
The material cannot be used for any other purpose without further permission of the publisher and is for private use only.

There may be differences between this version and the published version. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it.

http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/222545/

Deposited on 25 August 2020

Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk
Scotland’s Dual Public Sphere and the Media

Philip Schlesinger


Abstract

Mediated communication and culture are central to the analysis of nations and nationalism. Scotland has a distinctive media landscape: newspapers, TV and radio, as well as new digital actors, all carry content specifically tailored for Scottish audiences. After Scottish devolution in 1999, the Scottish media became increasingly central to the new democratic polity. Their role was also crucial during the Scottish independence referendum of 2014. The nation’s mediated public sphere intertwines with that of the UK as a whole. Scottish publics are therefore diversely addressed through a dual public sphere. Of late, the audiovisual media’s role in the Scottish creative economy has grown as a public policy focus. However, the survival of the UK’s public service media is challenged by global internet-based majors in the digital economy, posing new problems for content regulation by states and nations, and the very constitution of national audiences.

Keywords

broadcasting, communication, media, nation, Scotland
Chapter 9

Scotland’s Dual Public Sphere and the Media

Philip Schlesinger

INTRODUCTION

Like other nations in multinational states, Scotland has a dual public sphere—that is, there are two distinct but interconnected communicative spaces in which the citizenry acts politically. There is a Scottish public sphere with its own national political institutions north of the border. This is deeply and simultaneously connected to the wider public sphere of the British state. Although the Scottish and UK public spheres often overlap, key differences in political institutions, voting patterns, and agendas mean that there is built-in scope for dispute about media content, legal and regulatory competencies related to the media, and the distribution of publicly funded resources to support the ‘creative economy’ to which media are central. The present constitutional and political framework, therefore, tends to generate continuous demands for change and, from time to time, drives related policy shifts.

Communication and culture are of key importance for the analysis of nations and nationalism (Schlesinger 2000). According to Deutsch (1953), nations are significantly defined by their internal ‘communicative complementarity’ and this singularity makes each distinct from any other. National boundaries, accordingly, may be seen as containers that both reflect and express the internal cultural development of a given polity. Mediated communication is what facilitates comprehensive territorial reach within such spaces. Deutsch rightly observed that statehood and nationhood do not necessarily coincide. Given Scotland’s historical distinctiveness and status as a devolved nation within
the larger UK, it is worth restating this point—a commonplace north of the border. It is not necessary to possess the political shell of statehood for a nation to have a collective identity or distinctive media.

Developing this Deutschian line of thought, Gellner (1983) argued that under conditions of industrial modernity, territorially based systems of communication tended to produce tightly bounded cultural communities marked as distinct by their common high culture, lingua franca, and media system. Anderson (1983/1991), similarly concerned with nation-formation, also reframed Deutsch’s central idea, in the process coining a celebrated trope. He described the ‘deep, horizontal comradeship’ of the nation as constituting an ‘imagined community’, typically supported by a range of cultural institutions such as the newspaper, the book, the census, the map, and the museum.

Billig (1995) subsequently shifted the focus from nation-building to national cultural reproduction. What he influentially called ‘banal nationalism’ concerned the routine, often unremarked, naturalized features of everyday life. The omnipresence of the national flag, the symbolic uses of the national anthem, the chronic categorizations of insiders and outsiders supplied by major media—all of these making a national identity part of what is taken for granted.

The Deutschian ‘social communications’ approach has been concerned pre-eminently with how nations speak to themselves. This perspective has much in common with Habermas’s (1989) theory of the growth of a public sphere, where the national collective may act as a public engaged in reasoned deliberation about matters of general interest—with affairs of state central to that conversation. This view, first formulated to deal with the emergent public of a ‘nation-state’ on route to modernity, may be adapted to analyse other political formations. Habermas (1994) subsequently sought to apply his theory to the supranational communicative space of the European Union, at
a historical moment when the boundary-transcending cosmopolitan potential of a European identity and public sphere still seemed to be realizable.

If supra-state scaling-up is one analytical option, intra-state scaling-down is another. Within the UK, since 1999 Scotland’s stateless national political distinctiveness has been institutionally buttressed by devolution. The creation of the Scottish Government and the Scottish Parliament, the reorientation of civil service activity, the evolution of Holyrood-focused electoral politics, and the refocusing of political communications became central to the operation of a Scottish polity within the British state. In this connection, then, what we know about ‘the ties between representations, institutions and power’ are crucially important for understanding how such a ‘media nation’ operates (Mihelj 2011: 20).

Debate on the public sphere has engendered discussion of the role of media and public opinion-formation in democracies, most commonly where political public space is coextensive with the boundaries of a state, although it has been extended to nations that do not have sovereign statehood. Discussion of how media operate in the public sphere has been particularly important in shaping discussion of PSB—public service broadcasting (Garnham 1992).

Both social communication and public sphere theories have tended to be inward-looking: first and foremost, they concern national publics that speak to themselves. However, states and nations do not exist in isolation. Both public deliberation and national identity need to be understood in the wider contexts that give them shape.

For example, the UK’s exit from the European Union (EU) in 2019 did not cancel the British state’s need to devise a new set of relations with that formation’s Member States. A changed relationship to the EU did not mean that splendid isolation and autarchy had become feasible future options. Moreover, the reshaping of international relations between the UK and the EU had, and will continue to have, consequences for interrelations between
the component nations of the British state. The outcome of the 2016 referendum on leaving the EU was a case in point. Only 48 per cent of England’s electorate voted to remain in the European Union whereas in Scotland 62 per cent opted to do so. This divergence fed into the continuing debate over Scotland’s place both in the UK and the EU.

Social communication theory describes relatively stable political formations with largely predictable patterns of cultural reproduction. Aside from the political and constitutional question marks hanging over the UK’s future, like the media industries elsewhere in the UK as well as in other small countries, Scotland’s media face a period of major instability due to the digital revolution (Schlesinger and Benchimol 2015). This has profoundly disrupted the business models of media enterprises—how they deliver content, how this is consumed, and relationships to competitors and audiences. The present digital revolution is transforming media and communications globally. Scotland’s media, therefore, are faced by wider changes in technologies, consumption, and markets and related questions of policy and regulation.

This chapter will discuss the contemporary lineaments of a Scottish media space that is also, in David McCrone’s (2017: 555) term, a ‘geopolitical’ one. The Scotland Act 1998 established the present devolved order and the principal focus of our analysis will be the two decades since the Scottish polity assumed its present status, although, where relevant, earlier developments and events will be discussed.

In what follows, we will consider the decline of the post-devolution Scottish ‘indigenous’ press—that is, titles established and published in Scotland—in the wider context of the digitization of journalism; the gradual reshaping of broadcasting and its uncertain future; established and emerging media during the 2014 independence referendum campaign; and the consumption of media. Some relevant policy developments throughout the period will also be addressed.
THE PRESS IN SCOTLAND

The press has figured large in sociological conceptions of how national cultures and public spheres are constituted (Anderson 1983/1991; Billig 1995). While this approach has predominantly concerned the formation and functioning of states, it has also addressed the sub-state level of political life (Schlesinger and Benchimol 2015). Scotland, as both a distinct polity and society, has long had an indigenous press whose history and development is distinct from that south of the border, although deeply connected to wider political and economic developments in the UK and internationally, not least those affecting the ownership and control of the newspaper industry and the technologically driven shift from print to digital. The Scottish press has been a key part of a Scottish public sphere although it is regulated at a UK level, presently under the Independent Press Standards Organisation.

Early examples of Scottish newspapers were produced in the seventeenth century (Hutchison 2008) and the public prints were an important form of political expression in debate about the Union of 1707 between Scotland and England (Bowie 2018). Since the late eighteenth century, the press has been significant in articulating and interacting with national and regional identities in Scotland, as well as in contributing to the making of a distinct public sphere within that of the United Kingdom. Kellas (1989) has described how Scotland’s post-war media connected with the ‘Scottish political system’, then centred on the Scottish Office. Several years before devolution returned to the constitutional agenda MacInnes (1993: 96) noted that compared to other parts of the UK, ‘[g]iven the existence of a distinct civil society and various institutional remnants of political autonomy in Scotland the news media have something to report!’

Prior to the passage of the Scotland Act 1998, newspapers such as Edinburgh-based The Scotsman and The Herald in Glasgow—both influential in shaping elite opinion—were cheerleaders for new political arrangements north of the border. In Scotland, coverage
of the campaign for devolution and a Scottish parliament differed from that of the UK’s London-based press. Not surprisingly, the first post-devolution parliamentary election in May 1999—which occurred during what was still the heyday of the printed press—was reported and analysed in much greater depth in Scotland than south of the border, thereby addressing the needs of the new Scottish electorate (Higgins 2006).

The creation of the Scottish Government (initially called the Scottish Executive) and the reconvening of the Scottish Parliament after almost three centuries, underpinned a Scotland-focused system of political communications. Post-devolution arrangements made for the new Scottish political media corps and government media management evolved from models supplied by Westminster, Whitehall, and London’s parliamentary Lobby, rather than constituting a radical break (Schlesinger et al. 2001). But it was a rough beginning as Macwhirter (2018: 28–9) has noted, with a ‘hyperbolically critical’ press that offered ‘generalised hostility’ to the new political institutions.

The precipitous decline of the Scottish press since devolution, whether in sales or democratic influence, has been much discussed. Often presented as a paradox, this is best considered as a continuing loss to the country of newspapers’ collective capacity to hold those in power to account by offering in-depth content for Scotland’s citizens. The communications deficit arrived just as Scotland became ‘more detached from the British state’ (McCrone 2017: 549). With the shrinking press in mind Macwhirter (2014: 9) commented: ‘Scotland has a national political system, but is in danger of losing a national media’.

Focusing on the indigenous press, McCrone (2017: 558) showed how between 1973 and 2015, sales of the Scotland-wide Daily Record (founded: 1895) plummeted from some 570,000 by 69 per cent; sales of nearly 123,000 of Dundee’s The
Courier (founded: 1801) fell by 65 per cent; those of Aberdeen’s The Press and Journal (founded: 1747) dropped from close to 108,000 by 48 per cent; Glasgow’s The Herald (founded: 1783) slumped from over 85,000 by 62 per cent, while those of Edinburgh’s The Scotsman (founded: 1817) collapsed from over 80,000 by 72 per cent. The Scotsman and The Herald, and to some extent their Sunday stable-mates, had long vied to be ‘national’ voices for Scotland but in their attenuated state this ambition became less credible.

Following devolution, London-based newspapers increased their competitive edge in producing editions for the Scottish market—‘putting a kilt’ on the news and features, in a well-worn phrase that combines wryness, cynicism, and disparagement. Often offering a ‘wider range of news and features than their Scottish competitors’ they are ‘now read in substantial quantities in Scotland as well resourced alternatives to “indigenous” newspapers suffering from under-investment’ (Blain and Hutchison 2016: 19, 17). Despite losing readers in the general downward trend of print sales, the Scottish Sun (owned by News UK, a subsidiary of Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp) presently sells more than any other title north of the border, its over 200,000 copies besting the indigenous former leader, the Daily Record, now the second most widely-read daily paper. The Scottish Daily Mail—the Scottish edition of the London title owned by the Daily Mail and General Trust—currently occupies third place in the market (McCrone 2017: 560).

Relatively little of the indigenous Scottish press is still Scottish-owned. Until recently, the Scotsman Group was part of the Johnston Press, Edinburgh-based but principally a major UK proprietor of local newspapers. This company went into administration in November 2018 and was bought by JPIMedia, led by a US hedge fund, raising questions about the long-term future of its titles and staff, the emblematic Scotsman included. The Press and Journal, The Courier and the Sunday Post are all owned by Dundee-based D.C. Thomson &
Co. The *Daily Record* and *Sunday Mail* are owned by Reach plc (the rebranded Trinity Mirror), one of the UK’s biggest newspaper groups and publisher of the *Daily Mirror* and *Sunday Mirror*. The Herald & Times Group is owned by Newsquest, a subsidiary of the Gannett Company, the largest US media holding company.

The fall in Scottish newspapers’ print sales is part of a broader trend in the UK as a whole, as well as comparable countries internationally. Dekavalla (2015: 108) has suggested that the decline in Scotland’s indigenous press has ‘arguably been more dramatic than that experienced in other markets’ because of competition for readers with titles based south of the border. It is a crowded marketplace and there has been long-term underinvestment in Scottish titles.

The Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism has reported that ‘UK newspaper print circulations have halved since 2001, with average revenue from digital users less than 10 per cent of a print reader’ (Newman et al. 2018: 62). The post-devolution decline in the indigenous press has coincided with a widespread shift from a purely print publication to a combination of print and digital, one in which publishers have devised different business models to try to compensate for the loss of physical sales and the migration of advertising revenues from print to online. At the ‘quality’ end of the UK market, there are signs that newspapers such as *The Telegraph*, *The Guardian*, *The Financial Times*, and *The Times* have made some headway in strategies to generate new revenues that range across imposing a paywall, metering content, and soliciting donations (Newman et al. 2018: 62).

Mobile devices (notably, widespread use of easy-to-use smartphones and tablets) have increased digital reach across all demographics.

Access to content via digital devices does not equate to providing a reliable income stream for producers. The UK is near the bottom of the international rankings in paying for online news, with only 7 per cent of those surveyed willing to do so, which puts recent claims
to advances in digital revenue-generation by newspaper publishers into context. Moreover, only 1 per cent of UK news consumers are willing to donate to access news digitally, with most of that funding going to *The Guardian* (Newman et al. 2018: 22–5).

The Published Audience Measurement Company (PAMCo) has developed a new ‘currency’ to assess the reach of ‘news brands’. The results for Scottish titles reveal that shrinkage of print sales has been accompanied by a substantial shift to digital consumption, where the use of smartphones generally has far exceeded that of desktops and tablets.

Between April 2017 and March 2018, *The Scotsman*’s daily ‘total brand reach’ (TBR) was 233,000 readers, of which 60,000 read print but 176,000 accessed content digitally. *The Herald*’s TBR was 167,000 of which 86,000 read the print version but 83,000 used a device. *The Press and Journal*’s TBR was 302,000, with 184,000 using print and 131,000 digital means. *The Courier* had a TBR of 139,000, dominated by 122,000 print readers and 28,000 digital. The *Daily Record*’s 877,000 TBR was digitally dominated with 521,000 accessing content through mobiles or desktops to 372,000 via print (PAMCo 2018). These figures do give pause to catastrophist predictions of inevitable decline, although they offer no insights into how reach may be converted into revenue streams, an issue that precipitated The Scotsman Group’s change of ownership. That said, Scottish newspaper publishers seeking to recoup lost advertising revenues due to falling print sales and circulation do now have a better case to argue.

**Broadcasting**

Like the press, public service broadcasting (PSB) has been a linchpin of the UK’s public sphere and often theorized as of key importance to the functioning of democratic polities, while at the same time being seen by critics as reproducing the status quo (Higgins 2015). Its
operations and regulation have always been in the public eye. Whether PSB at a national level can long survive in this crucial (if contested) role is increasingly in question (Tunstall 2015). The streaming of audiovisual content by unregulated global players with deep pockets that outmatch the broadcast finance available to UK broadcasters, the rapidity of technological change in a platform economy, and the digital device-driven transformation of consumption, most notably in younger demographics, are all displacing PSB from its former centrality (Ofcom 2018c).

The Scotland Act 1998 established cultural policy as a devolved power under the aegis of the Scottish Government and Scottish Parliament. Despite devolution, broadcasting policy—which deals with radio and television—remains a reserved power, held in London rather than Edinburgh. This policy field has always been marked by highly political considerations, as is evident from the near century-long history of the BBC, which has been an ‘organization within the constitution’ ever since the general strike of 1926 (Briggs 1961: 335).

The broadcasting marketplace and its regulation have always involved the political management of economic interests and the creation of regulatory bodies deeply inscribed with Britishness, even if they offered various forms of territorial representation to the ‘nations’, namely, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. The latest step in this process came after the 2014 referendum on Scottish independence, when the Scotland Act 2016 provided Scottish Ministers with the power to appoint members for Scotland to the Boards both of the BBC and the UK communications regulator, Ofcom. That power, however, was ultimately subject to the approval of the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport in London. London, however, has largely relinquished control over the Gaelic Media Service, MG Alba, for which substantial financial support comes from the Scottish Government; it falls under the strategic oversight of the Scottish Ministers (MoU 2017).
Scotland is part of the UK television network and receives all the five public service channels: BBC1, BBC2, ITV, Channel 4, and Channel 5. It is therefore integrated through network provision into the UK’s audiovisual space. Viewers in Scotland may also access the gamut of non-public service channels and platforms through satellite, cable, and the internet.

There have been recurrent pressures in Scotland to treat broadcasting policy as part of cultural policy. In 2005, the first tentative rethinking of the policy map came with the report of the Cultural Commission chaired by a former BBC senior executive, James Boyle. Jack McConnell, First Minister of the last of the Labour–Liberal Democrat coalitions that ruled between 1999 and 2007, initiated a rethinking of cultural policy. The Cultural Commission (2005, annex G: 5) asked Scottish ministers to introduce ‘an element of devolution in broadcasting’, stating that there was ‘a strong case for the establishment of at least one [television] channel based in Scotland’. Rapidly dismissed by the then Scottish Executive, the idea was picked up shortly thereafter by the incoming SNP minority government.

In the background lay a failed attempt in 1998 to seek the devolution of more decision-making powers to BBC Scotland. In particular, there was a proposal to launch a new Scottish, UK and international hour-long news programme replacing the BBC’s networked Six O’Clock News while integrating Reporting Scotland, the BBC Scotland news programme that followed. The refusal to countenance such purported broadcasting nationalism by the BBC’s Director-General, John Birt, together with machinations in Westminster by leading Scottish Labour cabinet ministers, ensured that the downfall of aspirations for a ‘Scottish Six’ would in future become an instantly recognizable, regularly invoked, and enduring symbolic cause (Schlesinger et al. 2001: chapter 2).

In line with the UK as a whole, Scotland’s present broadcasting landscape has evolved by stages. The BBC has addressed Scottish audiences in what used to be called its ‘national region’ through radio broadcasts ever since the 1920s (McDowell 1992; MacInnes 1993).
BBC Radio Scotland was established as a stand-alone service in 1978 and BBC Nan Gàidheal, the Scottish-Gaelic radio service, was set up in 1985. BBC Radio Scotland covers the whole national territory, addressing listeners in ways comparable to its national counterparts in Wales and Northern Ireland. It is a generalist broadcaster that covers news and current affairs, talk, music, sport, and comedy. The BBC’s UK radio networks are also available to Scottish listeners in the shape of thirteen DAB and seven analogue stations.

As distinct from England, there is no BBC local radio in Scotland. However, in March 2018 there were sixty-nine DAB and thirty-five analogue commercial local stations; thirty-four DAB and four analogue UK commercial stations could also be received (Ofcom 2018a: 30). The commercial sector has seen considerable consolidation and the majority of stations (notably those in major urban areas) are owned by companies located outwith Scotland. The German-headquartered company, Bauer, owns Forth 1, Clyde 1 and Northsound 1 and has 26 per cent of the market, followed by Global, London-based owner of Capital and Heart, which has almost 15 per cent (Ofcom 2018a: 36). Over time, due to commercial contractors’ pressure, the regulated scope of ‘locality’ has shrunk and has become largely focused on short news bulletins and music. In 2018, twenty-five Scottish community stations were also licensed to broadcast.

The BBC’s Scottish HQ is at Pacific Quay in Glasgow, housed in a major production centre established in 2008. It has become a relatively significant contributor to network production, although the extent and nature of BBC Scotland’s contribution is a matter of perpetual dispute. In television, programming specific to Scotland was long provided by BBC Scotland ‘opt-outs’ from the BBC1 and BBC2 networks. Programming included news and current affairs, drama, sport, music, and comedy. This was meant to change in 2019 when, marking a break with decades of opt-outs, the BBC launched a BBC Scotland channel, broadcasting daily from 7pm, with a 9pm integrated news programme intended to dispel the
resilient spectre of the Scottish Six. In addition, new investments were made in drama, factual, and journalism. Whether this would transform critical perceptions of the corporation’s role in Scotland remained an open question.

STV Group plc, also located at Pacific Quay, is the last outpost of the original ITV federal system. STV operates the Central Scotland and the North East commercial licences under one brand. It took over the Grampian TV licence in 2006. Aside from broadcasting ITV network programmes, STV produces its own opt-outs, notably news and current affairs; it is also a production house, supplying programmes to other companies, with a focus on factual entertainment. In the south of Scotland, the ITV Border region provides sub-regional Scottish news and current affairs programming.

In 2011, legislation enabled the launch of local television throughout the UK, although detractors immediately raised questions about the financial viability of such ventures. In Scotland, STV successfully bid for local licences in Glasgow and Edinburgh, successively launching those stations in 2014 and 2015. Subsequently, STV won its bids for stations in Aberdeen, Ayr, and Dundee, which were launched in 2017. The broadcaster consolidated the five local stations under a secondary brand, STV2. However, even as a quasi-channel they rapidly proved to be loss-making and in 2018 the licences were sold to That’s Media, which controls local stations in England and Wales.

Comparable to the BBC Gaelic radio service is the Gaelic TV channel BBC Alba. Set up in 2008, this channel is broadcast by the BBC but supplied with content by its partner, MG Alba. The remit is to serve the Gaelic-language community, 1.1 per cent of Scotland’s population, in line with Scotland’s language policy. Despite the use of Gaelic along with English sub-titles, Alba has achieved a reach among the wider Scottish public, notably through its sport coverage. How BBC Alba will be affected by the launch of BBC Scotland is presently unclear.
The London-centrism of the UK’s broadcasting has been regularly attacked in Scotland, as in other ‘nations and regions’. Debate north of the border has typically concerned two matters: the volume and range of Scottish-produced content aired in Scotland for Scottish audiences; and the extent to which the share of production of radio and television programmes for the UK’s networks is proportionate to Scotland’s population and contributes to the country’s creative weight in the British system. Complaints from executives and producers about the small share of Scotland’s contribution to the networks have been long-standing and became more vociferous from the early 1990s (McInnes 1993: 86). The quotas under Ofcom’s rules applied by the PSBs to ‘out of London’ production are therefore a matter of considerable interest to politicians and producers.

In this regard, a potentially significant development came in October 2018 when Channel 4 (2018) announced that Glasgow would become one of its ‘creative hubs’, in line with its intention to spend 50 per cent of its commissioning budget in the ‘nations and regions’ of the UK. Glasgow had long had a minor Channel 4 presence, on which this new initiative built, following a fierce UK-wide competition.

However, back in 2007 dissatisfaction with the prevailing state of play crystallized tellingly when the SNP First Minister, Alex Salmond, influenced by an Ofcom report detailing a fall in the percentage of Scottish production for the UK network, as well as by a Work Foundation report on the importance of the creative economy, set up the Scottish Broadcasting Commission (SBC). In this, he followed his Labour predecessor Jack McConnell, and also asked a former BBC executive, Blair Jenkins (later to head the pro-independence Yes Scotland campaign), to chair the inquiry. This was charged with investigating the economic, cultural, and democratic aspects of broadcast provision in Scotland. Salmond’s move implied that broadcasting policy was rightly part of cultural policy—that it should be a devolved rather than a reserved power (Schlesinger 2009).
The Commission’s establishment was a response to TV producers’ demands—they wanted more programme production commissioned in Scotland because the country’s overall reported share in value and volume had fallen. The creation of the SBC also reflected the SNP’s long-term dissatisfaction with the service provided by the BBC as well as wider concern about the relative decline of Scotland’s audio-visual creative economy. The SBC’s (2009: 5) key recommendation was the creation of a Scottish digital network within the devolution settlement, funded by the TV Licence Fee, which won no favour in London, although it did gain cross-party support in the Scottish Parliament. The Commission’s evidence-taking produced an assurance in September 2007 that BBC Scotland would increase its network production figures substantially, although how this was done rapidly became contentious because programmes could be misleadingly described as ‘Scottish’ when made elsewhere.

In 2011, a follow-up report came from a working party set up by the Minister for Culture and External Affairs, Fiona Hyslop. The remit set the stage for later ideas on broadcasting independence: ‘to provide a secure and sustainable source of competition to the BBC for public service broadcasting within Scotland’ (Scottish Digital Network Panel 2011: 1). Along with such inquiries, successive committee hearings in the Scottish Parliament have ensured that broadcasting has remained on the political agenda.

During the independence campaign, the Scottish Government (2013) issued a White Paper, Scotland’s Future, whose key proposal for broadcasting in an independent state was to set up a Scottish Broadcasting Service (SBS). This would be a public service broadcaster ‘founded on the staff and assets of BBC Scotland’ to broadcast on TV, radio, and online (Scottish Government 2013: 317). A licence fee equivalent to that raised for the BBC would be levied and a ‘proportionate share’ of the BBC’s commercial ventures claimed. It was assumed—questionably—that the new SBS would produce programmes for
the UK network and have unimpeded access to the BBC’s output. In short, there would be a very close relationship to the BBC but with control exercised in Edinburgh.

More than a decade on from the SBC’s report, the new BBC Scotland TV channel launched in 2019 was plainly a response to the Commission’s recommendation to increase the scale and range of broadcasting north of the border. The SNP did not envisage the new digital network as a mere add-on to the BBC but rather as an alternative. The particular form this expansion of service has taken bespeaks the continuing politics of caution in the broadcasting field. The new BBC Scotland was set up not only to respond to the pressures outlined above but also to retain control in London, in line with the reserved powers model. Its role and functioning will undoubtedly be heavily scrutinized.

**THE MEDIA AND THE 2014 INDEPENDENCE REFERENDUM**

The UK’s constitutional framework, coupled with Scotland’s history of shifting degrees of autonomy within the British state, has shaped the political contours of the evolving media environment. The established media, along with newer entrants, were a crucial theatre for representing (and misrepresenting) the long campaign for Scottish independence.

On 18 September 2014, the Scottish electorate voted on whether Scotland should stay in the United Kingdom or become an independent country. On a turnout of over 84 per cent, 55 per cent voted against leaving to 45 per cent voting for independence. Coverage of the campaign centred on the struggle between Better Together, which represented the pro-union parties, whereas Yes Scotland was the umbrella organization for those advocating independence.

Coverage of the ‘indyref’ campaign in 2013–2014 entrenched a negative view of ‘mainstream’ media performance in pro-independence circles. While the press had its
detractors, the BBC’s coverage engendered a particularly deep hostility that has persisted. Research into referendum media coverage has raised pertinent questions about how news and commentary were presented during the campaign. Dekavalla (2018: 49) has noted that:

During the 2014 referendum, the press—Scottish and UK-wide—was either outright opposed or ambivalent towards independence. Only the Sunday Herald eventually came out in favour of a ‘Yes’ vote and after the referendum Newsquest launched a new pro-independence title, The National.

We can only conjecture about the impact of pro-union press coverage on voting intentions. But it is reasonable to conclude that it favoured the status quo. Hutchison (2016: 31) concluded that during the campaign ‘the lack of press support was a serious problem for the Yes side’, also noting that whilst no paper supported the independence movement editorially, ‘individual columnists certainly did so in The Herald and The Scotsman [and] space was offered to Salmond and [Deputy First Minister Nicola] Sturgeon’ (Hutchison 2016: 29). Clearly, such concessions did not significantly shift the overall balance of coverage.

The launch of The National in November 2014, and support for independence by the Sunday Herald, combined both editorial and commercial judgements on the part of the publisher. Richard Walker, long-standing editor of the Sunday Herald, and also launch-editor of The National, had to convince Newsquest that this shift of allegiance would work in business terms. In August 2018, Newsquest announced that the Sunday Herald and Herald would merge operations, with the new Herald on Sunday abandoning its pro-independence line. The National acquired a Sunday stablemate and these became the sole bearers of pro-independence journalism in the group, and more exposed as a result of this reorganization.
Walker (2018: 69) has argued that disaffected independence supporters think that most media reporting in Scotland has aimed ‘to discredit the SNP government, failing to explain properly the respective powers of Holyrood and Westminster and, in general, obscuring the true picture to undermine confidence in independence’. Hassan (2018: 113) concurring, cited a Panelbase survey indicating that 36 per cent of Scots ‘thought the BBC was biased against independence’, and contended that the referendum and its aftermath revealed the Britishness of the BBC and the lack of autonomy of BBC Scotland. According to his analysis of the main Scottish news and current affairs programmes, both the BBC and STV had failed to adapt their now-outmoded models of coverage and did not grasp the grassroots nature of the pro-independence movement. Moreover, post-referendum, the broadcasters were unable to offer a common way of addressing ‘a more fragmented and divided society’ (Hassan 2018: 115).

Dekavalla (2018: 51) has suggested that despite its broadly oppositional stance to independence, the Scottish press took a ‘more nuanced’ approach than London-based papers. During the campaign, she found, editorial positions across Scottish titles shifted increasingly towards recognizing the need for enhanced devolved powers across a range of policy areas. The Scotsman, The Herald, and the Daily Record largely converged on the position known as ‘The Vow’—the last-minute plea to Scots to stay in the Union, burnished with a commitment to give ‘extensive new powers’ to the Scottish Parliament. This was published in the Daily Record on 16 September 2014, two days before the vote itself.

‘The Vow’ displayed on the paper’s front page was signed by the UK party leaders of the Conservatives, Liberal-Democrats, and Labour—David Cameron, Prime Minister, Nick Clegg, Deputy Prime Minister, and Ed Miliband, Leader of the Opposition. The Daily Record—its senior editors dismayed by the lacklustre Better Together campaign and alarmed by the likelihood of a ‘yes’ vote for independence—linked up with former Labour Prime
Minister Gordon Brown to engineer promotion of a promise of more devolved powers for Scotland—precisely what had been excluded as an option on the ballot paper (Foote 2015). It was hoped that this appeal would rally wavering voters to the unionist cause, just as independence had gained significant support in the polls. It was a dramatic intervention by a media platform.

The impact of The Vow on the electorate is not clear, as intentions to vote may well have been largely settled by that point. Buchanan’s analysis of social media activity records scepticism about the delivery of Better Together’s last-minute promises, both in the pro-independence and pro-union camps. Of the latter, she observed: ‘The number of bitter and critical posts indicated that while pro-union supporters opposed independence, they did not believe that the promises made were likely to be fulfilled’ (Buchanan 2016: 78).

There was an exceptional level of public engagement during the campaign in an electorate well capable of deliberating and thinking for itself. We should not think of Scottish voters as passive, or of the media as simply a transmission belt for successfully imposing unionist ideas. Mitchell (2016: 13) has suggested that ‘the most significant impact of the campaign was the revival of Scottish democracy. The 85 per cent turnout in the referendum broke records.’ Furthermore, given the widespread rise of the ‘town hall’ meeting and a wide array of gatherings and activities, the BBC covered the referendum ‘beyond the Westminster and Holyrood bubbles’ although its approach ‘was dominated by high profile people and events’ (Mitchell 2016: 8).

Robertson’s (2014) research into referendum coverage on BBC TV and radio, as well as on ITV/STV questioned whether public service broadcasters properly adhered to expected standards of fairness and impartiality. His quantitative analysis of TV coverage from September 2012 to September 2013 noted that the first year of the campaign was intensively covered by Scottish broadcasters but rarely on UK-wide channels. Focusing on the key early
evening Scottish news programmes, the BBC’s *Reporting Scotland* and *STV News*, he found that these contained a ‘numerical preponderance of anti-independence statements by a ratio of 3:2’ (*Robertson 2016: 61*). Economic arguments dominated coverage and there was negative personalization of Alex Salmond, it was argued (*Robertson 2016: 63*). A qualitative one-month study of BBC Radio Scotland’s flagship, *Good Morning Scotland*, conducted in April 2014, found that the Yes Scotland campaign was favoured by a ratio of 7:6. Such unexpectedly favourable statements, he suggested, had emerged in response to negative ones (*Robertson 2016: 66*). On publication in February 2014, the BBC disputed Robertson’s findings. However, his research was taken up by pro-independence commentators and social media and enlisted in support by the BBC’s detractors.

In a smaller-scale study, Hutchison focused on coverage of the Scottish Government’s *White Paper, Scotland’s Future*, in November 2013, as well as the two set-piece TV leadership debates prior to the vote in August 2014. White Paper coverage was broadcast on news and current affairs programmes on three UK networks—the BBC, ITV, and Channel 4—as well as on BBC Scotland and STV. In 2013, there was a common reporting formula, with interviews involving leading figures: Alistair Darling, ex-Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer and main spokesman for Better Together; Alistair Carmichael, the LibDem Secretary of State for Scotland in the UK Coalition Government; and Alex Salmond, SNP First Minister. The interviews focused on Scotland’s access to the pound sterling, entry to the EU, and NATO membership coupled with the removal of nuclear weapons. Hutchison (*2016: 27*) concluded that excepting one fractious interview on the BBC’s *Newsnight Scotland*, the First Minister did not face especially hostile questioning and that broadcasting coverage was far more measured than that of the press.

In the final stages of the campaign, two set-piece debates took place between Alistair Darling and Alex Salmond, who had wanted instead to debate independence with
Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron, a request that was refused. The first debate, on 5 August 2014, was broadcast to a Scottish audience by STV, although viewable online. Hutchison (2016: 30–1) noted the widespread view that Salmond’s performance was relatively poor with the SNP exposed on the currency to be used by an independent Scotland. The second broadcast was on the BBC network on 25 August 2014, when Salmond was widely judged to have bested Darling. A measure of the temper of the closing days of the campaign came on 14 September 2014, when independence supporters demonstrated outside BBC Scotland’s Pacific Quay HQ in protest against its alleged anti-independence bias.

Reflecting on the overall impact of the independence campaign on the public sphere, Hassan (2014, 2016: 42) pointed to the enlargement, if not displacement, of an established anti-Tory, centre-left Scottish commentariat by ‘new voices, agencies and self-organising groups’. Social media and pro-independence websites offered new spaces for political discussion in ways that have become widely familiar: alongside reasoned discourse there was also personal vilification and trolling. Social media engagement gave rise to two new contending identities: ‘cybernats’ and ‘unitrolls’, with the former receiving most attention (Macwhirter 2014). Much critical social media discourse and its agenda and frames of reference were unavoidably dependent on reports and comments appearing in ‘mainstream’ outlets. Buchanan (2016: 70) commented that ‘Public participation in the independence debate on Facebook and Twitter was so extensive that on 10 December 2014, it was announced that the Scottish referendum was the UK’s most discussed subject on Facebook, and one of the most featured topics on Twitter’.

During the independence campaign, it is clear, a new stage in the development of Scotland’s ‘alternative media’ (Atton 2003) occurred, changing the scope of the Scottish public sphere. The hostility of established media to the independence cause was a generally accepted starting-point. The need to counter this led to the expansion of the mediated public
sphere by the launch of political websites, political uses of social media and a fresh focus on some existing websites. Much of this shift was underpinned by the widespread political engagement already noted, which for younger generations was a first entry into a politics of commitment. However, social media involvement also cut across age groups.

The expanded Scottish public sphere consisted of a mixed bag of generally very small-scale, sometimes individually run ventures, which at times have been capable of achieving significant audience reach. *Wings Over Scotland*, launched in 2011, a well-established pro-independence site successful at crowdfunding, gained a substantial following during the campaign. So did *Bella Caledonia*, set up in 2007, which attained considerable prominence in 2013–2014, although since the referendum, its longer-term viability has sometimes been in doubt. *Newsnet Scotland* was established in 2010 to counter mainstream media reporting, with a particular focus on the BBC; in December 2014, it restructured, continuing operations as newsnet.scot. *National Collective* gathered mainly younger support from various cultural sectors, ran some political-cultural events, and was active from 2011 to 2015. *Scottish Review*, a current affairs magazine established in 1995, went online in 2008 to become a source of commentary before, during, and following the independence campaign. *The Ferret*, a subscription- and crowdfunding-based digital investigative journalism start-up, although conceived before the referendum, was launched in 2015 and has been run by a cooperative of journalists with a public interest mission (Price 2017). Hassan (2016: 43) has suggested that emergent and mainstream media are engaged in a struggle over legitimacy in ‘a political culture in significant transition’. In that undoubted jockeying for position, however, the resources available play a key role. At this time of writing, more striking than the displacement of established media is their continued centrality.

**MEDIA CONSUMPTION AND DEVOLUTION**
When investigating how a collective identity is formed we should ask ‘what importance communicative practices might play in its constitution’ (Schlesinger 1991: 150). We cannot assume, for instance, that there is a simple correspondence between the circulation of media content, its reception and interpretation, and formation and development of a national identity. Scotland has been an illuminating laboratory for addressing this complex issue, although it has not provided a definitive answer.

When the devolutionary media–political nexus was established in Edinburgh, the focus of political communications north of the border rapidly shifted from London—from the UK state to the Scottish nation (Schlesinger et al. 2001: 87–105). Rosie and Petersoo’s (2009: 137) interviews with press and radio journalists and editors a few years after devolution underlined just how much the new system ‘had brought a specifically Scottish news agenda into focus’, a major consequence being ‘less rather than more obligation on media to relay news from Scotland to audiences in England’. Preston (2001) similarly noted: ‘Scotland has ceased to exist south of the border. [...] And in just the same way, from Berwick on, England has faded into the mists of public consciousness. What you see and read is what you get.’ ‘Ghettoization’ of this kind was further remarked on by King (2008: 25) in a review of BBC news and current affairs coverage commissioned by the BBC Trust. The post-devolution regionalization of media content and the overwhelming metro-centrism of the London press made it easy for citizens of the UK to be ignorant of Scottish affairs. But equally Scots may be uninformed about Wales, Northern Ireland, and most of England.

In March 1999, in the wake of the Scottish Six row, the BBC produced a staff guide titled The Changing UK to raise awareness of the implications of devolution (Schlesinger et al. 2001: 48–9). Little changed, and criticism did not fade away. The BBC Trust’s report was commissioned in 2007 due to continuous complaints from the UK’s nations and because
the BBC had ‘a particular responsibility to serve the whole UK, not least because it draws the same licence fee from citizens wherever they live’ (BBC Trust 2008: 4). Its report concluded:

there is seen to be a general bias in favour of stories about England or telling stories from an England perspective; and there is evidence that several stories in the nations which may have been significant to the UK were not taken up by the network.

(BBC Trust 2008: 7)

In response, the BBC Executive suggested a range of remedies. Unconvinced, the BBC Trust, however, soon felt the need to follow up, publishing a further report in 2010. It considered that, despite improvements, there was still a lack of clarity in the labels used in coverage, leaving audiences unsure of ‘which devolved issues affect which parts of the UK’, as well as a ‘continuing preponderance of stories about England’ (BBC Trust 2010: 2). More training was recommended and the Trust’s devolution guidelines were incorporated into the BBC Academy’s (2013) journalism courses. No further evaluation was published by the Trust, which was wound up in 2017 and replaced by Ofcom.

Whatever the shortcomings of news coverage, and despite the continuing row about bias, television viewing in general is still very important for Scottish audiences. In 2017, Scots had ‘the highest level of TV consumption of the four UK nations’, spending ‘an average of 3 hours 46 minutes per day’ (Ofcom 2018a: 4). However, reflecting Scots’ continuing ambivalence about the BBC, Ofcom (2018c: 31) also reported that so far as portraying the UK and its component nations was concerned:

Audiences in Scotland rate the BBC lower for its performance [...] than do those in other nations. The BBC needs to continue to develop its ways of serving and reflecting Scotland and consider how it can do so through its new BBC Scotland television channel, which will launch in 2019.
However, present-day consumption has occurred against a noteworthy decline of TV viewing in Scotland (in line with that of the UK as a whole) from 270 minutes daily in 2010 to 223 minutes in 2017. Of especial note has been the increasing shift away from watching PSB channels among younger age groups—the 16–34 years old and those even younger, the 4–15 years old. Netflix, the commercial content streaming platform, was as likely to be viewed in Scotland as the BBC iPlayer. Growing up with PSB has ceased to be the norm. This shift is highly relevant to the future of PSB channels as a whole, which in 2017, attracted just over 52 per cent of the total Scottish broadcast TV audience (Ofcom 2018a: 10–14). Live viewing of broadcast TV has continued to decline gradually and is now roughly two-thirds of all viewing (Ofcom 2018a: 17). Consequently, Sharon White, Chief Executive of Ofcom, urged the PSBs to coalesce and compete with online streaming services such as those of Netflix, Amazon Prime and Sky’s Now TV, noting the ‘decline in revenues for pay TV, a fall in spending on new programmes by our public service broadcasters, and the growth of global video streaming giants’ (Ofcom 2018b).

Dissatisfaction with news coverage continues to be marked among supporters of independence, whose criticism has focused especially on the BBC. According to Ofcom (2018a: 6), however, 79 per cent of regular viewers in Scotland considered PSB news programmes to be ‘trustworthy’. Although its figures do not disaggregate Scotland, The Reuters Institute also identified the BBC as the ‘most trusted news brand’ in the UK, closely followed by ITV News (Newman et al. 2018: 43). Early evening Scottish news programmes have attracted relatively high audiences—with, in 2017, BBC Scotland’s Reporting Scotland pulling in close to 31 per cent and STV’s News at Six over 26 per cent of viewers. Expenditure on news and current affairs absorbed almost half of the total spent on programming produced specifically for Scottish viewers (Ofcom 2018a: 10–14).
18). Criticism of the BBC in Scotland, therefore, coexists—in some quarters, at least—with considerable trust in, and extensive use of, its news services.

In March 2018, radio listening in Scotland was divided between services provided by the BBC and commercial companies. Over 57 per cent of the population accessed radio via digital platforms and devices and live radio was the most popular listening activity. After listening to music, local news coverage was the most valued activity—underlining, once again, the taste for Scottish content (Ofcom 2018a: 35). In line with a long-standing preference, more Scots listened to commercial radio (67 per cent) than the BBC (58 per cent), with listeners spending an average of just over twenty-one hours per week. Counting in Radio 2’s substantial following, however, the BBC stations’ overall share of the radio market in Q1 2018 was more than 46 per cent, followed by Bauer Radio’s 26 per cent and Global Radio’s almost 15 per cent. Despite declining slightly year on year, BBC Radio Scotland’s weekly reach was still 20 per cent in Q1 2018 (Ofcom 2018a: 38). Looking ahead, there are parallels in the growing bypassing of scheduled radio consumption to the digitally driven shift to streaming amongst television audiences. The Reuters Institute reported that ‘Crucially, the demographics of podcasting are explosive. The younger generation is embracing content at a time and in a format that works for them’ (Newman et al. 2018: 43). The UK’s multinationality has become ever more salient since the devolution of powers not only to Scotland but also to Wales and Northern Ireland. Figures of the kind just cited do not reveal the meaning of the content consumed nor do they illuminate the identities of those consuming it. While most of the press read in Scotland is not Scottish-owned, it must still produce enough Scottish content to sell newspapers. Law (2001) has underlined the importance of the ‘deixis’ used in Scottish newspapers—that is, the minute contextualization embedded in press content that provides a connection with the readership. This includes emphasizing the ‘we-ness’ of the audience, its identification with place,
common experiences, and a recognized manner of telling what is being told. Law noted that Billig’s approach to ‘banal nationalism’ took the overarching ‘Britishness’ of the English press for granted. This meant overlooking those parts of the UK state that rightly consider themselves to be distinct and where, as in Scotland’s case, the press still daily signals its readership’s national identity to itself.

Relatedly, Rosie and Petersoo (2009: 130) have analysed how ‘the patterns of national nouns and adjectives explicitly mentioned in articles, and the locations mentioned in them’ differed systematically between Scottish and London-based, overwhelmingly metro-centric newspapers, arguing that the UK’s diverse cultural geography means that there has never been a ‘single news agenda within the UK’s press [or] in more modern forms of media’ (Rosie and Petersoo 2009: 134).

Within Scotland, how media are consumed, at least in part, depends on how audience members conceive of themselves. As Kiely et al. (2006: 475) note, the country therefore ‘provides an interesting case for assumptions about the relationships between identity and media consumption’, precisely because of its dual public sphere.

Drawing on research in the early years of devolution, when widespread and regular newspaper reading was still common, Kiely et al. (2006) analysed the different relationships to media of Scottish nationals by birth compared with English migrants to Scotland. Their study showed that ‘most Scottish nationals read the Scottish press’, preferring local news and sports coverage. By contrast, English migrants might diversely use their media consumption to negotiate their identities in Scottish society. Media consumption could at times lead some incomers to invoke Britishness as their preferred identity, whereas others, in effect, decided to ‘become Scottish’, underlining the point that national identity is not automatically reproduced (Kiely et al. 2006: 481–8).
As yet, no equivalent research into the meanings of media consumption has been undertaken on the independence campaign or its aftermath. Nevertheless, we may conjecture that the electorate’s diverse assumptions about the nature of Scottish identity and its relationship to Britishness, along with a range of views as to what independence might mean for Scottish society, were—and continue to be—systematically related to the choices of media consumed, and to the interpretation of content.

WHERE NEXT?

As this chapter has made clear, Scotland’s mediated dual public sphere is comprised of what are now often termed ‘legacy’ media—the press, radio, and television—as well as a range of internet-based voices, whose overall weight, influence, and durability is far from clear. An analysis such as this is bound to be overtaken by the continuing digital revolution and the resulting transition to new media business models that technological disruption has provoked. At present, it is noteworthy that in terms of reach the fall in indigenous newspaper print sales has begun to be counterbalanced by their extended digital reach. Scotland is not out of kilter with the rest of the UK in this regard. How such a shift might translate into long-term viability for the press as a sector, and particularly which indigenous titles will survive in the face of London-based competition remains an open question.

As for radio, Scotland’s long-standing preference for local commercial services over the BBC remains evident. The generic range of Scottish commercial services has increasingly narrowed and, while their localism is now lightly worn, as throughout the UK, news is still an important signifier of place and identity. BBC Radio Scotland’s model has not been fundamentally rethought for several decades and will need to be. Meanwhile, at a UK level, the BBC has taken increasing cognizance of changed consumption by younger demographics.
With the creation of its audio platform BBC Sounds in October 2018, the corporation began to address how to change to meet the accelerating shift from broadcast to podcast, as well as how a new balance may be effected between the two.

In a renewed policy focus on the creative economy, in 2018 the Scottish Government increased its financial support for the audiovisual sector. In response to TV and film producers’ pressure, as well as a reappraisal by the Scottish Parliament’s culture committee, it began to rethink how best to intervene. The ineffectiveness in the fields of film and television of Creative Scotland, the lead quango for the arts and the creative industries established in 2010, had become increasingly evident (Schlesinger 2013). In 2018, a new semi-autonomous body, Screen Scotland, was created in response to Creative Scotland’s shortcomings (CTEER 2018).

This occurred just as the long-standing profile of television north of the border had undergone significant change. STV’s local TV experiment proved to be short-lived amidst continuing speculation about whether the company would in future be taken over by ITV (itself not immune to speculation about a takeover by a global player). The decision to establish a Channel 4 creative hub in Glasgow in October 2018 offered the prospect of enhancing Scotland’s position within the UK’s audiovisual economy. Moreover, the BBC’s launch of a new channel in January 2019 was a consequential throw of the dice, given forecasts of a very small audience share in an audiovisual market in which the PSBs have lost ground overall, and where channels per se have been profoundly challenged by video on-demand. Aside from these considerations, the BBC’s expansionary move might contribute positively to the Scottish creative economy by commissioning new work north of the border (along with Channel 4), and thereby add to Scotland’s competitiveness with other nations and regions outwith London. However, BBC Scotland’s operations will be minutely scrutinized,
and for those favouring independence its very existence is a direct blockage to setting up an autonomous new broadcaster in Scotland.

As we have seen, social communication theory may provide a useful starting point for conceptualizing the boundaries of Scotland’s mediated space, whereas public sphere theory is apt for considering how that space is populated. However, Scotland is not an enclosure. Its present Britishness means that the country’s mediated public sphere is necessarily dualistic. The future course of Scotland’s media and its public spheres will be shaped by how the constitutional question plays out, by the UK’s relationship to the European Union, by the competitive impact on the UK media sectors of global internet-based players, by how market-driven media economics addresses continuing digital transformation, and not least by how government policy and regulation allocate powers and resources in light of their sensitivity to the UK’s complex multinational polity.

REFERENCES


BBC TRUST. 2010. BBC Network News Coverage of the Four UK Nations: follow-up. July 2010. 8 pp. Available at:


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


