A priori perceptual entitlement, knowledge-first

Simion, M. (2020) A priori perceptual entitlement, knowledge-first. Philosophical Issues, 30(1), pp. 311-323. (doi: 10.1111/phis.12187)

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Abstract

Tyler Burge notably offers a truth‐first account of perceptual entitlement in terms of a priori necessary representational functions and norms: on his account, epistemic normativity turns on natural norms, which turn on representational functions. This paper has two aims: first, it criticises Tyler Burge's truth‐first a priori derivation on functionalist and value‐theoretic grounds. Second, it develops a novel, knowledge‐first a priori derivation of perceptual entitlement. According to the view developed here, it is a priori that we are entitled to believe the deliverances of our perceptual belief formation system, in virtue of the latter's constitutive function of generating knowledge.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Simion, Professor Mona
Authors: Simion, M.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Research Group:COGITO Epistemology Research Centre
Journal Name:Philosophical Issues
Publisher:Wiley
ISSN:1533-6077
ISSN (Online):1758-2237
Published Online:19 September 2020
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2020 The Authors
First Published:First published in Philosophical Issues 30(1):311-323
Publisher Policy:Reproduced under a Creative Commons licence

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