A Quinean critique of Ostrich nominalism

Pickel, B. and Mantegani, N. (2012) A Quinean critique of Ostrich nominalism. Philosophers' Imprint, 12(6), pp. 1-21.

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Abstract

Ostrich nominalists often cite Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment in order to claim that their view is more parsimonious than rival positions in ontology such as realism. We show that Quine’s criterion, properly understood, does not support this claim. Indeed, we show that ostrich nominalism has a far more profligate ontology than realism.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Pickel, Dr Bryan
Authors: Pickel, B., and Mantegani, N.
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Philosophers' Imprint
Publisher:Michigan Publishing
ISSN:1533-628X
ISSN (Online):1533-628X
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2012 Bryan Pickel and Nicholas Mantegani
First Published:First published in Philosophers' Imprint 12(6):1-21
Publisher Policy:Reproduced under a Creative Commons License

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