Epistemic value in the subpersonal vale

Carter, J. A. and Rupert, R. D. (2021) Epistemic value in the subpersonal vale. Synthese, 198(10), pp. 9243-9272. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-020-02631-1)

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A vexing problem in contemporary epistemology – one with origins in Plato’s Meno – concerns the value of knowledge, and in particular, whether and how the value of knowledge exceeds the value of mere (unknown) true opinion. The recent literature is deeply divided on the matter of how best to address the problem. One point, however, remains unquestioned: that if a solution is to be found, it will be at the personal level, the level at which states of subjects or agents, as such, appear. We take exception to this orthodoxy, or at least to its unquestioned status. We argue that subpersonal states play a significant – arguably, primary – role in much epistemically relevant cognition and thus constitute a domain in which we might reasonably expect to locate the “missing source” of epistemic value, beyond the value attached to mere true belief.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Carter, Dr J Adam
Authors: Carter, J. A., and Rupert, R. D.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Synthese
ISSN (Online):1573-0964
Published Online:02 April 2020
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2020 The Authors
First Published:First published in Synthese 198(10): 9243-9272
Publisher Policy:Reproduced under a Creative Commons licence

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