Kvanvig on pointless truths and the cognitive ideal

Carter, J. A. (2011) Kvanvig on pointless truths and the cognitive ideal. Acta Analytica, 26(3), pp. 285-293. (doi: 10.1007/s12136-010-0114-9)

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Jonathan Kvanvig has recently attempted to reconcile the problem of (apparently) pointless truths with the claim that the value of truth is unrestricted— that truth is always and everywhere valuable. In this paper, I critically evaluate Kvanvig’s argument and show it to be defective at a crucial juncture. I propose my own alternative strategy for generating Kvanvig’s result—an alternative that parts ways with Kvanvig’s own conception of the cognitively ideal.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Carter, Dr J Adam
Authors: Carter, J. A.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Acta Analytica
ISSN (Online):1874-6349
Published Online:13 January 2011

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