Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization

Lombardi, M. and Yoshihara, N. (2019) Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization. Economic Theory, (doi: 10.1007/s00199-019-01233-4) (Early Online Publication)

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Abstract

A partially-honest individual is a person who follows the maxim, “Do not lie if you do not have to”, to serve your material interest. By assuming that the mechanism designer knows that there is at least one partially-honest individual in a society of n≥3 individuals, a social choice rule that can be Nash implemented is termed partially-honestly Nash implementable. The paper offers a complete characterization of the (unanimous) social choice rules that are partially-honestly Nash implementable. When all individuals are partially-honest, then any (unanimous) rule is partially-honestly Nash implementable. An account of the welfare implications of partially-honest Nash implementation is provided in a variety of environments.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Early Online Publication
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Lombardi, Dr Michele
Authors: Lombardi, M., and Yoshihara, N.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Economic Theory
Publisher:Springer
ISSN:0938-2259
ISSN (Online):1432-0479
Published Online:29 October 2019
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2019 The Authors
First Published:First published online in Economic Theory 29 Oct 2019
Publisher Policy:Reproduced under a Creative Commons License

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