A priori perceptual entitlement, knowledge-first

Simion, M. (2020) A priori perceptual entitlement, knowledge-first. Philosophical Issues, 30(1), pp. 311-323. (doi: 10.1111/phis.12187)

Abstract

Tyler Burge notably offers a truth‐first account of perceptual entitlement in terms of a priori necessary representational functions and norms: on his account, epistemic normativity turns on natural norms, which turn on representational functions. This paper has two aims: first, it criticises Tyler Burge's truth‐first a priori derivation on functionalist and value‐theoretic grounds. Second, it develops a novel, knowledge‐first a priori derivation of perceptual entitlement. According to the view developed here, it is a priori that we are entitled to believe the deliverances of our perceptual belief formation system, in virtue of the latter's constitutive function of generating knowledge.

• Item Type: Articles
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Simion, Professor Mona
• Authors: Simion, M.
• Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
• College/School: College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
• Research Group: COGITO Epistemology Research Centre
• Journal Name: Philosophical Issues
• Publisher: Wiley
• ISSN: 1533-6077
• ISSN (Online): 1758-2237
• Published Online: 19 September 2020
• Copyright Holders: Copyright © 2020 The Authors
• First Published: First published in Philosophical Issues 30(1):311-323
• Publisher Policy: Reproduced under a Creative Commons licence