Existence and optimality of Cournot-Nash equilibria in a bilateral oligopoly with atoms and an atomless part

Busetto, F., Codognato, G., Ghosal, S. , Julien, L. and Tonin, S. (2020) Existence and optimality of Cournot-Nash equilibria in a bilateral oligopoly with atoms and an atomless part. International Journal of Game Theory, 49(4), pp. 933-951. (doi: 10.1007/s00182-020-00719-z)

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Abstract

We consider a bilateral oligopoly version of the Shapley window model with large traders, represented as atoms, and small traders, represented by an atomless part. For this model, we provide a general existence proof of a Cournot–Nash equilibrium that allows one of the two commodities to be held only by atoms. Then, we show, using a corollary proved by Shitovitz (Econometrica 41:467–501, 1973), that a Cournot–Nash allocation is Pareto optimal if and only if it is a Walras allocation.

Item Type:Articles
Additional Information:Francesca Busetto and Giulio Codognato gratefully acknowledge financial support from PRID2018-2- DIES005.
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Ghosal, Professor Sayantan
Authors: Busetto, F., Codognato, G., Ghosal, S., Julien, L., and Tonin, S.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:International Journal of Game Theory
Publisher:Springer
ISSN:0020-7276
ISSN (Online):1432-1270
Published Online:03 June 2020
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2020 Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature
First Published:First published in International Journal of Game Theory 49(4): 933-951
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher

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