Richard Rorty and epistemic normativity

Kerr, E. T. and Carter, J. A. (2016) Richard Rorty and epistemic normativity. Social Epistemology, 30(1), pp. 3-24. (doi: 10.1080/02691728.2014.971914)

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The topic of epistemic normativity has come to the fore of recent work in epistemol- ogy, and so naturally, theories of knowledge, truth and justification have been increas- ingly held accountable to preserving normative epistemological platitudes. Central to discussions of epistemic normativity are questions about epistemic agency and episte- mic value. Here, our aim is to take up some of these issues as they come to bear on the rather unconventional brand of epistemology that was defended by Richard Rorty. Our purpose is to explore whether Rorty’s epistemology—or perhaps his replacement for epistemology—can preserve these normative platitudes about epistemic agency, responsibility, achievement, and the value of knowledge. Our conclusion is a negative one: that Rorty’s commitments leave him firmly at odds with some of the most plausi- ble assumptions about epistemic agency and epistemic value.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Carter, Dr J Adam
Authors: Kerr, E. T., and Carter, J. A.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Social Epistemology
Publisher:Taylor and Francis
ISSN (Online):1464-5297
Published Online:19 February 2015

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