Lyons, J. C. (2008) Evidence, experience, and externalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 86(3), pp. 461-479. (doi: 10.1080/00048400801886363)
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Abstract
The Sellarsian dilemma is a famous argument that attempts to show that nondoxastic experiential states cannot confer justification on basic beliefs. The usual conclusion of the Sellarsian dilemma is a coherentist epistemology, and the usual response to the dilemma is to find it quite unconvincing. By distinguishing between two importantly different justification relations (evidential and nonevidential), I hope to show that the Sellarsian dilemma, or something like it, does offer a powerful argument against standard nondoxastic foundationalist theories. But this reconceived version of the argument does not support coherentism. Instead, I use it to argue for a strongly externalist epistemology.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Lyons, Professor Jack |
| Authors: | Lyons, J. C. |
| College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
| Journal Name: | Australasian Journal of Philosophy |
| Publisher: | Taylor and Francis |
| ISSN: | 0004-8402 |
| ISSN (Online): | 1471-6828 |
| Published Online: | 22 July 2008 |
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