Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation

Korpela, V. and Lombardi, M. (2020) Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation. Games and Economic Behavior, 121, pp. 108-116. (doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.02.006)

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Abstract

We study the relationship between the two-agent implementation problem and the concept of interim efficiency of Holmström and Myerson (1983) in Bayesian environments with private values and independent types. We present a general property, called closure under interim utility equivalence, and show it is sufficient for the implementation of social choice functions. This condition, when combined with another property, called interim inseparability, is also sufficient for the implementation of essentially single-valued social choice sets. The characterization results are then examined in a variety of environments.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Lombardi, Dr Michele
Authors: Korpela, V., and Lombardi, M.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Games and Economic Behavior
Publisher:Elsevier
ISSN:0899-8256
ISSN (Online):1090-2473
Published Online:21 February 2020

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