Lyons, J. (2016) Unconscious evidence. Philosophical Issues, 26(1), pp. 243-262. (doi: 10.1111/phis.12073)
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Abstract
Can beliefs that are not consciously formulated serve as part of an agent's evidence for other beliefs? A common view says no, any belief that is psychologically immediate is also epistemically immediate. I argue that some unconscious beliefs can serve as evidence, but other unconscious beliefs cannot. Person‐level beliefs can serve as evidence, but subpersonal beliefs cannot. I try to clarify the nature of the personal/subpersonal distinction and to show how my proposal illuminates various epistemological problems and provides a principled framework for solving other problems.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Lyons, Professor Jack |
| Authors: | Lyons, J. |
| College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
| Journal Name: | Philosophical Issues |
| Publisher: | Wiley |
| ISSN: | 1533-6077 |
| ISSN (Online): | 1758-2237 |
| Related URLs: |
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