Levy, Y. J. (2021) An update on continuous-time stochastic games of fixed duration. Dynamic Games and Applications, 11(2), pp. 418-432. (doi: 10.1007/s13235-020-00361-0)
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Abstract
This paper shows that continuous-time stochastic games of fixed duration need not possess equilibria in Markov strategies. The example requires payoffs and transitions to depend on time in a continuous but irregular (almost nowhere almost differentiable) way. This example offers a correction to the erroneous construction presented previously in Levy (Dyn Games Appl 3(2):279–312, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-012-0067-2).
Item Type: | Articles |
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Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Levy, Dr John |
Authors: | Levy, Y. J. |
College/School: | College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics |
Journal Name: | Dynamic Games and Applications |
Publisher: | Springer |
ISSN: | 2153-0785 |
ISSN (Online): | 2153-0793 |
Published Online: | 22 July 2020 |
Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2020 The Author |
First Published: | First published in Dynamic Games and Applications 11(2): 418-432 |
Publisher Policy: | Reproduced under a Creative Commons License |
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