Lyons, J. C. (2006) In defense of epiphenomenalism. Philosophical Psychology, 19(6), pp. 767-794. (doi: 10.1080/09515080601001861)
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Abstract
Recent worries about possible epiphenomenalist consequences of nonreductive physicalism are misplaced, not, as many have argued, because nonreductive physicalism does not imply epiphenomenalism but because the epiphenomenalist implication is actually a virtue of the theory, rather than a vice. It is only by showing how certain kinds of mental properties are causally impotent that cognitive scientific explanations of mentality as we know them are possible.
Item Type: | Articles |
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Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Lyons, Professor Jack |
Authors: | Lyons, J. C. |
College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
Journal Name: | Philosophical Psychology |
Publisher: | Taylor & Francis |
ISSN: | 0951-5089 |
ISSN (Online): | 1465-394X |
Published Online: | 23 November 2006 |
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