Lyons, J. (2011) Circularity, reliability, and the cognitive penetrability of perception. Philosophical Issues, 21(1), pp. 289-311. (doi: 10.1111/j.1533-6077.2011.00205.x)
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Abstract
Is perception cognitively penetrable, and what are the epistemological consequences if it is? I address the latter of these two questions, partly by reference to recent work by Athanassios Raftopoulos and Susanna Seigel. Against the usual, circularity, readings of cognitive penetrability, I argue that cognitive penetration can be epistemically virtuous, when---and only when---it increases the reliability of perception.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Lyons, Professor Jack |
| Authors: | Lyons, J. |
| College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
| Journal Name: | Philosophical Issues |
| Publisher: | Wiley |
| ISSN: | 1533-6077 |
| ISSN (Online): | 1758-2237 |
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