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Title: Women and black employees at the Central Intelligence Agency: from fair employment to diversity management

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Women and black employees at the Central Intelligence Agency: from fair employment to diversity management

This article examines US intelligence through the lens of its personnel and the socio-political and organizational conditions that affect them. Intelligence scholarship has largely focused on the relationship between intelligence and policy to explain foreign and security policy decisions, and the tensions between national security and liberal democratic values (see for example Andrew 1995; Jeffreys-Jones 2003). The approach proposed in this article draws inspiration from the broader effort to re-center the study of security and intelligence on people, their identity and experiences to better understand gender and racial disparities (see for example Sjoberg 2011; Carpenter 2016; Bean 2018; Wibben 2020). Instead of looking at the impact of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) activities on international affairs, this study seeks to deepen our understanding of the socially constructed nature of national security intelligence as an organization and an occupation through an examination of the CIA’s efforts to understand and manage the place of women and black employees within its workforce.

When academics write about intelligence professionals, they tend to focus on spies and spymasters (Moran et al 2019; Sulick 2013). The vast majority of these characters, as well as the spies depicted in popular culture, are white men who display masculine attributes such as audacity and determination (Willmetts 2016, 128; Heeg Maruska 2010, 241). The US intelligence community (IC) has a reputation for being ‘overwhelmingly white and disproportionately male’ (Callum 2001, 27) and, various former officials note in their memoir that the CIA has a poor record of recruiting women and racial and ethnic minorities (Marchetti and Marks 1974; Colby and Forbath 1978; Gilligan 1991; Drumheller 2006, 189; Tenet 2007, 23-24). Observers might be tempted to conclude that the ‘high’ politics realm of national security intelligence is a white men’s world in which women and minorities are largely absent.

However, the history women and black employees at the CIA draws a more complex picture that challenges stereotypes about intelligence professionals and the ways in which scholars tend to study intelligence.

Focusing on two marginalized groups of employees sheds light on the social hierarchies that pervades society and intelligence agencies. From a practitioner’s perspective, gender and racial prejudices can affect an agency’s outlook on the world and the knowledge it produces to serve
decision-makers. Feminist research has established that social norms influence the ways in which security is conceived. For example, Stachowitsch (2012) correlates women’s status in the military to the development of foreign policy concepts. Holliday (2012, 91) finds that women’s engagement teams deployed in Afghanistan facilitated communication with local women and men, and helped gathering critical intelligence, thus providing a more comprehensive picture of the environment. From an academic perspective, the lack of attention paid to the heterogeneity of intelligence professionals distorts scholarly understandings of intelligence as an organization and an occupation.

In 2013, the CIA historical review program organized a thematic release of 120 documents on the ‘view of women in the CIA’s workforce’ and published two articles on the ‘evolution’ of the agency’s policies on this issue (CIA 2013). This effort demonstrates that the agency is keen to portray itself as an increasingly diverse organization. But to what extent has the CIA been a genuinely diverse and inclusive organization? When and why did its personnel policies change to improve the situation of marginalized employees? To answer this question the article draws inspiration from intersectional theory and its application to the study of intelligence. Intersectional theory emerged as a criticism of attempts to homogenize the situation of women as a group sharing a common identity, and thereby erasing persisting inequalities relating to race (Crenshaw 1991; Yuval-Davis 2011, 3). An intersectional approach seeks to identify how the characteristics of a specific identity marginalize group members who differ, thus revealing the multi-dimensionality of inequality (Hancock 2007, 65). In her study of women in the British Security Service, Jessica Shahan (2019, 45-68) develops an intersectional framework that engages with multiple facets of identity (mostly gender but also class and race) and levels of analysis (structural, organizational, experiential and representational). This approach sheds light on the multiple ways in which social stratification constructs power relations and determines access to resources (Peterson 1992, 192; Yuval-Davis 2011, 5-6). This article is intersectional to the extent that it examines and contrasts the places and experiences of two marginalized groups (women and black employees), drawing attention, when possible, on their intersection (black women). The analysis combines three levels: structural (societal attitudes toward women and black Americans), organizational (government and CIA personnel policies and interests) and individual (employees’ initiatives and experiences).

CIA policies and procedures create methodological constraints that complicate research on its workforce. Secrecy protects intelligence sources and methods and limits the information
intelligence agencies can disclose, but it does not fully explain the limited evidence basis available to conduct research on marginalized intelligence professionals. This study focuses on women and black employees because they are the two most visible minorities in the CIA records. While they shed light on organizational shifts in personnel policies, these records tend to homogenize and reduce experiences to broad categories of employees. The content and language of CIA memoranda and studies reflect social hierarchies. Since its establishment in 1947, the agency has used various categories such as ‘male/female’, ‘negro’, ‘black’, ‘African American’, ‘black women’, ‘minority’, ‘minority women’ to describe and analyze the composition of its workforce. Alternative sources of information such as memoirs and personal accounts, news media coverage, congressional and court records provide further information on the agency’s employment practices, and the individual experiences of women and black employees.

Social identities and marginalization vary across time and contexts. Covering the period ranging from the establishment of the CIA to 2020, provides an opportunity to examine changes in the position of women and black employees and the multiple factors that might explain them. This relatively long period sheds light on the slow pace of social change and the persistence of inequality, despite policy responses and employees’ initiatives. The article is structured chronologically in five sections that are grouped into three eras. A first era started with the establishment of the agency in 1947 and continued into the following decade. The first section shows how CIA leadership demonstrated some awareness of issues of sexual and racial discrimination in the early 1950s but did not take significant remedial action to support women and black personnel at the time, thus reflecting the prevalence of structural inequality during this era. Gains in the educational attainment of women and black citizens, and the advances made by the civil rights movement ushered in an era of change in the 1960s and 1970s. During this second era, public pressure prompted the federal government, including the CIA, to improve the representation and role of women and black employees. Two sections are devoted to this era. The first section links social to policy change and shows how new laws and regulations pushed the CIA to reorganize the ways in which it managed its workforce. The second section illustrates how social and policy change empowered women and black personnel to challenge prevalent hierarchies and fight for greater equality using internal complaints mechanisms and lawsuits.
A third era started in the late 1980s, when the federal government’s rhetoric moved away from equal employment regulations and the moral imperative of representation to emphasize the notion of diversity management. The **fourth section underlines how this** reconceptualization broadened the focus of personnel policies, to include new categories of employees or minorities deserving of further attention, and presented diversity as an asset that would foster organizational efficiency. This approach gave visibility and importance to multiple groups of employees but did not prevent the recurrence of discrimination. The last section of the article focuses on the period following the intelligence controversies surrounding the failure to prevent the 9/11 attacks and the mistaken assessment that Iraq had a weapons of mass destruction program. In the early twenty-first century, diversity continued to broaden to include cognitive aspects, emphasizing how diverse backgrounds, experiences and perspectives can sustain more comprehensive approaches to complex problems. However, the rhetoric of diversity did not eradicate structural inequalities, which continued to limit the careers of women and black personnel at the CIA, and in American society.

The history of women and black employees at the CIA shows how the national security establishment has struggled to overcome gender and racial hierarchies in its own workforce, thus producing forms of insecurity in its own midst. The interaction between social norms, employment and workforce policies, and the capacity of individuals to enact change best explains the slow improvement in the situation of women and black employees. Social norms have structured government policies and CIA regulations, and the extent to which women and black employees believed in and were able to fight for equal opportunities. Throughout its history, the CIA has largely failed to anticipate social change and struggled to adapt to it. Federal policies, personnel initiatives and lawsuits pushed, and sometimes forced, the agency to organize and communicate about equal opportunity, an ideal that remains difficult to achieve to this day.

**Women and black employees in the newly established CIA**

The role of women and racial minorities in American espionage largely predates the establishment of the IC in the aftermath of the Second World War. A number of women and African Americans gathered intelligence on behalf of the United States during the Revolutionary and Civil Wars, as well as during the First World War (Martin 2015, 99-100). The websites of US intelligence agencies present women such as Union spy Harriet Tubman
CIA 2014) and National Security Agency (NSA 2020a; NSA 2020c) hall of honor inductee Minnie McNeal Kenny as pioneers. A handful of studies have paid attention to the story of female spies in the first half of the twentieth century and their popular depiction (van Seters 1992; Macintosh 1998). These accounts are valuable but they do not tell us much about how intelligence agencies have sought to manage the contribution of the majority of women and black employees to the national intelligence effort.

Women entered the workforce in unprecedented numbers during the Second World War but once the war was over many of them were laid off and replaced by men. At the height of the war, some 4,500 women worked for the 13,000 strong Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and 7,000 of the 10,500 codebreakers employed at the US Army’s Arlington Hall facility were women (Durbin 2013, 17; Foy 2017, 81). They served as clerks, but also in more prominent positions as cryptanalysts and some, like the famed Virginia Hall, operated clandestinely providing support to the French resistance (Pearson 2005; Wilcox 1998). When the OSS was disbanded in 1945, many women had to cede their job to returning soldiers. By and large, women in post-war intelligence agencies were restricted to subordinate roles with little to no possibility for promotion to managerial positions (Elias 2018, 301-302). Societal understandings about masculinity and femininity shaped the place of women in most occupations, including intelligence – and the war did little to alter attitudes. The situation of racial and ethnic minorities in intelligence has not attracted as much scholarly attention (for an exception see LaGumina 2016). Among the plethora of white men serving the US government, the successful careers of Ralph Bunche, an African-American analyst at the OSS who transferred to State Department in 1944, where he helped draft the United Nations Charter in San Francisco (CIA 2010a), and William coffee who led a group of African-American cryptographers in the Signals Intelligence Service during the Second World War stand out (NSA 2020b). However, the contribution of black officers to the US intelligence effort has not attracted much scholarly attention.

When the CIA was established in 1947, its ranks were filled with World War II veterans and establishment men who had graduated from Ivy League and other top tier American Universities (Jeffreys-Jones 2013, 94; Colby and Forbath 1978, 77). Up until the late 1960s, many of these universities’ programs were only open to men (Malkiel 2018). Racial segregation and its legacies also meant that black students predominantly matriculated at colleges and universities that were not part of the top tier (Haynes 2006, 13). The stereotypical
intelligence officer was a white man who could rely on his education to engage with complex national security problems. CIA historian Jackie Benn Porter (2013, 7) notes that ‘many of OSS women came to the CIA as highly decorated intelligence and operations officers’ but ‘their rank and salaries did not reflect prior accomplishments as it did for men’. Virginia Hall, whose audacious missions during the Second World War challenged the perception that men are better suited to operate in dangerous theaters, is a case in point. When she joined the CIA after the war, she was assigned to a desk job and struggled to achieve meaningful career advancement (Purnell 2019). In these early days, the agency leadership was more concerned with setting up the agency and professionalizing its workforce than with issues of parity and workforce equality. Professionalization required levels of education and training most commonly offered to white men. The agency’s leadership failed to notice the gender and racial hierarchies that defined who could be an intelligence officer, and engaged with gender and racial issues when it was required to do so.

Federal policies on recruitment in the civil service pushed the CIA to establish a ‘grievance and complaints procedure’ as early as April 1947 (Executive for Administration and Management 1947). President Truman (1948) signed Executive Order 10479, setting up a fair employment board to ensure workplace equity in federal agencies. The agency’s first fair employment case regarded a black applicant who was turned down (CIA 1951a). The case was investigated and a report was subsequently sent to the fair employment board, which determined it had no basis. This case, and the administration’s concern with racial discrimination, encouraged the CIA to gather data on the number, grades and assignments of its black employees (CIA 1951b; Thurber 2006). Some 447 ‘colored personnel’ worked at the CIA in 1953 (Meloon 1953). The same year, the Office of Personnel began a ‘concentrated effort to recruit Negro JOT’s [Junior Officer Training] and operations officers’ (Acting Director of Personnel 1964). One of the issues limiting their recruitment appears to have been the security clearance process, which a number of black employees failed ‘because of problems of close relatives’ (CIA 1955). The memorandum of the meeting in which these ‘problems’ were discussed does not provide further information, but the prominence of racial hierarchies in US society at the time provides a plausible explanation for some of the security vetting issues black applicants would have confronted. For example, the disproportionately high rate of incarceration of black Americans (Department of Commerce 1951, 6; Langan 1991, 5) meant that they were more likely to have relatives who could not vouch for them.
In 1953, a group of women challenged Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Allen Dulles during a talk at an orientation course, asking whether he was ‘going to do something about the professional discrimination against women’ (Panel on Career Service 1953a, ii). Dulles responded that any discrimination would be stopped, and decided together with his inspector general to set up a panel of accomplished CIA women – who referred to their task force as the ‘Petticoat’ Panel – to study the career opportunities for women in the CIA. The thirteen women and their nine alternates had all worked in intelligence for several years and reached grades ranging from 11 to 14 (the CIA pay scale ranges from general schedule (GS) grade 1 to 15, grades above GS-15 are called Senior Intelligence Service or SIS). The composition of the panel included representatives from a variety of offices, but none of the panelists came from an ethnic or racial minority background (Centre for the Study of Intelligence 2003, 2).

This panel produced the first known study of the status of women at the CIA, yielding meaningful data on their number and occupations. The study, released to senior Agency officials in November 1953, concluded that the CIA had offered ‘at least equivalent opportunities to career women’ as to other employees, but that it had not ‘in common with other employers, taken full advantage of the womanpower resources available to it’ (Panel on Career Service 1953a, ii). The report revealed significant inequalities between male and female employees. By 30 June 1953, the median grade for female employees was GS-5, compared to GS-9 for men. Not a single woman served in GS-15 or above grades, including executive positions (Ibid., 2-3). Most women were hired in clerical positions, where they represented 86 percent of employees (Ibid., 4). The panel provided statistical proof that sex discrimination was extensive and limited the range of occupations available to women (Benn Porter 2013, 8). Yet the situation of women at the CIA compared favorably to other government agencies, and their salaries – like those of their male colleagues – were higher than elsewhere in government. Their representation within the agency workforce (39 percent in 1953) compared favorably to the entire federal government employee group (25 percent of women), and the number of women employed in the United States (30 percent) in 1952 (Panel on Career Service 1953a, Tab A). The fact that nearly four out of ten CIA employees were women in 1953 challenges the notion that intelligence was a men’s job. Yet women’s career opportunities were much more limited than those offered to men.

Women played a particularly limited role in the planning and conduct of clandestine operations, sometimes described as the heartbeat guiding the agency (Moran 2019, 99). They represented
25 percent of professional operations personnel at headquarters and only seven percent in the field (Panel on Career Service 1953a, 3). Explanations for this imbalance reflect gender stereotypes that ignored the potential of women to acquire and develop their own intelligence tradecraft. Agency officials considered that stationing women overseas was particularly difficult because of ‘the necessity for CIA to conform to the customs and restrictions imposed by [redacted] local mores and attitudes in the foreign area which might hamper a woman in operations; by problems of plausible cover; and by situations in which women might not have access to intelligence objectives’. The report continues: ‘in some covert offices, also, where the emphasis is on para-military activities, few women are qualified for operations work’ (Panel on Career Service 1953a, Tab D). By comparison, women were excluded from combat and other ‘heavy duty’ in the US military at the time (Centre for the Study of Intelligence 2013, 11; Department of Labor 1953, 15). However, the ‘analysis professions’ were considered much better suited to women because ‘they do not make the technical, physical, and professional demands of operations’ (Panel on Career Service 1953a, Tab D). Though women’s opportunities to pursue a career in intelligence were equally limited in Great Britain at the time, there were some notable exceptions (Pattinson 2016, 82). For example, the Secret Intelligence Service posted a woman as head of a minor overseas station in 1946 (Jeffery 2010, 640).

Preconceptions about the role and place of women played an important part in limiting their career opportunities. The ‘Petticoat panel’ report provides a number of examples of prevalent gender biases at the time, with officers stating that ‘women won’t travel’, ‘are more emotional and less objective in their approach to problems than men. They are not sufficiently aggressive’, they ‘can’t work under the pressures of urgency’, and that their ‘economic responsibilities’ are ‘not as great as those of men’. The panel of women who authored the report provided convincing rebuttals to these comments, noting that the agency was already employing ‘a fairly large number of women in overseas positions’, and that women do work ‘under considerable pressures and appear no more affected by them than men are’ (Panel on Career Service for Women 1953b, 6-9). These biases, and the hierarchy they reflect, limited the CIA’s ability to tap into the potential of its entire workforce. The case of Eloise Page – who started working as General William Donovan’s secretary during the Second World War, helped identify Nazi spies in Brussels after the war, and then joined the CIA to eventually become Chief of Station in Athens in 1978 – proves that women were more than able to achieve operational successes (Benn Porter 2013, 13). Yet the women who authored the 1953 study seemed to accept prevalent gender biases, using the name of a women’s undergarment (petticoat) to refer to their
task force, and conceding that ‘[an] employer cannot be sure that a woman employee will not elect to resign upon marriage, or to devote more time to her family’ (Panel on Career Service for Women 1953b, 9).

While the report made a series of recommendations, ranging from a policy statement to encourage utilization of women in the agency to better career advancement opportunities for women, CIA leadership decided not to implement any immediate corrective policy. Management considered that existing regulations, which mandated against any discrimination regarding personnel ‘because of favoritism, marital status, sex, race, color, religion or external pressure’, were sufficient (Center for the Study of Intelligence 2003, 10-12). Senior officers were grappling with several other personnel management issues that they considered more important at the time, including the lack of consistent recruitment and promotion policies (CIA 1953; Kirkpatrick 1953, 6-7). The ‘Petticoat’ panel concluded, somewhat complacently but not incorrectly, that ‘a slow evolution of sociological change’ would eventually change attitude toward women (Center for the Study of Intelligence 2003, 9).

Publicly available records show no evidence that the employment of black personnel led to an in-depth study like the Petticoat report but they provide some indications of their situation. By 1957, 703 black employees worked at the CIA, most of them in the directorates of support and intelligence. In 1955, the CIA workforce was around 14,000 employees (Barrett 2005, 217). Assuming this number had remained relatively stable, black employees would have constituted about 5 percent of the agency workforce in the mid-1950s. Their average grade – for those of them in GS grades – was 4.4 at the time (Stewart 1957). In subsequent years, the Office of Personnel continued to report an ‘increase’ in ‘negro employment’, which reached 744 employees in 1963 (Echols 1963). An internal report disseminated the following year highlighted seven cases of black employees who had not advanced proportionately to their educational attainment and length of service. The report concludes that ‘the Negro still suffers from cultural deprivation’ and limited educational levels, which restricted their ability to pass various agency screenings, occupy a broader range of positions and achieve promotion within the agency (Echols 1964; CIA 1964). The effects of racial segregation on black Americans’ access to education, among other resources, hindered their career opportunities at the CIA and beyond. A study conducted in 1967 found fewer than twenty black employees among the CIA’s estimated 12,000 non-clerical employees (Marchetti and Marks 1974, 238). Overall, gender and racial hierarchies limited the role and opportunities given to women and black employees.
at the CIA. Publicly available records suggest that the agency had not devoted much attention to the situation of employees at the intersection between these two groups.

**An era of change: the slow march toward equal employment opportunity**

The civil rights movement along with the cultural revolution of the 1960s helped empower women and minorities, fostering increases in voting, education, jobs and income for women, black Americans, and other discriminated-against groups. Their forceful claims for access to job opportunities and fair employment spawned several federal efforts to tackle workplace discrimination. The government’s approach to equal employment was legalistic and normative, and helped institutionalize a number of requests made by civil rights organizations. Presidents Kennedy (1961) and Johnson (1965, 1967) signed Executive Orders that urged employers to end employment discrimination. Congress passed the Equal Pay Act in 1963, requiring employers to pay men and women the same amount for equal skill, effort, and responsibility in similar working conditions. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 further outlawed employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin. The selection of these categories reflected an understanding that these groups had experienced discrimination and disenfranchisement and were entitled to special protection (Edelman, Riggs Fuller and Mara-Drita 2011, 1616). Title VII enabled individuals to sue their employers for discrimination. An Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) commission would oversee its implementation and enforce civil rights law against employment discrimination (Chen 2009).

These new policies institutionalized a number of pre-existing practices such as counting anonymous minorities in the workforce, periodic re-evaluations of standards of ‘merit’, and reflected a concern with proportional representation and utilization of minorities (Skrentny 1996, 7-8). The administration of Richard Nixon (1969-1974) sought to enforce affirmative action, moving from nondiscrimination to minority preference and exhorting employers to use a measurable approach based on goals and timetables (Davis Graham 1994, 17-19; Elias 2018, 307-310). For its critics, affirmative action forced ‘overtly racial hiring decisions’ and eroded the traditional notion of ‘merit’. Yet ‘merit’ itself can be criticized as a vague and color-blind concept (Skrentny 1996, 36, 110). At the agency level, the implementation of these regulations would depend on factors such as political preferences, organizational leadership and resources – all of which were shaped, in turn, by societal conceptions about the role and place of women and racial minorities in society (Elias 2018, 303).
Government enforcement of this new regulatory environment pushed the CIA to develop EEO policies and procedures to investigate discrimination, and provide opportunity for redress should discrimination occur (CIA 1965). In 1970, the agency was asked to report to the Civil Service Commission on progress regarding its EEO program (CIA 1970). One report emphasizes the ‘positive efforts by the Office of Personnel to recruit from minority groups’ for clerical and lower graded nonprofessional positions. But instructions and training on EEO questions remained ‘informal and limited to discussions of objective and procedures’ (EEO Officer Support Directorate 1970). Personnel data gathered in the early 1970s suggest that the place of women and black employees at the CIA remained limited. The representation of black employees stagnated at 5.1 percent of the agency workforce in 1971, and only 50 of them had achieved a grade of GS-11 (Centre for the Study of Intelligence 2003, 15). This percentage compared quite poorly to their employment in federal government (15.2 percent) and the 11.2 percent of black people in the United States in 1970 (CIA 1972, 12). Reflecting changes in societal norms, publicly available agency records stopped using the term ‘negro’ to refer to ‘black’ employees in 1972, several years after public criticism of this term had started. This linguistic change shows that the agency was adapting to its social environment, but it could not conceal the recurrence of racial hierarchies.

In subsequent years, the Office of Personnel developed a series of ‘recruitment innovations’ to support equal employment opportunities for black and female employees. These included hiring a black minority recruiter, inviting black co-op officials to meet CIA professionals, guaranteeing graduate level education to qualified black applicants. But CIA recruitment efforts were hampered because ‘Negro colleges’ did not appear to have ‘adequate academic standards for the Career Training Program’. Racial segregation had formally disappeared, but black citizens continued to struggle to get access to first-rate education. Recruiters decided to focus their efforts on black applicants from the same schools from which the agency received its other officers. The memo further raised concern about potential bias in the professional battery test used to assess applicants – which might explain some of the difficulty in recruiting more black employees (Chief Career Training Program 1971). A memo on minority recruitment explained that ‘there are relatively few qualified blacks in the employment market who can meet the agency’s substantive requirements’ (Deputy Director of Personnel for Recruitment and Placement 1972b). The report noted that government agencies, including CIA, are ‘at a disadvantage in competing for the better graduates’ (Ibid.) because of lower starting
salaries, slow employment decisions, and issues with location of work. The Deputy Director of Personnel for Recruitment and Placement proposed a more nuanced and targeted effort at recruiting black employees with the help of relevant colleges. Executive Director William Colby (1972), who was trying to keep a close eye on the situation of women and black employees throughout the agency, ‘fully concurred’.

The agency’s EEO program seemed to suffer from its poor visibility and took a series of steps to improve understanding of equal opportunity issues (CIA 1972b). Screening of films such as the documentary ‘Black and White –Uptight’ emphasized inequalities of education, economic opportunity and legal protection between black and white people in an effort to ‘deprogram’ racial bias (Miller1969). Another film ‘What’s the Matter with Alice?’, sought to ‘orient supervisors and managers to upward mobility concepts’ (Civil Service Commission 1972, 2; Durbin 2013, 21). Representatives from personnel security, medical staff, training and inspector general staff initially offered ‘mixed’ reactions to these films, but a majority agreed they should be used for appropriate training and discussion groups (Deputy Director of Personnel for Recruitment and Placement 1972a, 2; CIA 1975, 15). The EEO program acknowledged had been ‘a demonstrable discrimination against women in this Agency’ but optimistically noted ‘there are encouraging signs that this is becoming more broadly recognized. Our approach to this problem differs from our approach to black employment in all essentials’ (CIA 1972b). Subsequent initiatives sought to ‘upgrade the role of women and heighten their sense of participation’ at the CIA (Deputy Director of Personnel for recruitment and Placement 1972a). But statistics showed that the number of women working at the CIA dipped from 39 percent in 1953 to 31 percent in 1972, and their average grade rank (GS-7.3) remained well below the average for male employees (GS-11.4) (CIA 1972a, ii). Despite a slight increase in their average grade (from 4.75 in 1952 to 6.3 in 1970), the overall picture was that of ‘an essentially static situation’ for black employees (Wattles 1970), who continued to be discussed as a homogenous category.

William Colby, who became DCI in September 1973, supported the establishment of a Women’s Advisory Panel to further analyze their situation. The resulting study used statistics to show that women were overrepresented in lower salary grades across the four CIA directorates, and underrepresented in higher grades (Durbin 2013, 22-23). This discrepancy was clear to women serving at the CIA. A female officer who joined as a linguist in the 1960s remembers that women serving at senior levels like GS-13, were extremely rare at the time, to
the point she perceived one as ‘a goddess’ (CIA 1994, 5). Joanna Mendez, who joined the agency in 1966 as a clerk before transitioning to the Office of Technical Services, remembers some men hazed her during her training and felt she needed to ‘work harder than they do’ to prove herself (Winkler 2019). In a notice to all the CIA employees, DCI Colby (1974, 2-3) noted ‘It is every supervisor’s responsibility […] to plan and implement upward mobility and special training programs for black and women employees who are dead-ended in their jobs but who have the potential and will to learn and gain new experience […]. Equal Employment Opportunity in the Federal Government is not only the law, it is the only way to ensure the continuation of the Agency’s mission’. Colby would later support the inclusion of performance ratings in equal opportunity areas into supervisors’ annual fitness report (Career Service Panel 1974, 2).

Agency EEO officials remained concerned about the difficulty the agency confronted in recruiting black employees and their under-representation in the workforce. A report to the EEO Director identifies the ‘reputation’ the agency had gained over the years as ‘a lily white organization’ as a major obstacle (EEO Black Advisory Panel 1974). The memo suggests changing personnel management practices, for example by stopping to attach snapshots to personnel folders. The EEO program had gained in importance following the passage of the Equal Employment Act of 1972. The Director of EEO could now rely on professional counselors handling the informal stage of complaint procedures, and dozens of EEO representatives throughout the agency. The Federal Women’s Program Coordinator acted as Deputy Director of EEO. Both the Director and his Deputy were also members of the Inspector General’s (IG) Staff, allowing them to access data on IG complaint cases immediately (Colby and Director of Equal Employment Opportunity 1973). In 1975, the agency established a dedicated EEO Office within the Office of Personnel (Ware 1975). This structure would help systematize the possibility for each applicant and employee that they would receive equal opportunity ‘for employment and for subsequent assignment, training, development and promotion with no distinction or bias derived from race, sex, religion, national origin, language, age or physical handicap’ (Ibid.). But the institutionalization of EEO did not eradicate problems of representation and discrimination.

Affirmative action struggled to bridge the women and men’s job ladders. By 1977, women continued to make up a limited percentage (15 percent) of employees in grades GS-9 and above. The average female employee was at GS-7.7, which compared favorably to their position in
the federal government as a whole (GS-5.84) (Blake 1978). The position of women remained particularly limited at the Directorate of Operations (DO), where they accounted for 8.2 percent of the workforce in 1978. A memorandum explained that ‘cultural restrictions on their operational use in many parts of the world must necessarily limit their numbers in the Operations Directorate’ (Ibid.). Women were also underrepresented in physical science positions where they represented 4.7 percent of the workforce. The Deputy Director for Administration explained that ‘only about seven percent of those [applicants] studying engineering or the physical sciences are female’ (Ibid.). The underrepresentation of women in these positions can be linked to the way in which science and objectivity have historically been considered as masculine traits (Peterson 1992, 195). In another memorandum, the Deputy Director complained about ‘the lack of a sufficient number of qualified minority applicants in order to assist components in meeting hiring goals’ (Blake 1978). The situation of black employees remained equally problematic. In a letter to DCI Stansfield Turner sent in June 1978, a ‘concerned black GS-15 staff employee’ noted: ‘There are about 1,100 black employees in CIA. Despite 31 years of existence, CIA has only one black supergrade, a handful of GS-15 officers and, to my knowledge, no blacks in any line command position at Headquarters’. The employee requested an ‘unequivocal statement’ from the CIA on affirmative action addressed equally ‘to the black (and other minority) population in the Agency’ (Office of the Inspector General 1978). In the following months, DCI Turner sent a series of memos to the Deputy Director for Operations in which he expressed his concern that ‘few blacks and women are given supervisory and managerial posts in Headquarters’ (Turner 1978a), and emphasized – for the first time – the situation of black women, whose access to senior positions in the future ‘would be minimal’ (Turner 1978b).

Structural inequalities continued to limit the career opportunities of women and black citizens well after the civil rights movement pushed for, government reforms and the introduction of legal protections. These two groups continued to be over-represented in lower grades government posts throughout the 1970s and beyond (Rose and Ping Chia 1978, 250; DiPrete 1987, 122) and the situation of black women was only starting to draw some attention. The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 called for government workforce to reflect ‘the nation’s diversity’ (Pitts 2005, 616). In addition to the moral imperative to provide equal opportunities to all citizens, there was now also a democratic mandate to develop a representative bureaucracy that would better take into account women, as well as racial and ethnic minorities.
Critics feared that a narrow pursuit of diversity, based on strict representation, would not support but challenge equal opportunity (Skrentny 1996, 1-2).

**Challenging the status quo**

The history of women and black employees at the CIA goes beyond government policies. Marginalized groups have played a key role in setting up grassroots initiatives that defined and represented their interests and pushed the agency to change. Women started to organize themselves, achieving some representation through the congressional women’s caucus, which met with the DCI Turner in 1978 (Eckstein 1978). In a memorandum, addressed to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, an Agency representative of the Federal Women’s Program Board (1977) recommended ‘It is important not only for managers to be fair, but to be seen as being fair […] the inclusion of women and minorities on promotion panels will alleviate these suspicions and generate a greater feeling of trust in the objectivity and fairness of the system’. A few pages later, the author of the memo warned: ‘pressure from women and minority groups will increase’ and ‘competent blacks feel a sense of hopelessness and frustration with their career progression in CIA’ (Ibid.). This warning echoed the experience of other intelligence agencies such as the NSA which, following a discrimination complaint by one of its female employees, was forced to include women on its promotion panels (US District Court for the District of Maryland 1976; NSA 2020c).

The case of Harritte T. Thompson, an employee of the Directorate of Operations (DO) who joined the CIA in 1952 and claimed to have hit a glass ceiling in the late 1970s, exemplifies the continued struggle of women at the CIA, as well as their ability to challenge hierarchies and enforce their rights. Thompson was the first woman to challenge the CIA in court for gender discrimination. She initially lodged a formal administrative complaint in October 1977 for discrimination based on sex. In her complaint, she noted that, after she achieved a GS-12 position, her promotion rate became much slower than her male colleagues performing similar work. Thereafter, she had continued to perform very well and was assigned a number of GS-15 and GS-16 positions, while formally remaining at GS-14. This suggests that CIA statistics about the average grade of women (and possibly other categories of employees) did not provide an accurate representation of their responsibilities. Thompson complained that ‘because of my sex, I have been systematically denied essential training courses designed to prepare officers for upward mobility’ (Ellison 2002, 46).
The EEO office received the case and launched an enquiry into her career. The investigation comprehensively examined the broader context of the DO. The investigators used employment data to evidence ‘disparate sexual representation with increasing grade level’ (CIA 1978, 5-6). Thompson had received ‘very little CIA training, much less in both quality and quantity than the average of her male colleagues’ (Ibid, 6). In other words, she was not provided equal opportunities to progress and develop her career. Elements within the DO continued to overlook the effect of the directorate’s policies and its ‘cowboy’ sub-culture on the position of women. Instead, officers emphasized the role of ‘prejudice in the cultures in which we must operate’ which created circumstances in which women ‘seldom have access to information of value’ (Ibid, 10). However, the DO itself was not free of prejudice. One senior officer who had ranked Thompson as a part of her promotion review noted that ‘male officers could better control and exploit the emotional aspects of relationships with their agents, while women were more emotional’ (Ibid.).

The EEO investigation found evidence of discrimination, noting that the complainant had been ‘damaged primarily by unwitting, subliminal, unconscious discriminatory procedures which have become institutionalized by practice’ (Ibid, 16). The investigation underlined the weight of societal preconceptions about the abilities and role of women, and their expression through institutional practices. Thompson was promoted to GS-15, but unsatisfied with this outcome, she decided to appeal this decision. A complaints advisory committee examined the case in January 1979 and found that she had consistently been ‘held in high esteem’, yet received ‘disparate treatment’ when she was ‘ranked lower than her peers’ and recommended she should be promoted to a GS-15 position retroactive to October 1975 (Ware 1979). Reviewing the evidence in the case, the Director of EEO recommended Thompson should be promoted to GS-16 as she had initially requested. In May 1979, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence approved her retroactive promotion but decided not to promote her to GS-16.

Having exhausted internal processes, Thompson reached out to an attorney who, in June 1979, filed suit (Ellison 2002, 49). The suit charged that the CIA had violated the Equal Pay Act by paying Thompson less than male employees for equal work under similar working conditions, and requested for her to be promoted retroactively to GS-16 from February 1977 and GS-15 from May 1972. Senior CIA officers were concerned that the case would ‘put the Agency’s entire personnel system on trial’ and in June 1980 they proposed a settlement. The DO was
forced to promote Thompson to GS-16 retroactive to October 1977, and required to revise its promotion criteria. Thompson accepted the settlement and pursued her career at the CIA until her retirement in 1989, as a member of the Senior Intelligence Service (SIS) (Ibid, 52-53). A former senior CIA officer writes that Thompson’s case ‘undoubtedly helped to focus Agency senior managers on the bow wave of social change coming toward them’ (Ibid, 53). Yet their reluctance to provide a satisfying resolution to Thompson’s complaint shows that change was not coming easy. Social hierarchies continued to permeate US society and limit the opportunities offered to women at the CIA.

A majority of women continued to occupy the lower ranks of the CIA workforce. By 1980, women represented 35 percent of the agency workforce (a four percent increase compared to 1972) and only eleven of them served in the SIS (Federal Women’s Program Board 1981, 1). A report by the CIA Federal Women’s Program found there was ‘an underrepresentation of professional minority women, women in supervisory and management positions, and women in the Senior Executive Service’ (Federal Women’s Program Manager 1983). The CIA Deputy Director was ‘appalled’ and ‘embarrassed’ by this situation and asked that ‘immediate remedial action be taken to address this woeful imbalance’ (Deputy Director of Central Intelligence 1983). To change this situation, Agency officials reviewed recruitment practices, seeking to hire more women at the upper and middle levels, and exploring ways to facilitate their access to higher grades and salaries (Ukova 2016, 54). The Directorate of Administration was considering a course on ‘women and leadership’ – but this proposal from the Office of Training and Education (1981) was discarded because it would only serve one category of employees and discriminate against others. The rationale for the course proposal referred to ‘a class action filed on behalf of professional women’ in the national foreign assessment center (Federal Women’s Program Manager 1981). A number of women and protected minorities followed in Thompson’s footsteps, seeking legal action against what they perceived to be discriminatory employment practices, with varying degrees of success (US District Court for the District of Columbia, 1980a, 1980b, 1981a, 1981b, 1983).

In the mid-1980s, several female field officers proved themselves by recruiting a series of foreign agents. Women started to become more recognized by fellow officers for their different life experiences, understanding of threats and outlook, and therefore their different approach to recruitment (CIA 1984, 10-11). Giving them a greater place in the recruitment of agents did not only improve representation, but it could also have operational implications, leading to new
types of recruitments and channels to collect intelligence. Despite the achievements of female officers who had proven they could ‘command respect of subordinates, work under difficult conditions, establish rapport with agents and liaison counterparts, handle complex technology etc.’, the CIA continued to be marked by ‘the entrenched image of male, action-oriented leadership’ (Deputy Chief History Staff 1984).

To overcome persisting prejudices and defend their common interests, some women decided to mobilize and organize themselves. Women of the DO, for example, established a Women’s Advisory Council (DOWAC), which counted some 25 women in the mid-1980s. DOWAC was chartered as an organization that advised the Deputy Director of Operations on the hiring, training and promotion of women. The council requested statistics from the Career Management Staff about the role of women in promotion panels within the DO. Following their intervention, the senior service started to put women and minorities on promotion panels, according to one former CIA officer (CIA 1984, 17). DOWAC also put pressure on the CIA Office of Medical Service to conduct a study of the twenty-two women working as operations officers (Ibid, 18). The study, which compared the conditions of these female officers to that of female doctors, grabbed the attention of Agency leaders, and paved the way for subsequent internal reports and discussions. These examples show that the history of workforce management at the CIA was not simply led from the top by government policies and senior officials but also influenced by women’s increasing empowerment and sense of collective identity.

By the end of the 1980s, DCI William Webster expected ‘continued progress with respect to the representation of minorities in the agency’s professional work force in general, as well as increases of both women and minorities in the middle and upper levers of the grade structure’ and promised to ‘closely monitor’ their situation (CIA 1988, 3). Imbalances in the workforce, when compared to national civilian labor force, seemed to justify ‘affirmative employment initiatives’ for a number of positions and diverse groups including black candidates but also Hispanic, Asian and Native American men and women (Ibid, 21). Discussion about equal opportunity now focused on a broader set of identity categories or minorities who continued to be deprived from the prestige and benefits attached to senior positions. Louis Stokes (D-OH), the first African-American chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (from 1987 to 1989), would later emphasize the effects of ‘ancient customs and outmoded thinking, mind-sets’ (social norms) on the hiring, promotion and representation of minorities,
women and disabled persons within the community. ‘In all probability’, Stokes (1994, 7) noted, these would ‘require years to change’.

Managing diversity

In the 1980s, business, demographic, socio-political trends combined to create a shift in workforce policies. Reports produced for the Reagan administration in the late 1980s anticipated significant changes in the labor market. Demographic shifts and gains in educational attainment would soon contribute to an influx of women, minorities and immigrants into the labor market, further challenging government agencies to adapt their workforce policies and practices (Johnston and Packer 1987; Office of Personnel Management 1988). Without an effective effort to manage the growing diversity these reports anticipated, discrimination was likely to persist. American businesses proposed a ‘new’ management style that would harness the background and experiences of different types of employees (Williams 2015, 78). Making diverse employees feel appreciated would help to avoid costly lawsuits and maximize productivity. This reconceptualization of human resources management emphasized a broad understanding of workforce diversity, going beyond legally protected categories to add a variety of dimensions such as personality traits, diversity of thoughts, work styles and cultures (Edelman, Fuller, Mara-Drita 2001, 1589; Bell and Hartmann 2007). This approach depoliticized equal opportunity and turned it into a managerial issue. Organizations would now leverage a wider range of experiences and cultural expertise to boost creativity and identify solutions to complex problems (Williams 2015, 82).

The administration used the rhetoric of diversity management to move away from vigorous government enforcement of anti-discrimination regulations, and emphasize the free-market as way to increase performance and solve social problems. The market, not government regulations, was supposed to achieve equal employment opportunity (see Boyle 1973, 65; Thomas 1990; Kelly and Dobbin, 1998). Diversity became valued as a resource rather than a requirement, but there was no consensus on what policies would effectively harness diversity, and how to assess their outputs (Ferner, Almond and Colling 2005, 309; Pitts 2005; Pitts 2009). For its critics, the rhetoric of diversity and the introduction of new socio-cultural classifiers encouraged human resources professionals to overlook two central issues: sexual and racial discrimination (Kelly and Dobin 1998, 961; Lorbiecki and Jack 2000, 24; Kellough and Naff 2004, 65). Women and protected minorities continued to struggle to achieve upward mobility
into senior positions. In its Glass Ceiling Initiative, the Department of Labor (1991, 6) investigated barriers government employees faced in reaching top executive positions and found that women represented 6.6 percent and minorities 2.6 percent of executives in 1989.

The federal government’s effort to re-examine human resource policies soon reached the IC. A study conducted by the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) following a request made in the 1988 Intelligence Authorization Act emphasized recommended the IC should develop a flexible human resource management system, and make a greater effort to recruit and retain a diverse workforce (Director Planning and Policy Office 1988a, 1988b; National Academy of Public Administration 1989; Webster 1989). The shift toward diversity management hit the CIA at a time of change. Following the fall of the Soviet Union, intelligence priorities shifted and intelligence budgets decreased, leading to significant downsizing. While these changes captured the attention of intelligence leaders and members of Congress, old personnel problems persisted.

Frustrated with the lack of women in senior positions, a group of senior CIA female officers asked DCI Webster to launch a new study on women at the CIA. In March 1991, Webster ordered a study to ‘determine if career advancement barriers exist for Agency professional employees, particularly women and minorities’ (Gates 1992, 1). This study was the first to systematically examine discrimination toward women and ethnic and racial minorities. The assumption was that attitudinal and organizational biases, a kind of glass ceiling, might prevent these employees from advancing to middle and upper-level positions. The findings showed that a glass ceiling existed for women and minorities (CIA 1992a, 1-2). Women continued to be concentrated in lower grades than men were, and black as well as Asian Pacific Americans, Hispanic and Native Americans occupied lower grade levels than white employees. Women who constituted nearly 40 percent of the CIA workforce held only 10 percent of SIS positions, and (ethnic and racial) minorities who constituted about 10 percent of the agency workforce, 4 percent of them. Promotion rates in 1985-1990 were higher for men and white employees than for women and minorities respectively (Ibid, 3). One female officer remembers that the Glass Ceiling Study ‘put in hardcopy under CIA seal the statistics which proved the discrimination’ (CIA 1994, 19).

On a qualitative level, the study emphasized women and minorities’ dissatisfaction with the decision-making process for advancement and promotion, and divergent conceptions of how
to develop a successful career (CIA 1992a, 4). The survey helped to identify systematic barriers to their success. Female and minorities were offered less prestigious and visible assignments than white male employees. A lack of feedback and communication from superiors limited their progress. Stereotypes considered women and minorities to be less effective or only good for some types of jobs, typically those at lower grades. They worked in an adverse, alienating and uncomfortable environment, and inadequate work and family policies failed to take into account circumstances that hindered their careers (CIA 1992a, 9-17). The study paid attention to the intersections between multiple identity categories, considering not only the position of black women but also that of Hispanic and Asian Pacific women. Sections on black and Hispanic women identified their ‘feelings of isolation, alienation and powerlessness’ as a key issue (Ibid., 23-24). Nearly 50 percent of women reported experiencing sexual harassment. More than 50 percent of black women and 60 percent of black men reported racial harassment. At the time of the study, there was no racial harassment policy within the agency and ‘both employees and management lack[ed] the skills to deal with’ such issues (CIA 1992c, Appendix C-1).

In their recommendations, the authors of the Glass Ceiling Study proposed to include women and minority employees in all selection panels and to report on the consideration given to female and minority applicants for each assignment. Other recommendations proposed to further develop cultural and gender issues training, and evaluate ‘the effectiveness of existing racial and sexual harassment training programs’. The study also recommended to ‘pursue more effective [performance] feedback and communication policies and practices’, and better communicate about the agency’s commitment to work and family policies including parental leave, flexible working hours, etc. (Ibid, 28-30).

The release of the Glass Ceiling Study was, for the first time, accompanied by a communication campaign and a structured effort to implement its recommendations. The study was shared widely within the agency and beyond, generating some media coverage (Hirsch 1992). The agency subsequently launched a new recruitment advertising campaign targeted toward minority professionals in magazines like Ebony. A Washington Post article published shortly before the release of the Glass Ceiling Study noted that minorities represented 10.1 percent of the CIA’s professional staff, and 6.4 percent of the professional staff were black (Farhi 1991). At the CIA, DCI Robert Gates encouraged his employees to read the study and to ‘create an environment that provides opportunities for each employee to develop his or her potential regardless of gender or ethnicity’ (Gates 1992). He established a task force to implement the
study recommendations. A follow-on implementation report embraced the rhetoric of diversity management, presenting diversity as an asset that is ‘essential to the Agency’s ability to achieve its intelligence objectives’ (CIA 1992c, 1). To ensure compliance with the Glass Ceiling Study recommendations, the implementation group emphasized the need for continuous ‘commitment of senior agency management’ – through periodic meetings, expanded support for EEO initiatives, consultation with women and minority network groups, and annual reports on diversity issues. A number of accountability mechanisms, including an independent follow on study, and inspections by the IG would help pursue this effort (Ibid. 2-5).

Employees’ comments on the proposed glass ceiling actions reveal mixed feelings and feedback. Some employees felt the study was ‘comprehensive and objective’ and would lead to ‘specific action’. A number of employees feared the impositions of quotas that might affect recruitment and career progression, and trump job performance. Some senior officials expressed their concern that new measures would impose additional administrative burdens on managers who would ‘feel pressured to favor women and minority employees regardless of ability in order to show they can “manage diversity”’ (CIA 1992b). One particularly disapproving employee felt the study was a politically motivated exercise through which some elements of the agency were imposing their values, and senior management could remain ‘politically correct’ (Ibid.). He exhorted management to ‘avoid the contracting of bombasting clowns who take multicultural and gender training as an opportunity to lambast white males and only have the effect of further alienating groups’ (Ibid.). Less politically oriented criticisms questioned why specific measures – such as shadow assignment and leadership development training opportunities – should be provided only to some employees. Some recommendations seemed to support diversity at the cost of equal opportunity. Would the proposed measures institute ‘a system of minority/female preferences or reverse discrimination’ that would ‘exclude white males’ (Ibid.)?

While the Glass Ceiling Study raised awareness of persisting issues of representation and equal opportunity at the CIA, follow-on efforts revealed the difficulty of implementing effective and balanced personnel policies in such a sensitive and politically charged area. These problems were not unique to the CIA, and started to attract congressional attention. In 1994, the directors of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the NSA publicly acknowledged similar problems with the recruitment, promotion and retention of minorities and women at a congressional hearing (US House of Representatives 1994). Representative Patricia Schroeder
(D-CO) subsequently requested the Government Accounting Office to conduct a review into personnel practices, which found that female and minority were significantly underrepresented at the CIA, the DIA and the NSA when compared to the rest of the federal workforce from 1992 to 1994. And while the three agencies recorded ‘substantially fewer [EEO] complaints’ per employee than the rest of federal government, their number were increasing dramatically (Government Accounting Office 1996, 20-27).

Shortly after the Glass Ceiling Study, a number of court cases emphasized recurring issues with the position of women at the CIA, raising further questions about the ability of its leadership to effectively manage diversity. *New York Times* journalist Tim Weiner (1994) publicly outed Janine Brookner, ‘a terrific spy’ who was suing the CIA for sex discrimination. The CIA eventually settled for $410,000 and Brookner resigned, pursuing a successful career as a national security lawyer (Jones 2018). Shortly after, a group of female operations officers sued the CIA for sex discrimination. They had initially filed complaints of employment discrimination with the agency’s EEO office from 1986 to 1994, claiming there was a pattern of discrimination against women who had systematically been denied promotion opportunities. Dissatisfied with the way the agency dealt with their complaint, they decided to sue. Hundreds of CIA women soon joined the case, which was being handled as a class action. The CIA, wary about the negative publicity, offered close to a million dollars in back pay and salary increases and retroactively promoted 25 officers to settle the lawsuit (Pear 1995). But the principal employees behind the class action found that the proposed settlement was inadequate.

Several female officers considered that the CIA, and the DO specifically, continued to provide a discriminatory work environment. Some of the arguments initially presented in the 1950s continued to be used to argue that women would struggle to recruit agents in countries in which they had a low social status (Smith 1995). Despite their operational successes, women’s abilities were still assumed to be limited because of their sex. Under increasing public pressure, DCI John Deutch (1995) established workforce diversity guidelines for the IC, and appointed an outsider – Nora Slatkin – as the first female Executive Director, the third highest-ranking official at the CIA, in 1995. The following year, Slatkin (1996) spoke publicly about the agency’s progress but also acknowledged the persistence of problems in the ‘concerted effort to create a workplace where merit is the sole and universal criterion for advancement, and race and gender do not matter’. By the late 1990s, the conditions were ripe for change. Government
and elements of society seemed to embrace diversity, and CIA employees were more organized and less shy about challenging the agency to respect its obligations and keep to its words.

The push for diversity in the aftermath of 9/11

The intelligence controversies surrounding the 9/11 attacks and the decision to go to war in Iraq in 2003 prompted a new period of introspection leading to a series of reforms affecting personnel policies in the IC. The 9/11 commission report recommended ‘renewing emphasis on recruiting diversity among operations officers so they can blend more easily in foreign cities’ (Kean et al 2004, 415). The report on the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq emphasized diversity of analysis to encourage debate over the interpretation of information. The IC had ‘not adapted well to the diverse cultures and settings in which today’s intelligence experts must operate’ (Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction 2005, 20). Indeed, the 2004 intelligence authorization noted that the IC had a ‘significantly lower percentage of women and minorities than the total workforce of the Federal government and the total civilian labor force’ (US Congress 2003, section 319; CIA 2004, 29). Among a plethora of reforms, policymakers and intelligence leaders emphasized the recruitment of racial and ethnic minorities whose language skills and cultural backgrounds could help fill knowledge gaps in the national intelligence workforce, at a time when the community was on a hiring spree to fill the demands of the global war on terrorism. The question was not anymore whether the community should diversify but how to do so most effectively.

The newly established Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) sought to gather workforce data on the entire IC to develop human capital planning in a more systematic fashion. In its public communications, the ODNI (2006) embraced the rhetoric of diversity, elevating this concept as one of its seven principles of professional ethics (ODNI 2014). To create a sustainable pipeline of diverse candidates applying for jobs in the IC, the ODNI with the support of the congressional intelligence committees launched the Intelligence Community Center for Academic Excellence (ICCAE) program in 2005. The aim of this program was to collaborate with higher education institutions to ‘develop competitive, knowledgeable, and ethnically diverse talent pools for improving the IC’s recruiting, hiring, and retention of qualified Americans with foreign language proficiency, regional expertise, and cultural awareness’ (Ibid., 9). Speaking at an event in El Paso, TX, where one of these ICCAEs was
established, the then director of the National Clandestine Service and the highest-ranking Hispanic employee at the CIA noted:

Nothing is more important to the intelligence profession than cultivating different perspectives on the foreign threats and challenges facing the nation. By hiring men and women with a broad range of ethnic and cultural backgrounds, language expertise and educational experiences, we effectively minimize the likelihood of groupthink. For us diversity is a mission critical objective. We at CIA equate diversity of the workforce with diversity of thought. And we value diversity in all its forms in its most inclusive sense to mean among other things: race, ethnicity, area familiarization, language, culture, education and life experience (Rodriguez 2007).

The communication and recruitment effort to diversify the CIA achieved limited progress. When Rodriguez publicly defended the importance of diversity to the CIA mission in 2007, 14 percent of NSC officers were from a minority background. A subsequent report on workforce trends between 1980-2009 concluded that the agency was making ‘significant progress in diversifying its workforce’ noting that female representation had increased from 35 percent in 1980 to 44 percent (CIA 2010b). However, the report conveniently overlooked the decrease from 39 percent of women in 1953 to 35 percent in 1980, and the limited (four percent) increase from 1953 to 2009. This report also showed an increase in the overall number of minority employees from 11 percent in 1980 to 23 percent in 2009 but did not provide data about the different racial and ethnic groups behind this category (Ibid., 7). Statistics indicated the representation of minority female employees in grades GS-13 to GS-15 had grown from two percent in 1980 to 40 percent in 2009. Yet only one percent of minority women and three percent of minority men were SIS employees at the time, compared to four percent of non-minority female and 6 percent for non-minority male employees (Ibid., 8). The author recognized that ‘non-minority females and minorities, relative to their overall share of the agency population, remain underrepresented at GS14 and above. Minorities, particularly female minorities, have the most marked disparity’ (Ibid., 9).

The lack of women at senior levels continued to attract CIA leadership’s attention. In 2012, Director Petraeus established a Director Advisory Group (DAG), led by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to examine the barriers confronted by women seeking a promotion to SIS. The DAG conducted a series of surveys, focus groups, and interviews, finding significant discrepancies in employment between men and women (Petraeus 2012, 1). Its initial report noted that many women, including minority women, continued to struggle to break the
glass ceiling because of unconscious biases embedded within the culture of the agency and external barriers. Their promotion rate had improved but remained insufficient to increase their representation at senior ranks. In 2012, women constituted 31 percent of the agency’s SIS corps – a proportion that mirrored their number at senior executive levels across federal government (DAG 2013, 5; Carey 2012, 19). This was problematic because, as the report stated, research has established that ‘companies with three or more women on their senior management teams scored higher on nine important dimensions of organization – from leadership to accountability, from motivation to innovation – than those with no senior-level women’ (Ibid., 4). The report identified a number of recurring issues preventing women’s career advancement including: ‘lack of sponsors, forms of subtle bias and harassment, insufficient workplace flexibility, an increasing number of extreme jobs, and the pull of outside responsibilities’ (Ibid., 5). Some employees continued to complain about gender discrimination, sexual harassment and unlawful bias (Ibid., 10).

Key DAG recommendations addressed personnel issues that went far beyond sex discrimination. They included the establishment of clearer promotion criteria and an expansion of the pool of nominee to SIS positions. The advisory group also recommended establishing an ‘equity assurance representative role’ on promotion panels, a sponsorship program, and further workplace flexibility for all employees (Ibid., 2). These measures and the three core objectives emphasized in the last part of the report – to foster intentional development, value diverse paths and increase workplace flexibility – show how gender issues encompass all CIA employees. Implementation of these recommendations followed a two-pronged approach including top-down management support and grassroots involvement (Director’s Advisory Group Implementation 2017, 4). From 2013 to 2018, DAG recommendations were progressively implemented, and tracked through yearly reports. A separate survey of diversity at the CIA identified continuing difficulties to improve the representation of minorities at higher grades. Despite an agency minority population of 23.9 percent including 11.4 percent of employees identifying as ‘Black or African American’, minority employees only held about 10 percent of positions at SIS level (CIA 2015b, 14, 22). They continued to be underrepresented (below 20 percent) in the analyst and operations officer job classes (Ibid., 15). ‘Minority officers, particularly women of color’ had not ‘experienced similar gains’ to non-minority women in terms of advancing to leadership positions (Ibid., 16).
The CIA achieved a number of internal reforms in the last decade, including the establishment of clear criteria for promotion to SIS, required equity assurance training for officers on promotion panels and more flexible work options. By 2018, the SIS was composed of 36 percent of women. The DAG officially concluded in June 2018 and its key resources and deliverables were transferred to permanent units such as the CIA Talent Center of Excellence and its Center for Mission Diversity and Inclusion (CIA 2015a; CIA 2018). CIA leadership has embraced and sought to institutionalize the notion that its ‘national security mission requires inclusion of diverse viewpoints and expertise in decision-making at all levels of the organization’ (CIA 2013, 5). However, if history is any guide, the extent to which these initiatives will effectively help the agency develop and manage an increasingly diverse workforce in a fair and equitable manner remains to be seen.

Some of the prejudices that have long affected the work environment provided by the CIA are evident in a series of recently published memoirs written by white female. Nada Bakos (2019, chapter 11), Amaryllis Fox (2019, 157) and Tracy Walder (2019, 39, 47) all describe a male-dominated environment and emphasize the prejudices and difficulties they confronted as women working as operations officers and analyst during the global war on terrorism. Their accounts highlight some of the difficulties of reconciling motherhood and family life with the highly demanding and stressful nature of working at the CIA (Fox 2019, 193-194; Walder, 2019, 158). But their stories – just like those of Eloise Page and Virginia Hall – challenge popular assumptions about the masculine nature of intelligence work, highlighting how women were ‘critical’ in developing and refining the CIA’s effort to counter Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups (Bakos 2019, chapters 1, 5, 7). For Fox (2019, 157) ‘machismo is destined to change’ given the ‘unique skill set women bring to this work – the emotional intelligence, aptitude for multitasking, and keen intuition’. Walder (2019, 114), whose career brought her from the CIA to the FBI, compares the two agencies and notes that ‘the CIA felt like a true meritocracy’. These memoirs present strong women who overcame professional barriers and personal challenges to contribute to key intelligence missions. However, their significance is limited to the experiences of three white women. In the absence of memoirs written by black officers, very little if any information is available on their own views and experiences.

Conclusion
This article linked changes in the situation of women and black personnel at the CIA to three interconnecting factors: social norms, government and organizational policies, and employees’ initiatives and experiences. At the structural level, prejudices against women and black citizens have slowed progress toward equal opportunity, by limiting their access to higher education and pigeonholing them in lower grade and support positions. These prejudices affected CIA leadership when senior officials decided not to take action to remediate the discrimination identified by the ‘Petticoat’ study. Social change, epitomized by the civil rights movement, prompted the federal government and the CIA to develop new personnel policies and procedures to increase the employment of women and black employees and provide them with equal opportunities. But the implementation of equal opportunity policies has been complicated. The CIA has used descriptive statistics to track and evaluate the grades and occupations of a growing range of minorities. Workforce training, the dissemination of internal reports and public communication campaigns raised awareness and signalled CIA’s commitment to equal opportunity but they could not eradicate discrimination. Marginalized groups of employees – specifically women – organized themselves to defend their rights. Reforms passed in the 1960s empowered women and black employees to sue the CIA for racial and sex discrimination, and exert pressure on its leadership. Multiple directors expressed concern about discrimination and supported initiatives to better understand and mitigate this problem. Change, when it occurred, was linked to broader societal shifts, which spurred federal and organizational reforms, and empowered marginalized employees to defend their rights. Commitment from top management, visible through periodic studies, statements and initiatives, has been important to understand the position of women and black personnel but it was never a sufficient condition for meaningful change to occur. Women and black employees have had to push for and sometimes force the CIA to change. When it comes to equal opportunity, the CIA was reactive more than proactive.

The representation of women and black employees in a range of occupations, including in managerial positions, is better today than it was decades ago. The representation of women at the CIA increased from 39 percent in 1953 to 46 percent in 2013 (DAG 2013, 1), and from 10 percent in 1992 to 36 percent in 2018 at the SIS level. In 2018, Senate confirmed the nomination of Gina Haspel, the first woman to become Director of the CIA. Three women have served as deputy directors for analysis, operations and science and technology alongside Director Haspel (Windrem 2019). The combined effects of social change, government policies and individual initiatives have not been as noticeable in the case of black Americans – who
have historically constituted a smaller minority than women at the CIA and in the United States. Their representation stagnated at around five percent for decades, before an increase to more than 10 percent in the 2010s. A number of black officers and racial and ethnic minorities have now served in senior positions (Rhodan 2015).

Equal opportunity and diversity are not only about representation. Statistics and high-level nominations are important but they provide a limited understanding of discrimination. A significant proportion of women and black employees continued to report sexual and racial harassment in the early 1990s. Memoirs written by female CIA officers who served in the 2000s depict the agency as a male-dominated organisation in which women have to cope with prejudices and sometimes harassment. The CIA records provides little information and even less data on this issue. When recommending to reinforce the ‘Agency’s zero tolerance policy’, the DAG (2013, 10) confirmed that harassment remained a significant problem. The situation of black women is similarly difficult to track in the records. Their condition was alarming enough to push Director Turner to share his concern with the Deputy Director for Operations in 1978. More than a decade later, the Glass Ceiling study highlighted their ‘feelings of isolation, alienation and powerlessness’. Few, if any, black officers have expressed themselves publicly about their experience of working at the CIA and researchers thus lack evidence to better understand their situation.

Significant changes in government and CIA policies have helped mitigate but not eliminate problems of discrimination and inequality. Repeated efforts to study and adapt workforce policies to improve the situation of women and black employees highlight a long-term struggle to develop a fair and equitable workplace at the CIA and in government. In the last decades, dozens of officers and would-be employees have taken legal action against the agency, claiming they were discriminated against.¹ These court cases, CIA records and individual accounts highlight a continuing discrepancy between a government rhetoric that embraces equality and diversity, and facts that reveal the persistence of workforce inequalities in the national security state. Today while there is a broad acceptance that workforce diversity can provide increased flexibility and help the CIA harness talent to understand and exploit an

¹ A search for “‘Central Intelligence Agency’ AND discrimination’ on the Westlaw US database reveals 20 unique employment discrimination cases brought against the Central Intelligence Agency in District Courts since 1990.
increasingly complex threat environment, the means to achieve equality remain difficult to identify and implement and require further research.

Feminist and intersectional approaches to the study of intelligence invite us to reconsider the knowledge we develop as intelligence researchers, and the forms of power we decide to focus on. We know much about intelligence as an instrument of state power, but much less about the effect of social hierarchies on intelligence organisations, practitioners and their activities. The diverse and sometimes marginalized groups that compose the intelligence community deserve further attention. We do not know enough about the situation of a number of minorities at the CIA and in other intelligence agencies. A recent release about the history of PRIDE at the CIA (2020), for instance, provides a useful starting point to research the history of LGBT officers. Other identity groups, such as Hispanic officers remain under-represented (Van Puyvelde and Coulthart 2016) and under-studied, and more research is needed to understand how other Western intelligence communities have coped with similar challenges.

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