The Romanian Party System: Cartelization, Coalition Leverage and Elite Continuity

Gherghina, S. (2018) The Romanian Party System: Cartelization, Coalition Leverage and Elite Continuity. In: Lisi, M. (ed.) Party System Change, the European Crisis and the State of Democracy. Series: Routledge studies on political parties and party systems. Routledge: London, pp. 231-247. ISBN 9781138550087 (doi:10.4324/9781315147116-13)

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An extensive body of literature characterizes the Romanian party system as volatile and relatively unstable especially in the first post-communist decade. However, the picture is much more nuanced: the number of competitors in elections had gradually decreased, for two decades (1992–2012) there were no entries on the political arena (but only exits), and since 2000 the number of parliamentary party groups is relatively stable. This chapter aims to explain the evolution of the Romanian party system throughout seven electoral cycles (1990–2016). The analysis focuses exclusively on the lower Chamber of the Romanian Parliament and combines various secondary data to provide an overview of the party system dynamic. The findings indicate that in Romania the external factors such as the EU accession or financial crisis did not play a role in the format and pattern of competition. Instead, three important characteristics stand out and may explain the party system dynamics: the cartelization of politics, flexibility in coalition formation and elite continuity.

Item Type:Book Sections
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Gherghina, Dr Sergiu
Authors: Gherghina, S.
Subjects:J Political Science > JN Political institutions (Europe)
College/School:College of Social Sciences > School of Social and Political Sciences > Politics
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