opportunities for individual actors. Actors may react by escaping from public schools that have a high number of socially disadvantaged students, choosing schools based on pedagogic identities or trying to select upper class students. These actions taken together are the transformation mechanism by which school segregation is produced.

In this article, we use the analytical model developed by Hedström and Swedberg (1996) to understand the mechanisms that link the operation of different types of education markets to school segregation. We argue that the type of institutional design generates different types of actors’ responses that have an impact on school segregation.

**Education markets and school segregation: generative mechanisms**

### Mechanism 1: Enhancing white flight

The first situational mechanism operating at a macro level by which education markets affect school segregation is school choice. Policy designs that allow for absolute or significant levels of choice open the possibility of opting out of local schools and neighbourhoods. Thus, the situational mechanism of school choice facilitates the emergence of white flight as an individual action mechanism that is transformed into processes of school segregation.

The term white flight was coined in the 1950s and 1960s in the US to refer to the process of an exodus of white people from areas with higher levels of ethnic or racial concentration. Busing
policies in the wake of the Supreme Court’s sentence on Brown vs. the Board of Education, led many middle-class white families to move out of areas that received minority students (Ravitch 1983). Since then, the term white flight has travelled beyond the US and is currently used to refer to movement of native families out of local schools and neighbourhoods that have an increasing migrant population. The higher the residential segregation of migrants in specific neighbourhoods, the higher the probability of native middle-class families opting out of local schools. While most of the literature on white flight evidence focuses on racial segregation (Sikkink and Emerson 2008; Fairlie 2002), other studies have measured the same process referring to social composition of neighbourhoods or schools (Kye 2018; Cullen, Jacob and Levitt 2005). Qualitative analyses that have explored parental preferences find that choice opportunities activate the search for socially or racially homogeneous environments (Bagley 1996; Billingham and Hunt 2016).

White flight processes do not necessarily have to be related to the presence of private providers, but instead with families’ capacity of choice. Indeed, white flight exists because the perception of risk attached to enrolling children in areas or schools with a high concentration of migrant students, incentivises the search for alternatives. However, the more opportunities the system provides to opt out of local schools, the higher the probability that native or middle-class families move from their place of residence to alternative neighbourhoods and schools. A recent OECD report highlights that those systems that have reduced the role of proximity in school admission policies have significantly increased inequalities of access and generated processes of school segregation by social status or student’s nationality (OECD 2019). Moreover, other institutional designs such as per capita funding schemes or charter schools are also generators of more choice opportunities without necessarily changing school choice regulations (Brunner, Imazeki and Ross 2010; Garcia 2008). The strong link between higher levels of choice and school segregation has been evidenced in countries such as Sweden (Böhlmark, Holmlund and Lindahl 2016), the Netherlands (Boterman 2013), Chile (Elacqua 2012), Spain (Bonal, Zancajo and Scandurra 2019) and the US (Saporito 2003). While market advocates argue that school choice opens up the possibility for poor families to escape from low quality neighbourhood schools and get into higher quality schools (Merrifield 2001). Most of the empirical evidence illustrates that ‘native’ and middle-class families present higher levels of mobility which in turn generates higher levels of inequality and segregation (Waslander et al. 2010; Musset 2012). A number of studies have shown that poor families are not able to enact school choice as market theory expects. The lack of access to relevant information or the necessary skills to interpret it are the basis to explain why low-income families show different patterns of choice compared to middle-class families in most of the cases (Gewirtz, Ball and Bowe 1995). At the same time, the lack of high-quality schooling options in an accessible geographical distance or the fact
that poor families prioritise other choice criteria (e.g., safety, discipline or individual attention for their children) rather than academic performance, explain why a higher capacity of choice does not necessarily result into the access to higher quality schooling options, which in turn, triggers school segregation (Elacqua, Schneider and Buckley, 2006; Bonal, Verger and Zancajo 2017; Stewart and Wolf, 2014).

The relationship between privatisation and migrant concentration is twofold. As market-oriented education policies increase the possibility to opt out of local schools, several authors have pointed out that a higher concentration of migrant or ethnic minority students in certain schools increases the demand for private schooling (Betts and Fairlie 2003; Saporito and Sohoni 2006). Interestingly, the mechanism of white flight seems to channel both the effects of education markets on segregation processes as well as the effects of higher segregation on increasing demand for private enrolment.

In education systems with a significantly diverse private sector, choice strategies for private schools increase the process of polarisation and school segregation. The Chilean case is clearly paradigmatic in this regard. Santos and Elacqua (2016) compare socioeconomic school segregation in public, private subsidised and independent private schools in the metropolitan area of Santiago. They show how parental preferences and economic barriers to access to private schools increase the homogeneity of school composition. The higher the presence of private schools that practice academic selectivity and have a high fee, the higher the difference between observed segregation and counterfactual proximity-based segregation. In the case of Spain, Bonal and Zancajo (2018) found that private subsidised schools receive significantly more students than public schools from families who opt out of their catchment area.

In summary, policy designs that allow for choice stimulate processes of white flight by the actors that predominantly produce school segregation. Although possibilities of choice and mobility for all families are formally equal, middle-class families are far more active in flying from areas or schools with a high proportion of disadvantaged students. Likewise, education markets facilitate white flight by expanding school supply.

**Mechanism 2: Boosting social closure**

The second mechanism refers to processes of social closure that are induced by market-oriented policies. This mechanism refers to the capacity of education markets to trigger the concentration of socially homogenous populations in specific schools. In this case, two situational mechanisms at the macro level are the initiators of this process. First, school choice schemes that increase the number of
schooling options for families and second, the high level of autonomy and incentives given to education providers for diversification creating market niches aimed at certain families. These two situational mechanisms facilitate specific actions at both the demand and the supply side.

In the case of the demand side, housing markets and school choice create the conditions for activating social closure as a possible response to avoid the risk of attending a low performing school. Several studies have shown how choice patterns of the middle classes are affected by the changing conditions of housing and the production of specific circuits of schooling (Butler and Robson 2003; Ball, Bowe and Gewirtz 1995). Studies in geography of education have demonstrated how residential and school choices are mutually related. School choice is spatially contingent but also residential choices are conditioned by school choice opportunities (Pearman and Swain 2017). Interestingly, the rise in gentrification processes in many cities may simultaneously activate processes of white flight and strategies of social closure in local schools (Ichou and van Zanten 2019; Maloutas 2007). Agnès van Zanten (2009a) has used the term ‘colonisation’ to refer to processes of social closure of local schools by families with high levels of cultural capital, but with insufficient economic capital to opt for private schools. Interestingly, while open school choice may facilitate processes of white flight, processes of colonisation may be more frequently activated by school choice restrictions, or by processes of urban gentrification, where higher levels of social mixture can incentivise processes of differentiation by ensuring a homogeneous social composition of the school.

Social closure may sometimes be a conscious process of attracting middle-class families and excluding low-income families. Advantaged parents who often play the role of careful investors, can become a source of value to the school and marginalise socially disadvantaged families (Freidus 2019). Social closure may also occur in those situations in which progressive middle-class families aim to transform a previously segregated and marginalised school into a diverse one. Attempts to improve the conditions of ‘gentrified’ schools do not occur without conflict as middle-class parents can make themselves heard and have the cultural resources to fight for a better school. These attempts may generate processes of exclusion and reduce the sense of belonging felt by low-income families (Siegel-Hawley Thachik and Bridges 2016, Posey-Maddox 2014). While choosing a local school is usually justified by middle class parents as opting for staying in the neighbourhood and being involved in the community, strategies of school closure actually show that middle-class parents ‘espouse a politically progressive ideology but act in their own self-interest’ (Roberts and Lake 2016, 215). Parents mobilise their social networks to either choose the ‘best’ public schools of the neighbourhood or to monopolise local schools and engage in their transformation, in many occasions excluding low income families living in the area (Butler 2003). Both options may result in increasing processes of school segregation.
Beyond the key role of the demand side to boost processes of social closure, providers can also contribute decisively to increase the social or ethnic isolation of some social groups. The capacity of educational providers to trigger social closure is explained by the need for schools to create specific ‘market-niches’ (Jabbar 2015) as a means of responding to the incentives of competitive environments. As Levin (1991) points out, education markets incentivise schools to differentiate their educational approach to meet the preferences of specific families and attract demand. At the same time, this facilitates families to ‘choose schools according to their own cultural, academic, social, political, ethnic, racial and religious values’ (p.148).

While the capacity of families to choose based on their values or orientations can have positive effects in meeting the demands and the needs of minority groups, the need for schools to meet specific educational demands can also have the unintended consequence of reinforcing processes of social closure, and therefore segregation. As the evidence has shown, school choice preferences are highly socially mediated (Schneider, Teske and Marschall 2000), and schools’ differentiation strategies can reinforce social closure because they can appeal to the choice criteria of specific social groups. As different studies recognise, there is an evident trade-off between the diversity of the educational system and the capacity to ensure a balanced social distribution of the students (OECD 2017; OECD 2019). Frequently, the use of symbolic attributes by schools as part of the differentiation strategy increases their capacity to attract families from specific social groups. Likewise, the use of symbols, values or cultural codes of the middle and upper classes act as a mechanism of self-exclusion for those groups from a different social background who do not identify with these codes (Zancajo 2019). In some contexts, the choice of religious schools by some social groups is guided by the desire to avoid socioeconomic integration rather than by educational preferences (Harel Ben Shahar and Berger 2018; Meure 2004). Beyond the unintended consequences of diversification, evidence shows how some schools explicitly use differentiation as a way to influence the social background of their potential applicants or to foster processes of social closure (Zancajo 2019; Lubienski 2006).

Sometimes the school composition becomes an attribute of diversification itself. Schools use the advantaged social composition of their school population to attract new demand (Fiske and Ladd 2000; Maroy 2004). This phenomenon relies on the fact that for many families, schools’ composition is one of the main criteria of choice and most socially advantaged schools try to attract them by ensuring a certain level of social closure. This situation by which schools diversify themselves based on the socioeconomic background of their population is what Lubienski (2006) denominates vertical diversification. As studies in different contexts have shown, in education markets vertical
diversification or hierarchisation is a more common phenomenon than diversification based on pedagogical or curricular approaches (Kosunen and Carrasco 2016; Maroy 2004; Jabbar 2015).

In summary, processes of social closure that lead to school segregation can be triggered from both demand and supply sides. Indeed, strategies developed by families and schools can reinforce each other. Families trying to achieve certain levels of social closure indirectly induce schools to develop diversification strategies aligned with particular social class codes. At the same time, schools developing social-class differentiation strategies may channel specific family preferences.

**Mechanism 3: Incentivising student selection**

The third mechanism is the trend of the education market to incentivise educational providers to develop practices of student selection and therefore, foster processes of school segregation. Education markets are frequently characterised by some form of public funding scheme that follows the demand either to state or private schools. This funding scheme is expected to increase families’ capacity to choose, as well as setting up the necessary incentives for schools to attract as much demand as possible. Likewise, pro-market policies are frequently accompanied by accountability devices and school choice information systems that emphasise the importance of academic performance. The combination of per capita funding schemes and accountability policies acts as a situational mechanism. As a result of this situational mechanism, schools tend to develop an individual action mechanism that consists of selecting the most academically able students or those from the most advantaged backgrounds. The development of practices of student selection results in a transformational mechanism that increases school segregation.

The theory of change of pro-market policies predicts that per capita funding schemes and accountability policies will encourage schools to improve the quality of their educational service (Chubb and Moe 1990). However, research in different contexts has shown how frequently schools enact these incentives screening the ablest students instead of increasing the quality of the service (Lubienski, Weitzel and Lubienski 2009). This response enables schools to improve their position in the education market without necessarily developing better educational practices which are often more costly, risky and challenging to implement (Adnett 2004).

In competitive environments, the trend for schools to attract and enrol the most academically able students has been conceptualised as the ‘second-order’ of competition in contrast with the ‘first-order’, which refers to the attempt to recruit as much demand as possible (van Zanten 2009b). Second-order competition usually takes place under three main schools’ logics of action. First, because most academically able students are ‘less costly’ to educate, this allows schools to reduce the cost of
their operation (Ball 1993), as well as increasing their academic performance and their position in the market without increasing their instruction quality (Bellei 2007). When schools are not able to measure the performance or the academic ability of students, particularly at an early age, they use the economic background of the applicants as a predictor of their future performance. Second, accountability systems based on the students’ academic performance incentivise student selection as a means of ensuring good performance in standardised tests (Waslander et al. 2010). Third, as has been previously argued, the profile of the student body plays a significant role in attracting demand. In the context of school choice, parents frequently use the student academic profile as a proxy for school quality (Schneider, Elacqua and Buckley 2006). Therefore, schools able to concentrate more academically able students are more likely to increase their capacity to attract new demand, particularly from the middle and upper-middle social class (Ladd 2002).

As would be expected, student selection practices are particularly prevalent in those education markets where they are legally permitted and where performance assessments play an important role as accountability devices or/and as information systems for school choice (Boeskens 2016; Hart and Figlio 2015). For example, in Chile, where school rankings based on academic performance have been actively disseminated as a source of information for school choice, student selection practices are very common, particularly among private subsidised schools, despite being formally prohibited by law (Contreras, Sepúlveda and Bustos 2010). Carrasco, Gutierrez, and Flores (2017) show how schools frequently use different methods and instruments to screen applicants, including entrance exams or play sessions. These practices are not only oriented to assess the current academic level of the new applicants, but also their potential performance (Zancajo 2017). In New Zealand, the provision for schools to establish admission plans if they reached a certain level of demand, significantly increased instances of student selection (Wylie 2006; Fiske and Ladd 2000).

The impact of selection practices goes beyond school segregation and also affects the performance inequality between public and private schools. Hsieh and Urquiola (2006) show how the performance advantage of private schools in Chile is clearly related to their student selection practices rather than to their supposed better education. Likewise, Boeskens (2016) affirms that the process of ‘cream-skimming’ is one of the mechanisms that explains the frequent social stratification between public and private subsidised schools in many education markets.

In the case of those education markets where selection practices are prohibited, the prevalence of student screening has been reported to be lower. However, in some contexts where student selection is formally prohibited for schools receiving public funding (e.g., Spain) some studies
have reported the presence of selective admissions in some private subsidised schools (Alegre et al. 2010; Valiente 2008; Maroy, 2004).

Beyond direct practices of student screening, in some cases, schools develop more subtle or soft devices to promote processes of self-selection. For example, practices such as differentiation or marketing are carried out under the logic of student selection or have direct effects on it. Frequently, differentiation or marketing strategies play an important role in attracting socioeconomically advantaged families and students, as well as in fostering processes of auto-exclusion from other social groups. In the case of charter schools in the US or in Chile, some studies have shown how marketing strategies developed by schools are not only oriented to attract specific groups of students, but also discourage the access of socioeconomically disadvantaged or minority students (Wilson and Carlsen 2016; Jabbar 2016; Zancajo 2018; Jabbar 2015). Schools can choose to advertise themselves only in local spaces where middle-class families live or they can avoid advertising themselves in specific areas, a phenomenon that Jabbar (2015) defines as a ‘not marketing’ form of selection (p. 19).

As it has been shown in this section, the capacity of education markets to encourage student selection has direct effects on students sorting. The fact that private subsidised schools are more likely to develop these practices, contributes to the increase in the social stratification between public and private providers and fosters school segregation (Boeskens 2016). The evidence also shows that the ‘cream-skimming’ developed by private subsidised schools tends to increase the concentration of less academically able or socioeconomically disadvantaged students in public schools.

Discussion

The capacity of education markets to boost school segregation is well documented in the literature. Beyond impact evaluations, mechanism-based comparative analyses offer useful insight to understand how the relationship between education markets and school segregation works. They provide information to make evidence-informed decisions and to answer an emerging question in international debates: is it possible to balance education markets and equity? (OECD 2017).

From the mechanisms presented in this paper and the evidence reviewed, two main conclusions can be drawn. First, the relationship between education markets and school segregation is complex, multidimensional and frequently overcomes what the ontology of these policies predicts. Families use market mechanisms not only to meet their educational preferences or to maximise the level of educational quality for their children, but also to ensure social closure or isolation from other social groups. In the case of educational providers, education markets tend to incentivise strategies of student selection or the formation of market niches usually based on social class codes and symbolic
attributes. Second, market-oriented policies are prone to exacerbate social class differences in the education field. Although the activation of individual actions explains the final transformational mechanism that produces school segregation, these individual mechanisms are clearly socially mediated. As it has been argued before, education markets facilitate processes of emulation among social groups or the possibility to share schooling with peers from similar social backgrounds.

However, the evidence reviewed also shows that the presence and the role of the three identified mechanisms are mediated by the regulatory frameworks, the social and educational contexts and the historical paths followed by each education market. For instance, in education markets where choice is more restricted due to the presence of controlled choice regulation, the dynamics of social closure or colonisation can be the more powerful mechanism to explain processes of school segregation. In contrast, in contexts with higher levels of school choice and where competition between schools plays an important role, the emergence of student selection processes or the process of white flight are more likely. High levels of school autonomy and incentives for school diversification also give more manoeuvrability to schools to develop processes of indirect selection of self-exclusion.

In the past few years, many international and national actors have raised their concerns regarding the relationship between pro-market policies and inequalities, particularly in terms of school segregation. In this respect, many of these actors are betting on regulatory frameworks and accountability policies as a means to make compatible the supposed benefits of education markets and equity (World Bank 2018; OECD 2019, 2017). The social mechanism approach developed to explore the effects of education markets on school segregation produces relevant conclusions in this regard. The capacity of regulation to inhibit the ‘opportunistic’ or unexpected behaviours of some social groups or educational providers is relatively limited. Frequently, situational mechanisms such as choice or competition are altered in their original purpose by the way actors enact them. The second limit refers to accountability devices. Usually, policy proposals consider that the lack of proper accountability schemes explains the capacity of actors to develop unintended responses to market policies. However, in many cases, the presence of accountability devices seems to be insufficient to avoid responses that contribute to school segregation.

In summary, mechanism-based analytical approaches can contribute not just to understanding the impact that education market reforms can have on school segregation, but also to understanding the causality of this relationship in different social contexts. National case studies and comparative research on education markets are needed to understand why, how and under what circumstances the three identified mechanisms are more or less present and more or less intense. The
findings of this type of research may provide policymakers with a solid base to know how specific policies operate in real contexts and how the expected effects may be confirmed or altered by actors’ enactment. In fact, policymakers do not normally make their decisions based on social mechanisms explanations but on policy learning or policy borrowing, which are much more common practices in policy design and educational reform. There is an interesting potential in the approach developed in this article. Understanding how actors respond to specific circumstances is necessary if effective policies are to be designed to improve education and social equity.

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