An update on continuous-time stochastic games of fixed duration

Levy, Y. J. (2021) An update on continuous-time stochastic games of fixed duration. Dynamic Games and Applications, 11(2), pp. 418-432. (doi: 10.1007/s13235-020-00361-0)

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Abstract

This paper shows that continuous-time stochastic games of fixed duration need not possess equilibria in Markov strategies. The example requires payoffs and transitions to depend on time in a continuous but irregular (almost nowhere almost differentiable) way. This example offers a correction to the erroneous construction presented previously in Levy (Dyn Games Appl 3(2):279–312, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-012-0067-2).

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Levy, Dr John
Authors: Levy, Y. J.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Dynamic Games and Applications
Publisher:Springer
ISSN:2153-0785
ISSN (Online):2153-0793
Published Online:22 July 2020
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2020 The Author
First Published:First published in Dynamic Games and Applications 11(2): 418-432
Publisher Policy:Reproduced under a Creative Commons License

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