Pickel, B. and Mantegani, N. (2012) A Quinean critique of Ostrich nominalism. Philosophers' Imprint, 12(6), pp. 1-21.
|
Text
220248.pdf - Published Version Available under License Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives. 544kB |
Publisher's URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.3521354.0012.006
Abstract
Ostrich nominalists often cite Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment in order to claim that their view is more parsimonious than rival positions in ontology such as realism. We show that Quine’s criterion, properly understood, does not support this claim. Indeed, we show that ostrich nominalism has a far more profligate ontology than realism.
Item Type: | Articles |
---|---|
Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Pickel, Dr Bryan |
Authors: | Pickel, B., and Mantegani, N. |
College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
Journal Name: | Philosophers' Imprint |
Publisher: | Michigan Publishing |
ISSN: | 1533-628X |
ISSN (Online): | 1533-628X |
Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2012 Bryan Pickel and Nicholas Mantegani |
First Published: | First published in Philosophers' Imprint 12(6):1-21 |
Publisher Policy: | Reproduced under a Creative Commons License |
University Staff: Request a correction | Enlighten Editors: Update this record