The logic of aspect-perception and perceived resemblance

Kemp, G. (2021) The logic of aspect-perception and perceived resemblance. Acta Analytica, 36, pp. 49-53. (doi: 10.1007/s12136-020-00434-0)

Abstract

Does the relation of seeing something as another really differ from seeing the one as resembling the other? Does seeing a cloud as a camel really differ from seeing a resemblance between the cloud and a camel? It is easy to think not, but I claim that the logic of the relation B sees x as resembling y differs markedly from that of B sees x as y and thus that we have two relations, not one. Aspect-perception is nontransitive, nonsymmetric, (presumably) irreflexive and categorical. Perceived or subjective resemblance is weakly or faintly transitive, symmetric, reflexive and graded. By the ‘logic’ of aspect-perception and perceived resemblance respectively, I do not mean the question of formalization per se—involving the syntax and perhaps the semantics of symbols in a formal system—but the logic of certain relations, as when we say that fatherhood is irreflexive. I shall argue that the logic of the relation B sees x as resembling y differs from that of B sees x as y and thus that we have two relations, not one. It is easy to think otherwise. One looks at a passing cloud, and suddenly one sees the cloud as a camel (of course, one is not under the illusion that a camel is in the sky; one thinks ‘A camel!’ without ever forgetting that one is looking at a cloud, not a camel). At the same time, one takes the cloud to resemble a camel. Are these not the same thing? Does not the phrase ‘x looks like y’ cover both, for the very good reason that these are each other’s notational variant? No. The relations differ in their respective formal properties—in particular, they differ or whether they are categorical rather than graded, and over transitivity, symmetry and reflexivity. I do take it that these logical points obtain because the underlying mental states differ, but the purpose of this note is merely to establish and to clarify the former, not to explore their connections to other departments of philosophy (they are immediately relevant to the philosophy of mind, aesthetics—especially to the theory pictorial representation—epistemology, the theory of evaluative perception, and to Wittgenstein studies).

• Item Type: Articles
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Kemp, Dr Gary
• Authors: Kemp, G.
• College/School: College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
• Journal Name: Acta Analytica
• Publisher: Springer
• ISSN: 0353-5150
• ISSN (Online): 1874-6349
• Published Online: 05 June 2020
• Copyright Holders: Copyright © 2020 The Author
• First Published: First published in Acta Analytica 36:49–53
• Publisher Policy: Reproduced under a Creative Commons License