On the value of participation

Grimalda, G., Kar, A. and Proto, E. (2008) On the value of participation. International Review of Economics, 55(1-2), pp. 127-147. (doi: 10.1007/s12232-007-0036-z)

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We report results from two different settings of a three-player ultimatum game. Under the “Monocratic” rule, a player is randomly selected to make an offer to two receivers. Under the “Democratic” rule, all three players make a proposal, and one proposal is then randomly selected. A majority vote is required to implement the proposal in either setting. Although the two rules are strategically equivalent, different patterns of behaviour emerge as the number of interactions increase. Under the “Monocratic” rule, proposers seem to be entitled to claim a larger share of the pie, and receivers are more likely to accept, than in the “Democratic” rule. We speculate that institutions allowing more participation in the process of collective choice lead to a more socially responsible behaviour in individuals.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Proto, Professor Eugenio
Authors: Grimalda, G., Kar, A., and Proto, E.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:International Review of Economics
ISSN (Online):1863-4613
Published Online:11 January 2008

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