Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization

Lombardi, M. and Yoshihara, N. (2020) Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization. Economic Theory, 70, pp. 871-904. (doi: 10.1007/s00199-019-01233-4)

Abstract

A partially-honest individual is a person who follows the maxim, “Do not lie if you do not have to”, to serve your material interest. By assuming that the mechanism designer knows that there is at least one partially-honest individual in a society of n≥3 individuals, a social choice rule that can be Nash implemented is termed partially-honestly Nash implementable. The paper offers a complete characterization of the (unanimous) social choice rules that are partially-honestly Nash implementable. When all individuals are partially-honest, then any (unanimous) rule is partially-honestly Nash implementable. An account of the welfare implications of partially-honest Nash implementation is provided in a variety of environments.

• Item Type: Articles
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Lombardi, Dr Michele
• Authors: Lombardi, M., and Yoshihara, N.
• College/School: College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
• Journal Name: Economic Theory
• Publisher: Springer
• ISSN: 0938-2259
• ISSN (Online): 1432-0479
• Published Online: 29 October 2019
• Copyright Holders: Copyright © 2019 The Authors
• First Published: First published online in Economic Theory 70:871-904
• Publisher Policy: Reproduced under a Creative Commons License